Will Washington Hold Iraqi Kurdistan Together—Again?

Many Kurds Believe Washington Lacks the Will to Intervene in the Rivalry Between Iraqi Kurdistan’s Two Dominant Parties

The Iraqi Kurdistan Region parliament buildings in Erbil, Iraq.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Region parliament buildings in Erbil, Iraq.

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The United States may have been the only force holding Iraqi Kurdistan together. For decades, U.S. political, financial, and military support was instrumental in keeping the autonomous region functioning and maintaining a degree of stability. Now that Washington’s support has been reduced largely to diplomatic engagement and limited political backing after the U.S.-led mission against the Islamic State ended, Iraqi Kurdistan appears vulnerable to fragmentation.

More than two years after holding parliamentary elections, which themselves had been postponed several times, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) failed to form a new government. The breaking point came this month, when the KDP convened the regional parliament’s first session in nearly two years without the participation of PUK lawmakers. To secure the 51-member quorum required to hold the session, the KDP persuaded several lawmakers from its rival party, who attended as independents, as well as members of other opposition groups.

Many Kurds and their supporters believe the U.S. relationship with Iraqi Kurds has been transactional. That is incorrect.

In response, the PUK withdrew all its ministers from the caretaker government. PUK leader Bafel Talabani declared that he did not recognize the newly convened parliament and threatened to establish a separate government in the party’s stronghold of Sulaimani. Meanwhile, his younger brother, Qubad, the caretaker government’s deputy prime minister, and other PUK luminaries appear in photo opportunities in Sulaimani, giving the impression of a separate government.

Many Kurds and their supporters believe the U.S. relationship with Iraqi Kurds has been transactional. That is incorrect. U.S. direct support made possible the Kurdistan Region’s emergence as an autonomous entity within Iraq. Operation Provide Comfort helped establish the conditions for Kurdish self-rule and paved the way for the region’s first parliamentary elections in 1992. In 1998, a civil war between the Barzani family-led KDP and the Talabani family-led PUK that claimed thousands of lives ended following direct U.S. mediation. Then came the 2003 U.S.-led war that toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime, which gave the Kurds another opportunity to expand their autonomy and secure the region’s status as a federal entity under Iraq’s new constitution.

Following the rise of the Islamic State, Washington again turned to the Kurds as a partner, working directly with Kurdish forces, often with independence from Baghdad. During those years, the United States invested to strengthen Iraqi Kurdish unity and institutional cohesion. For years, the U.S.-led coalition worked to unify the Peshmerga forces affiliated with the region’s two ruling parties, with the goal of transforming them into a professional, fighting force under the authority of the Kurdistan Region’s Ministry of Peshmerga, rather than individual party leaders. Shortly before the September 30, 2026, deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, the Kurdistan Region announced the unification of its Peshmerga forces. However, the move was cosmetic, intended to signal progress to Washington. Subsequent events have exposed how misguided was the belief that the Peshmerga had unified.

Against the backdrop of a changing political landscape in the Middle East, the Trump administration appears inclined to work with strong central governments across the region. This perception has reinforced the belief among many Kurds that Washington lacks the will to intervene in the rivalry between the two dominant parties in Iraqi Kurdistan.

“Honestly, now is the moment. You have this huge opportunity in front of you. You need to get over these tribal dismays.”

U.S. Envoy Tom Barrack

President Donald Trump’s envoy for Iraq and Syria, Tom Barrack, made the administration’s position on Iraqi Kurdistan and its ongoing political crisis clear during a panel discussion at Chatham House on November 11, 2026: “We’re not going to intervene. There is no way we can intervene. We can encourage. We can help. We can counsel. We can mediate. But honestly, now is the moment. You have this huge opportunity in front of you. You need to get over these tribal dismays.”

Barrack identified the crisis unfolding in Iraqi Kurdistan as being rooted in longstanding rivalries between the Barzani and Talabani families. At its core, the dispute over control of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Ministry of Interior, for example, masks decades of mistrust between two parties that have struggled to overcome their tribal and regionalist loyalties. In this respect, the supposedly progressive PUK is no less shaped by tribal and family-based politics than the KDP.

As imminent as it may seem, Iraqi Kurdistan is unlikely to split into two separate administrations based in Sulaimani and Erbil. In reality, the region has long been, and will continue to be, divided along party lines, with the PUK and KDP controlling their respective strongholds. What may happen next is that Washington will pressure both sides to reach a temporary agreement and form a government. What seems more certain, however, is that these disputes will cause the autonomous region to lose ground in its broader rivalry with Baghdad.

Sirwan Kajjo is a journalist and researcher specializing in Kurdish politics, Islamic militancy, and Syrian affairs. He has contributed two book chapters on Syria and the Kurds, published by Indiana University Press and Cambridge University Press. His writings on Syrian and Kurdish issues have appeared in the Middle East Forum, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and other prominent think tanks and publications. Kajjo is also the author of Nothing But Soot, a novel set in Syria. He holds a BA in government and international politics from George Mason University.
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