MEF Executive Director Gregg Roman joins host Dan Feferman to argue the recent U.S.–Israel war with Iran is part of a 25-year continuum of American strategy, not a standalone conflict. He assesses that Iran’s nuclear program was delayed but not eliminated and its missile capabilities were significantly degraded. Despite major losses, the regime survived due to its decentralized structure and long-term planning. Roman says Iran entered a ceasefire under pressure and is now focused on outlasting the current U.S. administration. The result is a weakened but intact regime entering a new phase of strategic competition.
FEFERMAN: Hi everyone, welcome to Middle East 24’s Breakdown. I’m Dan Feferman, here with my co-host. Today we’re unpacking what may be the most significant military confrontation to date between the U.S. and Israel on one side and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the other. We’re looking at this 12-day window following the escalation. Is it over? Who’s winning? Is this just one chapter in a broader war? What comes next? We’re joined by Gregg Roman, Executive Director of the Middle East Forum. Gregg, welcome.
ROMAN: Thanks for having me.
FEFERMAN: Over the last several weeks, we’ve seen what appears to be the largest escalation to date between the U.S. and Israel on one side and Iran on the other. Israel targeted nuclear and missile infrastructure, and the U.S. joined with strikes on key facilities. We’re now in a temporary ceasefire. It’s hard to follow in real time, with conflicting statements and competing narratives. So let me start here: what were the war aims, and were they achieved?
ROMAN: You can’t look at this as just a 39-day war. This is the continuation of 25 years of American foreign policy across multiple administrations. It started with clandestine operations, shifted to cyber efforts, then diplomacy, then kinetic action again, and now back to direct military engagement. This is not a binary conflict—it’s part of a broader global confrontation. The first goal was to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. That was not accomplished. It was delayed by eight to ten years, but the infrastructure still exists. The second goal was degrading Iran’s ballistic missile capability. That was reduced by about 60 to 70 percent, but not eliminated. Then you have Iran’s proxies. They’ve been hit, but they’re still active. So by no measure are all war aims accomplished. This was a success—but it’s not done yet.
FEFERMAN: There’s been debate about whether regime change was ever a real objective. Were the aims realistic?
ROMAN: You have to look at what was achievable through air power. Regime change is something Israel would prefer, but it doesn’t have the capacity to drive internal political change in Iran. From the U.S. perspective, the goal has consistently been to weaken Iran, and that has been achieved militarily. Now we’re entering the policy phase—diplomacy, deterrence, and what comes next.
FEFERMAN: Where do U.S. and Israeli goals overlap, and where do they differ?
ROMAN: I think they’re largely in lockstep if Iran is defanged. Israel would like regime change, but after this war, it understands it can’t force that outcome directly. If anything, Israel has moved closer to the American position. Iran has long been the central focus of U.S. foreign policy—through sanctions, pressure, and military action—so the idea that the U.S. was pulled into this doesn’t hold.
FEFERMAN: Some argue Iran forced the ceasefire, especially through pressure on the Strait of Hormuz. Do you agree?
ROMAN: No. Iran went to the table because it feared regime collapse. The threat of overwhelming force was credible, and the next step would have been escalation beyond air strikes. Iran blinked. They’re trying to frame it as leverage, but they said they wouldn’t agree to a ceasefire, and they did.
FEFERMAN: But isn’t their strategy always to buy time—make concessions now and reverse them later?
ROMAN: Exactly. If I’m Iranian leadership, my goal is to survive the next two years. I make temporary concessions, seek sanctions relief, and wait for a different administration. That’s been their playbook. The question is whether they can execute it this time given the damage they’ve taken.
FEFERMAN: Some analysts say the remaining leadership is more hardline and less pragmatic. Does that change anything?
ROMAN: Not really. The regime’s survival strategy has been in place for years. Since 2009, the IRGC has decentralized command across the country. That’s why the system didn’t collapse after leadership strikes. They have a deep bench. Removing leadership doesn’t eliminate the structure.
FEFERMAN: So was the decapitation strategy ineffective?
ROMAN: No. It sends a message. The next generation of leadership understands the cost of escalation. They’ve seen what happens. That creates deterrence. It doesn’t stop the regime entirely, but it changes how they act.
FEFERMAN: Who’s actually in charge right now? There’s a lot of uncertainty.
ROMAN: On the civilian side, you have the president, the foreign minister, and the speaker. But the real authority lies with the Supreme National Security Council, which is effectively controlled by the IRGC. They’re pulling the strings. Even if top leadership is removed, the system continues.
FEFERMAN: There’s speculation about internal fractures—about who survived versus who didn’t. Does that tell us anything?
ROMAN: Not really. Targeting decisions are based on operational priorities, not hidden allegiances. What matters is that the regime still has a functioning command structure.
FEFERMAN: There are also reports that Gulf states want to “finish the job.” How do you see their role?
ROMAN: Gulf states understand how to pressure Iran indirectly—economically and politically. They’re less likely to engage in direct military action, but there’s potential for greater alignment. That could shape the next phase more than kinetic operations.
FEFERMAN: Final question—does this ceasefire hold?
ROMAN: It depends. If Iran continues its strategy of delay, we’ll see another round of conflict. If deterrence holds, we may get a longer pause. But this is not the end—it’s a transition point.
FEFERMAN: Gregg Roman, thanks for joining us.
ROMAN: Thank you.
