Massad Boulos, President Donald Trump’s Africa envoy, began a review of U.S. Eritrea policy in April 2026. Three months later, Boulos met with Eritrea’s foreign minister in Cairo to discuss a new U.S.-Eritrea relationship. Rumors persist that they signed a secret deal to lift sanctions and restore normal ties.
There is no debate over whether Washington should maintain diplomatic relations with Asmara, nor whether Eritrea’s geographical position along the Red Sea gives it strategic significance. Both propositions are self-evident. However, the effectiveness of American policy on Eritrea depends, in part, on how well Washington understands the political actors, institutional dynamics, and regional relationships that are most consequential to its long-term interests.
The corridor linking the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden is critical to international commerce, energy flow, freedom of navigation, and military access.
The American interest in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa is strategic, rooted in its importance to national security, global trade, and geopolitical influence. The corridor linking the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden is critical to international commerce, energy flow, freedom of navigation, and military access, making the security, political alignment, and institutional credibility of the states surrounding it an enduring strategic concern for the United States.
That said, Eritrea’s strategic location on the Red Sea makes sustained American engagement necessary but does not make the Isaias Afwerki regime a reliable strategic partner. Successive American administrations have explored the possibility of drawing Asmara into a more constructive relationship with the West, seemingly on the assumption that its geopolitical importance would encourage greater strategic predictability. This approach, however, overlooks the extent to which Isaias’s conception of regional influence is rooted in political antagonism and an exaggerated assessment of Eritrea’s capacity to shape the regional and international order. The record shows his ambition is larger than the material, demographic, and economic capabilities of the state he governs.
Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in October 2026.
Photo: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons
His political orientation has exhibited a pronounced tendency to combine geopolitical opportunism and radical rhetoric against regional and international arrangements within which the West exercises its influence. This is not simply a matter of ideological differences or occasional disagreements with Washington. Rather, there is a broader pattern in which the Eritrean regime has sought to position itself as an “independent counterweight” to Western influence. Such conduct extends beyond the pursuit of an inflated and strategically unpragmatic conception of an “autonomous” foreign policy; it challenges the principles and institutional frameworks underpinning the rules-based international order.
Eritrea’s involvement in Somalia’s arming and training of al-Shabaab terrorists provides an illustration. United Nations Security Council sanctions, established in 2009, targeted Eritrea’s continued involvement in supporting, hosting, and facilitating the activities of armed movements, including al-Shabaab. The 2012 (and subsequent) Monitoring Group report documented Eritrea’s hosting and training of Ethiopian armed opposition groups and their deployment in Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan. Given Ethiopia’s strategic importance as a regional security partner and its contributions to counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and regional stabilization, Eritrea’s repeated actions to undermine Ethiopia’s security have direct implications for U.S. national security interests in East Africa.
The United States would benefit from assessing the Eritrean regime’s commitment to predictability, collective security, and rules-based interstate relations.
The list of other destabilizing Eritrean actions is long: Eritrea launched a military incursion into Djibouti in 2008, which prompted international condemnation and U.N. Security Council intervention. It subsequently intervened in Sudan’s political and military affairs, aligning itself with the U.S.-sanctioned, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Sudanese Armed Forces. Eritrea has also embraced Iran in its Yemen intervention and appears to support the Houthis. The common thread here is instigating and attempting to profit from regional instability, political fragmentation, and selective sponsorship of armed movements. For Washington, the concern is that such conduct risks expanding the influence of America’s adversaries with increasing presence in the region, and undermining the security, diplomatic, and institutional frameworks essential to stability in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Horn of Africa.
The United States would benefit from assessing the Eritrean regime’s commitment to predictability, collective security, and rules-based interstate relations—the principles underpinning the international order Washington seeks to preserve—before pursuing a premature diplomatic rehabilitation of Asmara, based on superficial aspects of geography and wishful thinking about the ability and willingness of its 35-year dictatorship to change. U.S. policy also risks becoming hostage to the shifting political calculations and personal preferences of an individual leader if it does not anchor itself in durable institutional relationships, which remain absent within Eritrea’s authoritarian political order.