QAMISHLI, SYRIA—The Kurdish political movement in Syria today appears to be centered on one key issue: Kurdish-language education. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and other smaller Kurdish parties that were part of the governing administration in northeast Syria have made the formal recognition of Kurdish-language education their primary political objective.
The PYD and other groups affiliated with the now-defunct Syrian Democratic Forces have supported student protests and backed various initiatives to pressure Syria’s interim authorities to recognize Kurdish as a language of instruction at all levels of education.
At their peak, Kurdish political actors in Syria championed decentralization as a potential solution to the country’s longstanding governance deficiencies.
This intense focus on a single issue is striking. Until recently, these Kurdish groups controlled nearly one-third of Syria’s territory, before Damascus seized most of the areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces and imposed an agreement on Kurdish leaders. The deal stripped Kurdish forces of nearly all their autonomy, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the civilian institutions that had governed northeast Syria for over a decade.
At their peak, Kurdish political actors in Syria championed decentralization as a potential solution to the country’s longstanding governance deficiencies. During those years, linguistic rights took a back seat, as Kurdish was already recognized by the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria as an official language alongside Arabic and Syriac. Kurdish was the primary language of instruction throughout the education system. For the first time, Kurds established institutions dedicated to their language and publish and broadcast in Kurdish freely.
To describe the shift from demands for decentralization and federalism to calls for Kurdish-language education as a political downgrade would be an understatement. However, the fact that an entire generation of Kurds grew up receiving their education primarily in Kurdish could explain why Kurdish-language education has become a central political objective for Kurdish parties at this stage in their struggle for recognition.
Historically, particularly under the Baathist rule, Kurds were denied the right to learn and teach their language. Linguistic rights, therefore, were a central component of political activism within the Kurdish movement. The Syrian conflict transformed that reality, allowing the Kurds for the first time in the country’s history to govern their regions in a de facto capacity. It is this reality, despite the changes that have unfolded in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, that should shape how Kurds pursue their cultural and political rights.
Syrian Kurdish groups should renew and strengthen their demands for decentralization, which would provide a framework for guaranteeing linguistic rights. Such a broader political agenda would strengthen their case for cultural and political recognition, rather than limiting their demands to a single issue.
Since the January 2026 agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Damascus, and particularly following the Syrian Democratic Forces’ dissolution in August 2026, organized political opposition in the Kurdish region—which has historically served as a hub of dissent against successive regimes in Damasus—has effectively disappeared.
Kurdish political parties and groups across the political spectrum no longer appear to feel the need to oppose the new Syrian regime, particularly as Damascus has allowed limited space for Kurdish identity to be expressed in the public sphere. Yet this may be precisely what Damascus seeks to achieve: pacifying the Kurds through symbolic and limited concessions to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish opposition movement that could inspire other minority communities, particularly the Alawites and Druze, which at times have looked to the Kurds as potential leaders of democratic change in Syria.
Al-Sharaa does not appear to regard the Kurds, or other political actors, as genuine partners in governing Syria.
There is a perception among the Kurdish political elite that they can serve as partners in building the new Syrian state and that openly opposing interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rule could undermine efforts to secure Kurdish rights. This, however, misreads the political reality. Al-Sharaa does not appear to regard the Kurds, or other political actors, as genuine partners in governing Syria. His agreement with Kurdish leaders was driven largely by international pressure. This is precisely why Kurdish group must continue to press Damascus, particularly given that major global powers urged the Syrian government not to sideline Kurdish groups following the January 2026 violence.
Syrian Kurds have lost their military power and de facto autonomous authority, but they retain the political agency and organizational capacity that place them in a unique position to remain a voice for democratic change in Syria. Although the prospects for a democratic transition under current circumstances are slim, the Kurdish movement would be better served by betting on a broader democratic future for Syria, rather than settling for limited concessions from Damascus.
