Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) submitted the so-called Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Cohesion to the country’s parliament on August 5, 2026, as part of a two-year effort to disarm and dissolve the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
The 12-point bill focuses almost exclusively on the security and legal dimensions of the dissolution process. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hailed it as a milestone toward eliminating terrorism in Turkey. His ally, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), portrayed it as a victory for both Turks and Kurds.
The Turkish government appears focused on dismantling what it considers a security threat, rather than addressing the Kurdish movement’s longstanding political demands.
The fact that Erdoğan and Bahçeli back this initiative raises questions about its credibility and commitment to resolving the decades-old Kurdish question. For one, the bill makes no reference to the Kurdish question; indeed, the word “Kurd” does not appear anywhere in the text. Nevertheless, the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) has embraced it as a “historic milestone” for a peace and democratization process. However, Ankara has always framed this primarily as a counter-terrorism and national security effort.
This fundamental divergence in expectations explains why the prospects of a durable settlement remain limited. The Turkish government appears focused on dismantling what it considers a security threat, rather than addressing the Kurdish movement’s longstanding political demands.
This is where PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, becomes central. Since MHP leader Bahçeli unveiled the initiative in late 2024, an unlikely political alignment has taken shape among him, Öcalan, and Erdoğan.
The DEM Party finds itself in a precarious position. As a political party with significant representation in parliament, it has backed the initiative, largely because of Öcalan’s role in the process. Like its predecessors, the DEM Party draws much of its support from constituencies aligned with the broader Kurdish movement, where Öcalan remains the most influential figure.
At the same time, many within the party recognize that the process cannot be trusted without concrete steps from the Turkish government. So far, however, the burden of concessions has fallen almost entirely on the Kurdish side; Ankara has yet to match them with meaningful political or legal reforms.
The fundamental issue lies in the very foundation of the Turkish state. No process will be meaningful without redefining the concept of the Turkish nation. Kurdish politicians, including members of the DEM Party, argue that constitutional reform is indispensable to the success of the process. Their central demand is a constitutional framework that places Turks and Kurds on equal footing and guarantees equal citizenship. Turkey’s Islamist-nationalist alliance has shown no willingness to consider such demands.
The debate taking place in Diyarbakir and across the Kurdish southeast is whether laying down arms will be met with genuine steps from Ankara.
There is a growing realization within the Kurdish movement that armed struggle, particularly in a country like Turkey, is no longer a viable path to securing Kurdish rights. As a result, there is a broad consensus in favor of dissolving the PKK. The debate taking place in Diyarbakir and across the Kurdish southeast is whether laying down arms will be met with genuine steps from Ankara. Another key question is whether Öcalan, imprisoned since 1999, should be the sole representative or negotiator for the Kurdish movement in this process.
The genesis of this process seems to be the regional developments that unfolded after the October 7, 2023, terror attacks by Hamas, when Israel demonstrated its willingness to act unilaterally across the region to protect its security interests. Turkey recognized this shift from the outset and sought to neuter any Kurdish autonomy that ultimately might undermine Turkey’s strategic interest. Ankara moved to recalibrate its approach toward the Kurds inside Turkey while also dismantling Kurdish self-rule in Syria. Turkish authorities continue to co-opt and undermine Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, and Erdoğan reportedly called President Donald Trump to get him to back away from support for an Iranian Kurdish insurgency.
Turkey is engaging with the Kurdish issue because of strategic pressures, not because it has accepted a new political vision for Kurdish rights. Any measures that may emerge are likely to give the illusion of reform while leaving the underlying issues unresolved. Therefore, Ankara is likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach, allowing regional dynamics to unfold before considering even limited political concessions to the Kurds.
