On October 2, 2026, several hundred pro-government Arab residents staged a demonstration in the city of Hasaka, the provincial capital of a Kurdish-majority province of the same name in northeast Syria, demanding an end to the Syrian Democratic Forces’ continued control of the area. A similar protest is expected on October 9.
The demonstrations are striking because the Syrian Democratic Forces has dissolved and integrated into the Syrian state as part of a deal with Damascus that significantly strengthened the central government’s control of the region. These protests suggest that the January 2026 agreement has done little to resolve the underlying tensions over who controls northeast Syria.
These protests suggest that the January 2026 agreement has done little to resolve the underlying tensions over who controls northeast Syria.
Some officials in the interim Syrian government have expressed support for the protesters’ demands, complicating the situation. The government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces commander Mazlum Abdi, now a presidential adviser, have reached an arrangement that grants individuals affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces positions in Syria’s administrative and military institutions. In practice, however, real political and military authority has shifted toward figures aligned with Damascus. This raises a broader question about the purpose of the protests and the government officials supporting them. If the agreement has substantially shifted control from the Syrian Democratic Forces to Damascus, what more are the protesters and their government supporters trying to achieve?
In essence, these protests reveal two important dynamics. First, they show that regardless of how the balance of power shifts in favor of Damascus, some in the Arab community still reject the presence of Kurds in positions of political and military authority. Most of the protesters come from al-Ghwairan, an Arab neighborhood of Hasaka with a history of supporting the Assad regime and, later, the Islamic State. Their participation suggests that the opposition to the Syrian Democratic Forces is not necessarily driven solely by its current political or military role; it also may reflect deeper Arab-Kurdish tensions over local power and authority. The reality is that some Arabs will not be satisfied unless they see the Kurds as subordinate.
Second, these protests could be part of an effort to push the balance of power further in Damascus’s favor. They also could indicate that some in the interim government, especially Arabs from Hasaka, are seeking to renegotiate, or potentially constrain, the concessions made to the Syrian Democratic Forces under the January 30 agreement.
The agreement was never intended to be a permanent solution, and even at the time, it appeared more like an interim arrangement than a durable settlement. It addressed the immediate priorities of both sides, largely under pressure from their respective external patrons in Turkey. For al-Sharaa, despite his desire to recentralize power in northeast Syria, reaching an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces was also important to reassure Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and address Ankara’s threats to launch a military operation in northeast Syria. For Abdi, the situation was equally constrained. With the United States ending its support for the Syrian Democratic Forces, he faced mounting pressure from Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, to reach an agreement with Damascus—one that, in turn, could help create more favorable conditions for the disarmament process underway in Turkey.
The agreement was never intended to be a permanent solution, and even at the time, it appeared more like an interim arrangement than a durable settlement.
In September, a Kurdish soldier serving in the Syrian army was lured to a location by armed men believed to be affiliated with an Arab tribe, who later beheaded him. The killing sparked protests across Kurdish Syria. During one demonstration in Kobani, authorities detained dozens of Kurdish protesters and prepared to transfer them to Aleppo. The detainees responded by setting a fire in the detention center, resulting in the deaths of seven prisoners and triggering more protests.
Coupled with widespread protests demanding the full inclusion of Kurdish-language education in Syria’s official school curriculum, these incidents are likely to continue as long as the underlying sources of tension remain unaddressed. Syrian Kurds demand meaningful autonomy in their region, in part because they see it as a safeguard against an Arab population that increasingly feels empowered to challenge Kurdish claims for equality. Without addressing this fundamental issue, any solution similar to the January 2026 agreement would amount to little more than kicking the can down the road.
