A new form of corruption has emerged in northeast Syria following the collapse of Kurdish autonomy. Although the region is now formally under the control of the central government in Damascus, former officials and networks affiliated with the now-dissolved Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces exploit the new power dynamics for their own benefit.
The transfer of local institutions and administrative personnel to the Syrian state was an accepted part of the so-called integration process, which was intended to bring Kurdish-led institutions under the authority of Damascus.
Former officials and networks affiliated with the now-dissolved Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces exploit the new power dynamics for their own benefit.
The problem, however, goes beyond a routine transition from one authority to another. Certain former officials and affiliated networks now use their connections and influence to operate an informal business network spanning multiple sectors of northeast Syria’s resource-rich economy. In doing so, they exploit the blurred lines of authority created by the ongoing transition to maintain long-term interests and access to resources.
Take the Jazira Oil Company, for example. Founded in 2013, as Kurdish forces consolidated their control over northeast Syria during the civil war, the company went on to become a key economic arm of the Autonomous Administration. Shahoz Hasan, the former co-chair of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the de facto ruling party within the Autonomous Administration, now heads the company.
Hasan led the PYD between 2017 and 2020, a critical period during which the region faced multiple Turkish military offensives, carried out with the support of Syrian proxy forces. He was not particularly charismatic as a political figure and largely played a ceremonial role in the party’s leadership. However, he has long been a loyalist of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the organization from which the PYD emerged.
It is this type of loyalist, including many who are unknown to the public, that the PYD has placed in companies and enterprises across the private sector. These are individuals with powerful political connections who are rewarded with lucrative contracts across various sectors, allowing the party’s networks to retain economic influence even after the dissolution of the institutions they once controlled.
After years of monopolizing oil production across northeast Syria, the company has shifted its focus to securing contracts for fuel distribution and sales in the region, following the transfer of responsibility for the sector to the Syrian Petroleum Company.
As the Qamishli-Nusaybin border crossing with Turkey prepares to reopen, individuals formerly affiliated with the Autonomous Administration are reportedly securing long-term contracts to operate businesses and commercial services at the crossing. This patten extends across virtually every vital sector of northeast Syria’s local economy.
While the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces accumulated substantial financial resources during their more than decade-long rule over northeast Syria, they appear to have further increased their wealth in the months leading up to their dissolution in August 2026 by selling off expensive machinery, equipment, and vehicles as the end of their control over the region became imminent. They then funneled the proceeds from these sales to their associated private sector companies.
From both Damascus’s and the Kurdish leadership’s perspectives, this arrangement, framed as the January 2026 agreement, offers a degree of stability.
The PYD recognizes that it no longer can maintain its political dominance in northeast Syria through military power now that the Syrian Democratic Forces has dissolved. The PYD strategy for preserving political influence, therefore, depends on consolidating its presence in the local economy and embedding its networks in key commercial sectors. The Syrian government appears content with, or at least indifferent to, this arrangement, provided the PYD does not challenge Damascus’s authority on matters of national sovereignty or other key issues reserved for the central government.
In certain sectors, Damascus and the PYD have reached an informal power-sharing arrangement, dividing the economic spoils while the Syrian government allows the Kurdish party to maintain its networks and retain influence over key commercial activities.
From both Damascus’s and the Kurdish leadership’s perspectives, this arrangement, framed as the January 2026 agreement, offers a degree of stability. However, it could backfire as the cost of living continues to rise and economic grievances deepen. Ad-hoc agreements and informal power-sharing arrangements alone cannot sustain stability in northeast Syria; it also requires economic improvements that translate into tangible benefits for the local population.