Somalia has quickly become Turkey’s second most important colony after occupied northern Cyprus. Turkey controls Mogadishu’s international airport and runs its seaport. Turkey’s Ziraat Katılım Bank became the first foreign bank to operate in Somalia in a half century. OYAK, Turkey’s military pension fund, set up a company to monopolize fishing licenses in Somali waters. On March 7, 2024, the Somali government and Turkey’s state oil company signed a production-sharing agreement for three offshore blocks. The Oruç Reis conducted seismic surveys and, in April 2026, the Çağrı Bey began sinking its first deep-sea well. Whether from fishing, oil, or other resources, Turkey reportedly gets 30 percent of revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone, though the text is not public.
Turkey also treats Somalia as a base for its ambitions to expand its colonial reach elsewhere into Africa.
On shore, the Turks forced through Mogadishu a 6,200-square-mile deal covering three blocks. Leaked terms suggest Turkey receives 90 percent of production for a deal that bypassed Somalia’s parliament. Simply put, Turkey now exploits Somalia akin to how the French and Belgians treated their colonial territories. Perhaps this is why Somalia now hosts Turkey’s largest embassy, which, at 860,000 square feet, is slightly larger than Buckingham Palace.
Turkey also treats Somalia as a base for its ambitions to expand its colonial reach elsewhere into Africa. Camp TURKSOM, a $50 million training base, is now Turkey’s largest overseas base. Turkey is also building a “spaceport,” which could double as a missile range. Increasingly, Turkey arms Somali militias—or uses its own forces directly—on behalf of the Somali government. Already, Turkey has deployed TB2 and Akıncı drones, ATAK helicopters, F-16s, M48/M60 tanks, and up to 2,500 troops.
It is essential to understand the lack of legitimacy to Turkey’s presence. Unlike Somaliland, Somalia has consistently failed to hold one-man, one-vote elections. Instead, the international community selects a few hundred community and clan leaders who, in turn, select a president. Such a system is vulnerable to corruption since it is easy for outside powers to buy votes on behalf of clients like incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. In Mogadishu today, the corruption is even worse. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s constitutional mandate expired on May 15, 2026; the Somali Supreme Court confirmed the date. Yet Turkey continues to prop him up and to isolate or disqualify any parliamentarians who ask difficult questions or refuse to use their positions as a rubber stamp.
Essentially, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and intelligence chief-turned-Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan repeat their Libya strategy, propping up an incompetent, corrupt, and unpopular politician whose political viability rests solely on their patronage. In exchange, that prime minister or president throws sovereignty aside and does whatever his Turkish handlers demand. Turkish officials figure that the passage of time launders the illegality or, in Somalia’s case, the unconstitutionality of their actions.
Unfortunately, Greek passivity too often allows Turkey to play out its strategy unchallenged. European hand-wringing on recognition and investment was no match for Turkish engagement, leading eastern Libyan authorities to endorse the illegal Libya-Turkey maritime deal.
Somalia may not be a primary Greek interest—though, arguably, any littoral state capable of disrupting Greek shipping should be—but a little Greek investment could stymie Turkish ambitions, overextend its military, and drive up the cost to its colonialism.
Turkey’s Achilles’ heel is that Somalia operates under a federal system that constitutionally promotes its member states’ rights. Puntland, Jubaland, the South West State, and others each have the right to govern themselves at a local level with minimal input from Mogadishu. First Puntland and now the South West State have rejected both Mogadishu’s overreach and Turkey’s backing for it.
Turkey’s Achilles’ heel is that Somalia operates under a federal system that constitutionally promotes its member states’ rights.
With Turkey apparently deploying F-16s to attack the South West State and perhaps even poised to insert its own Somali-trained battalions and advisors, Greece should come to the assistance of rightful South West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen. This need not mean any Greek troops, but Greece should provide Laftagareen with enough weaponry to bog down Turkey and raise the costs of its intervention. Nor would Greece need to do this alone. Athens and Nairobi have worked together well before and should renew their operational ties. Greece might also work directly with Puntland and Somaliland to provide support for their respective coast guards so that they might defend their territorial waters, regardless of the ambitions of Ankara and Mogadishu.
Turkey counts on inactivity from its competitors and rivals and, for several decades, Erdoğan has been able to amplify his influence simply because he understood there would be no pushback. He could bully and bribe on the cheap. The same dynamic works for Greece. A small investment in Puntland or Somalia’s South West State could grind Turkey’s Somalia project to a halt.