QAMISHLI, SYRIA—I recently returned to northern Syria for the first time since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024. What I saw was markedly different from what I had witnessed during previous trips to the Kurdish region, which enjoyed de facto autonomy from 2012 until January 2026.
The changes are visible the moment you cross the border from Iraqi Kurdistan. Until August 2026, the Semalka border crossing was controlled by the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, before its armed wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces, announced its dissolution. Established in 2013 as a humanitarian crossing during the Syrian conflict, Semalka was the only border point across the Middle East controlled by Kurdish forces on both sides of the frontier.
The picture becomes more nuanced as you travel west along the Syria-Turkey border, passing through Kurdish cities and towns all the way to Qamishli, the largest city in northeast Syria.
That is no longer the case on the Syrian side. Now officially known as the Semalka International Crossing, it is under the control of the central government in Damascus. Syrian flags have replaced those of the Autonomous Administration, and Kurdish symbols are nowhere to be seen. Official paperwork and stamps from Damascus have taken the place of those once used by the Kurdish authorities. Although these changes signal who is now in charge of northeast Syria, most of the government employees at the crossing are the same people who were on the now-defunct Kurdish administration’s payroll.
The picture becomes more nuanced as you travel west along the Syria-Turkey border, passing through Kurdish cities and towns all the way to Qamishli, the largest city in northeast Syria and one that Syrian Kurds regard as their capital. Qamishli is an exhausted city. Its crowded streets are riddled with potholes, far more than residents would care to see, and air pollution from diesel-powered electricity generators makes the air difficult to breathe. But these longstanding problems do not obscure the political dynamics that have emerged since the January 2026 clashes between Kurdish forces and Syrian government troops. The violence was followed by an agreement that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Autonomous Administration.
Qamishli is now under Syrian government control. Its international airport is expected to reopen before the end of 2026, as is its border crossing with Nusaybin in Turkey. Signs bearing the symbols of the Syrian Arab Republic are visible on government buildings, evoking the Baath-era landscape. The main difference is that most signs are now bilingual, in Arabic and Kurdish.
A similar situation is emerging in Hasaka, the provincial capital of Hasaka governorate. With its significant Arab population, Hasaka is seeing growing tensions between Kurdish and Arab residents. These ethnic tensions will serve as a litmus test for whether the January 2026 agreement can deliver long-term stability in northeast Syria. In Hasaka, the Kurdish governor appointed by Damascus appears to wield little power; his Islamist, Damascus-aligned deputy seems to be the real power behind the scenes. It is figures like the latter, including some ethnic Kurds, who have risen to prominence since the integration process began in northeast Syria.
These differences between large and small cities in northeast Syria illustrate the complexity of the region’s evolving power dynamics.
In smaller cities such as Amuda and Dirbasiyeh, the political and security landscape has remained largely unchanged, aside from administrative changes. Local security forces and traffic police officers wear the same uniforms that they wore under the Autonomous Administration. Most government institutions and public schools retain their old signage. Kurdish flags and portraits of fighters killed during the conflict are displayed along streets and in public spaces.
These differences between large and small cities in northeast Syria illustrate the complexity of the region’s evolving power dynamics. Even as Damascus has succeeded in recentralizing power, inconsistencies in local governance in northeast Syria underscore the challenges of extending central government authority uniformly across a region that was ruled semi-autonomously for over a decade.
Beyond the confusion over who governs what and whether key decisions are made in Damascus or Qamishli, Syrian Kurds recognize that any understanding reached between Kurdish leaders and Damascus is a temporary arrangement that does little to address their longstanding demands. Everyone you speak with here emphasizes that, in a country governed by Islamists, constitutional guarantees may be the only way to safeguard Kurdish rights in the long term.
