The January 30, 2026, agreement between the Syrian interim government and Syrian Democratic Forces may have halted the violence that ravaged northeast Syria for more than two weeks, but it lacks the foundation for a lasting settlement between the Islamist-led government and the Kurdish-led forces.
On its face, the deal offers few guarantees for the Kurdish population, but neither protection from future violence nor meaningful assurances for local autonomy in what remains of the Kurdish region in the northeast. Its ambiguity leaves room for multiple interpretations, which could shape how each side approaches the agreement’s implementation.
After the recent violence against the Kurds, it is hard to imagine the Syrian Democratic Forces agreeing to disarm.
In fact, shortly after the agreement was announced, Syrian government officials and Syrian Democratic Forces leaders spoke with their respective media outlets, offering differing interpretations of its provisions. One example concerns the clause on integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces, which the two sides explained in different ways.
Mazlum Abdi, the general commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, stated that his forces would remain in their areas, organized into three brigades forming a single division within the Hasakah province. By contrast, the Syrian minister of information indicated that integration would occur on an individual basis, meaning that Syrian Democratic Forces members would be absorbed separately into the Syrian army. This is essentially what the Syrian government had demanded: a dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. After the recent violence against the Kurds, it is hard to imagine the Syrian Democratic Forces agreeing to disarm, even if they appear to be the weaker party now.
This is the third such agreement between the two sides in less than a year, so there is little reason to believe it will differ from the previous two. But Kurdish leaders were willing to accept almost any arrangement that would halt further attacks by Syrian government forces and allied tribal militias against Kurdish communities. As one senior Kurdish official said in a private discussion, they could not do what Hamas and its leaders did—leaving people in Gaza exposed to a devastating and unwinnable war. While that may sound noble, the difference is that the Syrian Democratic Forces did not start this war, nor did it view Damascus as an enemy in the way that Hamas views Israel. With backing from the United States for the Syrian Democratic Forces no longer assured, the Syrian government now has the upper hand to decide when and how to honor or violate the agreement. This places the Kurds in an unequal position, one that is likely to shape future negotiations between the two sides.
Kurdish leaders were willing to accept almost any arrangement that would halt further attacks by Syrian government forces and allied tribal militias.
The return of certain state institutions, under the agreement, to cities like Hasakah and Qamishli is both feasible and beneficial for the local Kurdish population. Many key state functions have been absent from the region for over a decade, and more so following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024. But even that, if handled poorly, could heighten sensitivities among Kurds should the Kurds conclude that interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa means to continue their decades-long treatment as second-class citizens.
But Washington and Paris, who facilitated the recent agreement, still retain leverage to keep the agreement alive. If there is political will to preserve it, they must act now. Deploying monitors or a small contingent of peacekeepers is well within their capacity, especially if the goal is not only to protect the Kurds but also to stabilize Syria more broadly. An effective implementation of this agreement could help reduce the conditions that might allow the Islamic State to regain a foothold amid the current insecurity.
Syrian Kurds are coming to terms with the loss of much of what they gained over the past decade, including the hard-won de facto autonomy of their regions. With Afrin and other Kurdish areas still under Turkish occupation, and Kobani effectively under siege, the Kurdish forces’ struggle now may be limited to retaining control over what remains in Hasakah province. The Kurdish dream of full autonomy in Syria will have to wait a little longer. But in an unpredictable Middle East, the wait may not be that long.
