Nuclear Weapons
The Gap Between Washington’s Optimism and Tehran’s Rhetoric Suggests the Two Sides Are Not Negotiating with the Same Assumptions
China Has Never Been a Disinterested Party in Iranian Nuclear Diplomacy
Iran Is Perhaps Willing to Make Some Limited Concessions on Enrichment
Military Pressure, Economic Contraction, and Industrial Disruption May Push Iran Toward Significant Concessions
Faces Pressures from the Naval Blockade, Which Affects Its Imports of Essential Goods and Export of Oil
The Axis Exploits Divisions Among Western Allies, Tests Nonproliferation Norms, and Enjoys Quiet Tolerance from China and Russia
The Delegation Itself Has Become a Visible Expression of Internal Fragmentation
Vatican Maintains Formal Ties with Top Iranian University Despite Theocratic Regime’s Massacre of Thousands
The Administration’s Proposed Agreement Would Curtail Tehran’s Ability to Develop a Nuclear Weapon, But Would Not Touch the Real Drivers of Iran’s Power
Some Iranian Observers Interpret the Proposal as an Attempt by the Reformist Camp to Reassert Its Political Relevance
The Demonstration of U.S. and Israeli Military Superiority Has Not Yet Produced a Positive, Victorious Outcome from the Israeli and American Point of View
Even If Tehran and Washington Were to Reach a New Nuclear Agreement, Such Participation Would Remain Unrealistic
Oman, like Qatar, Has a Strong Interest in the Islamic Republic’s Continued Survival, Serving as a Trade and Financial Conduit
Israel Has Woken up to the Threat a Turkish Nuclear Weapons Program Would Pose; India Should Do So as Well
Religious Labeling Does Not Change Destructive Capacity, but It Changes Perceived Authority
Iran Faces the Largest U.S. Naval and Air Deployment in the Region Since the 2003 Iraq War