Although Islam is central to the identities of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, their domestic policies often claim religious tolerance, coexistence and national unity. The United Arab Emirates has institutionalized tolerance as national policy, Oman highlights religious pluralism, and other states showcase interfaith initiatives. Yet educational practices, institutional inequalities, and security policies often reflect sectarian divisions, undermining state narratives of interfaith harmony.
Sectarianism in the GCC states is not just about theological distinctions between Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims or even an extension of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. It is often shaped by domestic political alliances, religious education, access to public institutions, and official approaches to dissent. These structures play a role in how children begin to percieve their religious identities, even before they can understand it. The credibility of the GCC tolerance agenda, therefore, depends on how different institutions define and practice tolerance.
Educational practices, institutional inequalities, and security policies often reflect sectarian divisions, undermining state narratives of interfaith harmony.
Yet the challenge is not uniform across the GCC states. Oman’s Ibadi heritage, alongside Sunni and Shi‘a communities, has shaped a national identity that values shared citizenship. The government’s approach to educating students from different Islamic traditions presents an alternative to institutional separation. The Oman model shows that religious pluralism can bepart of national socialization, rather than remaining mere diplomatic messaging. The United Arab Emirates has established one of the region’s most visible tolerance programs, including the Abrahamic Family House as part of its branding as a tolerant state. However, the presence of multiple religious communities in a cosmopolitan city does not in itself demonstrate social integration or acceptance.
A Sunni-led leadership governs Bahrain’s predominantly Shi‘a population. Issues of religious representation, Sunni interpretations in religious education, and access to public-sector employment and other opportunities remain contested, despite the initiatives of the King Hamad Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence. In Saudi Arabia, systemic discrimination and repression of the minority is well-documented. Religious education has historically reflected anti-Shi‘a interpretations, and although there have been some recent curriculum revisions, there is room for further reform. In Kuwait, the minority Shi‘a community maintains distinct religious institutions and participates through power sharing accommodation in parliamentary and public life. Yet the 2015 Islamic State bombing of the Imam Ja’far as-Sadiq Mosque exposed underlying sectarian suspicions and divisions, even as the public response reaffirmed their solidarity. In January 2024, authorities foiled a terrorist cell’s plan to attack Shi‘a places of worship, illustrating that the threat of sectarian violence continues even as a sanguine tradition of Sunni-Shia relations prevails.
Children taught to regard other religious traditions with suspicion or as deviant may find it impossible to accept religious differences.
Qatar officially recognizes Shi‘a religious institutions. However, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2026 report noted restrictions affecting Shi‘a, including the Ismaili Dawoodi Bohra, as well as concerns about discriminatory educational content. Such distinctions matter in formal education. Children taught to regard other religious traditions with suspicion or as deviant may find it impossible to accept religious differences.
Children also absorb sectarian attitudes through interactions in families, neighborhoods, religious institutions, community networks, and digital platforms. Residential and social separation may reproduce inherited prejudices. Social media platforms further expose young people to sectarian narratives that often link domestic grievances and regional discord with conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.
During regional conflicts, these differences can become avenues for suspicion and exclusion. Following the Iranian attacks on GCC territory in May and June 2026, Bahraini authorities arrested Shi‘i clerics in a crackdown, accusing them of promoting allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader and conspiring with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. About 69 citizens also lost citizenship, with their Iranian heritage among the grounds cited. While authorities must identify and address genuine security threats, the distinction between legitimate security enforcement and collective suspicion is critical. Failure to do so risks a self-fulfilling prophecy of alienation.
Although GCC governments invoke unity and collective security, their distinct attitudes towards religious minorities, political dissent, and national security reveal competing approaches to citizenship and stability. These differences complicate intelligence cooperation, undermine mutual confidence, and weaken the prospects for a common regional response to external threats. They also expose the contradiction between the GCC’s collective language of unity and the uneven domestic practices of its member states. Ultimately, these divisions can undermine GCC cohesion, complicate U.S. partnerships, and provide opportunities for regional adversaries to exploit internal vulnerabilities.
Social media platforms further expose young people to sectarian narratives that often link domestic grievances and regional discord with conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.
For the United States, sectarian cohesion in the GCC states is critical to Gulf Arab security. American interests include energy security, counter-terrorism, and the protection of international shipping. Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet; Qatar is home to the Al Udeid Air Base; and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provide essential military facilities, logistical support, and intelligence cooperation to U.S. regional operations.The current U.S.-Iran conflict has exposed the vulnerability of these strategic arrangements to regional escalation. Over the longer term, such domestic divisions can undermine the foundations of American security partnerships in the region.
The GCC states must distinguish genuine security threats from domestic dissent and religious identity. When their Shi‘a citizens experience exclusion or collective suspicion, external actors like the Iranian regime may exploit their grievances. Conversely, treating religious affiliation as a proxy for political allegiance risks alienating citizens whose cooperation is essential to national stability. America’s GCC engagement should encourage inclusive religious education, equal access to public institutions, and protection of legitimate religious expression. These measures are not merely human rights concerns; they are also essential components of long-term security resilience.