On November 1, 2026, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) ceased operations after the U.N. Security Council failed to extend its mandate. Secretary-General António Guterres stated that he wished “to recognize the central role MINURSO has played since its establishment in 1991 in helping to monitor the ceasefire and creating conditions conducive to the pursuit of a political solution.”
Guterres is disingenuous. MINURSO’s chief mission was to hold a referendum to determine what status the Sahrawi from the former Spanish Sahara sought. Over the past 35 years, MINURSO cost $1.76 billion, but failed to even prepare for what should have been a simple vote. Granted, Algeria—which used the Polisario Front as a bludgeon against Morocco—sought to muddy the referendum pool with those who had never lived in the Western Sahara and, indeed, many who were not Sahrawi.
The Algerian military ... inflated numbers of Sahrawi refugees in its Tindouf camps and then embezzled aid sent into the camps for its own profit.
In 1999, Spain counted just over 70,000 residents in its former colonial outpost. That means that if MINURSO had simply distributed its administrative costs proportionately, each Sahrawi would have over $50,000, more than five times the region’s annual per capita income. Parties who stood to profit off the crisis regularly inflated numbers. The Algerian military, for example, inflated numbers of Sahrawi refugees in its Tindouf camps and then embezzled aid sent into the camps for its own profit.
That MINURSO did anything to further a political solution is nonsense. On multiple trips to the Western Sahara, the most obvious places to find MINURSO members were bars and restaurants, living above their living standards in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nigeria. Indeed, MINURSO and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) both failed refugees badly. MINURSO deferred representation of the Sahrawi to the Polisario Front, a throwback Cold War proxy group that declared itself the leadership of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.
The Polisario was autocratic and ran its camps with an iron fist. Algeria is hardly free, but moving from Algeria into the Polisario camps was akin to crossing the border from China into North Korea. The UNHCR did not run the camp, but it ran flights from Tindouf to Laayoune as part of its Confidence Building Measures (CBM) program. Unfortunately, the UNHCR allowed the Polisario to enforce a family separation policy. Worried about defections to Morocco, the Polisario forced those using the flight to meet long lost family to leave spouses, children, or parents behind as hostages.
Moroccan stewardship of the Western Sahara is benign and its commitment to local autonomy gives the Sahrawi political and cultural freedom.
Just as Cold War-era defections almost exclusively went one way, from the East Bloc into the West, so too have Sahrawi escapes moved almost entirely in one direction: from Algeria to Morocco. The reason for this is simple: Moroccan stewardship of the Western Sahara is benign and its commitment to local autonomy gives the Sahrawi political and cultural freedom. The Moroccan government spends more on schools and social services per capita in the Sahara region than anywhere else in the Kingdom.
The question now is how to dismantle the Tindouf refugee camps. Algeria wants them desperately to remain, for the same political reasons that Palestinian militants demand that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) continues its operations 75 years after its own leaders recommended ending its mission.
This leaves the Sahrawi refugees in a lurch. While the UNHCR assumes 173,600 refugees—likely an inflated number, due more to Polisario and Algerian military exaggerations than any real count—the question is whether the Tindouf camp residents are more refugees or hostages and, as such, the degree to which continued financing merely bolsters and rewards the Polisario hostage-takers. Here, there are distinct parallels to how Hamas used the UNRWA to treat refugees as hostages for political aims.
The UNHCR is not the UNRWA, though. It has a track record, especially under the stewardship of former Iraqi President Barham Salih, of being far more frugal and true to its mission. It is well on its way to its goal of cutting refugee roles 50 percent by 2035. Unlike the UNRWA, the UNHCR does not posture politically or play diplomatic games. Its estimates of transitional figures needed to shut down the camps also makes sense: It seeks roughly a million dollars to continue and then scale down education, sanitation support, nutrition, protection, and health. A smooth transition ensures that local capacity is not lost in a mad scramble to move elsewhere.
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The UNHCR does the right thing to plan a transparent transition. While the Trump administration remains dubious of U.N. agencies, ending MINURSO and the Sahrawi camps is a clear example of where U.S. government cooperation and modest investment can offset instability or the need to scramble emergency resources at a far greater level in just a few months. At the same time, for President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio to help the U.N. close unnecessary or ineffective missions furthers the goal to trim U.N. operations and redirect budgets to where they are most necessary. On the other hand, failure to invest in the UNHCR’s transitions could cause more demands and reduce funding available for more acute and sudden refugee crises as they occur.
Even more important, however, would be that demonstrating a smooth, coordinated end to MINURSO could set a precedent for the closure of the UNRWA which, like MINURSO, has done more to harm refugees and keep conflict alive than help and resolve. While Trump has created a Peace Board for Gaza, anti-Trump sentiment likely means its collapse after Trump’s term ends. Dislike of Trump, however, does not launder the UNRWA’s internal corruption, the moral hazard it represents, or its failure to reform.
Should the Trump administration fund the UNHCR’s termination plan for the Sahrawi camps, the United States might be able to make a more persuasive case internationally that dismantling the UNRWA without hurting true refugees is possible, and even position the UNHCR to absorb the Palestinian case as the United Nations streamlines and reforms.