Why the Concept of the Kafir Is the Root of Terror

Extremists Turn Religious Classification Into a Justification for Exclusion, Persecution, and Murder

File photo of a Muslim militant in Syria.

Extremist Muslims can use education to normalize exclusion and violence.

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The West has spent decades fighting terrorism with weapons, sanctions, intelligence operations, and border controls. These measures can disrupt terrorist networks, but they cannot defeat the ideas that make violence appear legitimate. To confront jihadist extremism, policymakers must examine how extremist movements weaponize the concept of kafir.

The Arabic word kafir refers to someone who rejects or disbelieves in Islam. Classical Islamic jurisprudence developed legal distinctions concerning non-Muslims, including dhimmi, a non-Muslim living under a historically defined protection arrangement, and ḥarbi, a person or party associated with a state of war. These categories did not make every non-Muslim an enemy. Nevertheless, classical jurisprudence also contained unequal rules that deserve critical examination.

The practice of takfīr—declaring another person or group to be unbelievers—has played a central role in the ideology of the Islamic State.

Extremists erase these distinctions and turn religious classification into a justification for exclusion, persecution, and murder. The practice of takfīr—declaring another person or group to be unbelievers—has played a central role in the ideology of the Islamic State. Its leaders have used it against non-Muslims and Muslims who reject their authority.

Beyond explicit theology, legal classifications of a person as kafir carry practical social consequences. In Twelver Shi’a jurisprudence, traditional texts discuss the ritual impurity (najasah) of non-Muslims, where physical contact involving moisture can theoretically transfer impurity and affect daily interactions such as sharing food. However, legal opinions vary: While some authorities treated all non-Muslims as impure, contemporary figures like Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani deem Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians ritually pure while maintaining distinct rulings for other groups.

Sunni jurisprudence generally approached this differently, avoiding the same pervasive rules of transferable impurity. Although ritual impurity does not inherently command violence, when paired with claims of religious superiority and exclusionary interpretations, it reinforces social distance and the perception that outsiders occupy an inferior status. A jurisprudence committed to human dignity must critically evaluate these foundational assumptions.

I write from experience, not distant observation. I spent nearly four decades studying Islamic jurisprudence and theology in the seminary tradition. I served as a mujtahid and worked as a judge. I understand the legal categories and debates from within. I also recognize the diversity of Muslim scholarship and do not claim that every school or religious teacher promotes extremism.

But it is essential to examine what children learn. Research into Islamic State textbooks demonstrates how terrorist organizations can turn education into ideological indoctrination. Studies have found that the Islamic State used subjects including language, mathematics, history, and science to advance its political and religious agenda. This does not prove that ordinary Muslim seminaries teach the same doctrines. It does show how extremists can use education to normalize exclusion and violence.

Terrorism does not arise from one word, text, or classroom. Political conflict, authoritarianism, propaganda, social networks, and recruitment also contribute to radicalization. Security agencies must address these factors while examining the religious arguments that terrorist organizations use to legitimize violence.

The December 2025 attack at Bondi Beach, Australia, which killed 15 victims and injured 42 people during a Hanukkah celebration, illustrates the continuing danger of antisemitic violence. It does not establish a connection to any particular Islamic curriculum, but it reinforces the need to challenge ideologies that deny the equal dignity and safety of religious communities.

Western governments and universities should support independent Muslim scholars through research funding, translation, curriculum development, and educational programs.

The Quran (Verse 60:8) calls for kindness and justice toward those who do not fight Muslims because of their religion or expel them from their homes. These principles should inform contemporary Islamic jurisprudence.

Reform of Islamic legal education is necessary. Muslim scholars should reassess disputed and probabilistic reports, examine the historical context of inherited rulings, and distinguish theological disagreement from legal hostility. They should evaluate interpretations through reason, ethics, public welfare, and international human-rights principles. This is not a rejection of Islamic scholarship; it is a call to practice ijtihad responsibly.

Western governments and universities should support independent Muslim scholars through research funding, translation, curriculum development, and educational programs. They should engage a wider range of Islamic intellectual traditions rather than treating a few politically organized movements as representatives of all Muslims.

The struggle against terrorism requires more than defeating armed groups. It requires challenging ideas that allow people to regard their neighbors as legitimate targets. That struggle must also take place in the classroom.

Meir Samani is the pseudonym of an Iranian-trained Islamic jurisprudence scholar and former judge whose research examines Islamic legal interpretation, religious authority, human rights, and the reform of contemporary Islamic jurisprudence.
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