U.S. forces have left Iraq completely for the first time in 15 years. When President Barack Obama withdrew troops, the Islamic State ultimately filled the vacuum. Today, President Donald Trump repeats history, failing to recognize that seldom do the forces of altruism fill the vacuum.
In the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, two main external powers will compete for influence: Turkey, which is closer to Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, and Iran, which has tighter ties to Bafel and Qubad Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
The Iranian leadership has sought to bypass Trump’s blockade by shifting trade from sea to land, with Iran’s northern neighbors Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan happy to oblige.
Trump’s decision to withdraw from Iraq while the war in Iran continues reduces U.S. leverage at a critical time. The Iranian leadership has sought to bypass Trump’s blockade by shifting trade from sea to land, with Iran’s northern neighbors Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan happy to oblige. U.S. presence did not eliminate smuggling, but it did maintain balance. Today, that balance is gone.
Absent boots on the ground, U.S. influence declines but Trump still has tools at his disposal. For years, U.S. intelligence officials have mapped out Iranian shadow businesses. Now Trump, U.S. intelligence, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. forces operating over the horizon should act against the network.
Among the largest conglomerates in Iraqi Kurdistan, if not Iraq itself, is the Nokan Group. Composed of 38 companies and their subsidiaries, it operates in everything from oil to construction to telecommunications to tourism, and monopolizes trade within both the Sulaymani and Halabja provinces. While political monopolies are corrosive, there is growing concern in Washington that Nokan’s success relies on its relations to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Ramazan Headquarters, the Qods Force entity responsible for Iraq.
Some Iraqis allege that the Iranian company Nikan Holding, which works in many industrial fields in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has a branch in Sulaymani, maintains strong commercial and coordination ties with Nokan.
There are large storage facilities near the Bashmakh Border Crossing between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan portion of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and Iran, through which construction companies working on Aram City and other projects store goods for cross-border trade. Polay Bahez, called Folad Bahez in Kurdistan, is a close affiliate with the U.S.-sanctioned Mobarakeh Steel. The Anzu Foundation both imports fuel from and exports it to Iran, and trades in cement, iron, and construction. Natron helps with fuel transport across the border. The South Kurdistan Group of Companies also reportedly deals in transporting and selling gas products from the Khor Mor field and increasingly is coming under focus for potential sanctions despite the direct investment of members of the Talabani family.
Among Iraqis, one of the biggest complaints, regardless of sect or ethnicity, is about Iran’s dumping of cheap manufactured and agricultural goods into the Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish markets, undercutting local industry. Many Kurds point to the role of Pegah, the largest dairy producer and food services company in Iran, which maintains a branch in Sulaymani.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has diversified its assets or, short of such formality, has companies upon which it can rely operationally or to avoid sanctions.
More blatantly, Homa Air—an alias of Iran Air and a sanctioned Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps company—maintains an office in Sulaymani as well, ostensibly for both the airline and as a travel service. The Talabani-led government also reportedly contracts with an Iranian company called Koushesh that imports explosives.
While Washington long has focused publicly on groups in Baghdad, like the Popular Mobilization Forces’ front Al-Muhandis Group, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has diversified its assets or, short of such formality, has companies upon which it can rely operationally or to avoid sanctions. In Baghdad, this apparently involves groups like ScopeSky, efforts by some U.S. consultants to whitewash them notwithstanding.
But the battle for influence and infiltration does not limit itself to non-Kurdish areas of Iraq. For too long, Iraqi Kurdistan has received a free pass. With U.S. forces no longer dependent on the niceties of Kurdish agreements to host, the U.S. Treasury Department and Central Intelligence Agency should recognize and hold accountable those companies that advance the Iranian regime’s mission, as well as the Kurdish investors who profit from and protect them.
