The Renewed Fighting Between the SDF and Syrian Government: Interview

Despite a Ceasefire Agreement, Clashing Visions of Central Authority and Kurdish Autonomy Are Driving Escalation in Hasakah and Along the Turkish Border

Despite the recent ceasefire agreement signed between Syrian president Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi following the Syrian government’s rapid advances in Raqqa and Dayr al-Zur provinces, fighting has resumed on multiple fronts as the government pushes further into Hasakah province and towards the town of Kobani along the border with Turkey. The SDF, for its part, has called for a wider mobilisation aimed mostly at the Kurdish population living under its rule.

Part of the reason for the collapse stems from differing expectations between the two sides on the nature of the agreements. For Sharaa, the agenda has been clear from the outset: a centralised government that does not allow for institutions of a rival or autonomous political project. For Abdi and the SDF, the goal at this point seems to be to preserve whatever they can of their ‘Autonomous Administration’ project. But to the extent that this project can survive at all, it is likely only to be in a de facto sense and not de jure, enforced perhaps by some external military intervention to prevent central government advances.

Part of the reason for the collapse stems from differing expectations between the two sides on the nature of the agreements.

The following should also be noted:

(i) Insofar as the SDF had the veneer of a diverse coalition, that veneer has started to collapse with an increasing reversion back to the original core of the YPG (the armed wing of the PKK-linked PYD).

(ii) The SDF seems increasingly less concerned about seeking to preserve responsibility for the Islamic State-portfolio as a form of leverage, withdrawing its forces from the al-Hol camp and area and focusing more on just defence of primarily Kurdish areas.

To give a ground perspective on what is happening, below is an interview I conducted with Kajin Aloush, a Kurd and executive director of a media company. She is currently in the predominantly Syrian Kurdish city of Qamishli on the border with Turkey.

Flags associated with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its military structures, amid renewed tensions between the SDF and the Syrian central government in northeastern Syria.

Source: Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Q: How is the situation right now in Qamishli? Have the Asayish and YPG been mobilised in the streets?

A: Correct. After the last meeting [between Sharaa and Abdi], all the people here have mobilised. All are preparing to defend themselves and their neighbourhoods as far as they can. Right now the situation is fine. There is nothing here. There are [terrorist] cells active in Hasakah, and since yesterday they have been combing the area. The same thing in Kobani. Currently, many of the youth of Iraqi Kurdistan are entering the area.

Q: Do you expect the central government will launch an attack on Qamishli?

A: I think after this great uprising that has arisen since yesterday evening, there will be interventions so that there won’t be a civil war. If there is an attack, I don’t think they will reach Qamishli.

Q: In you view has the SDF come to an end as a project and reverted to the YPG?

A: Currently, nothing is clear. But if there is a war between the two sides, I don’t think there will be the merger that was supposed to happen.

Q: What I mean for example is that the SDF control over Dayr al-Zur and Raqqa quickly collapsed, as though the Arab component that was working with it didn’t support its project at all. Is this correct in your view? For example some say ‘Thank God we are rid of Raqqa and Dayr al-Zur and these areas weren’t necessary for the Autonomous Administration Project’. Do you agree with this opinion?

After the last meeting [between Sharaa and Abdi], all the people here have mobilised. All are preparing to defend themselves and their neighbourhoods as far as they can.

Kajin Aloush

A: No, the Autonomous Administration project even encompassed these areas and for years they worked to apply a democratic project and brotherhood between peoples, but the people of the region from the Arab component- by which I mean Raqqa and Dayr- will side with whoever comes. They previously adopted such positions when the SDF liberated these areas from Daesh [Islamic State]. But what happened is that the SDF, until the very last moment, tried to have the issues resolved through dialogue and not war. Thus they withdrew from these areas, and there was no collapse, especially given that the Arab component who were there wanted the Syrian army to be the one ruling these areas. That is, regrettably, the matter became one of ethnicity.

Q: Do you think the SDF committed mistakes in negotiations? For example would it not have been better for the SDF to use its control of Dayr and Raqqa as a bargaining chip- i.e. for example withdrawing from Dayr and Raqqa as part of an agreement in exchange for preserving military divisions in Hasakah and Kobani?

A: What happened is as you say: Dayr and Raqqa were a bargaining chip. The last agreement between the SDF and Syrian transitional government were that the Kurdish areas should remain SDF-administered. They agreed and signed to this as well. But in the meeting yesterday, there was no commitment to this on the part of President al-Sharaa. That is, they have tried to repeat the Shaykh Maqsud and Ashrafoya experience here: i.e. nothing called the SDF should remain, surrender of all heavy weapons, and even the offices and centres should be handed to the central government. In short, that nothing of the Autonomous Administration project should remain, in exchange for offers whereby for example General Mazlum Abdi would become deputy minister of defence. For this reason they rejected, after all the attempts for the matter to be resolved politically rather than militarily.

Q: Do you welcome the idea of Israeli military intervention to stop the attack?

A: Of course not. Here anyway there are no borders with Israel and Israel previously did not intervene militarily for the Kurds, and Israel’s ambitions are in southern Syria, not here. Of course we are not against a unified Syria, and this was the idea of the Autonomous Administration Project. But we have seen the scenarios that unfolded on the coast, for example. Here the solution needs to be one of politics and dialogue, not military action.

Q: At this time do you expect the Autonomous Administration will survive or rather in the end there will be a merger?

A: After all the attempts that have taken place for a merger and solution through dialogue, regrettably there has been failure, and so after the general returned yesterday, they took the decision to defend their Kurdish areas and not hand them over. Today, here, in all the Kurdish areas, the people have also supported this decision whereby they will defend themselves and will only accept an Autonomous Administration. In addition, the Kurds in all regions of the world are helping and trying to come to defend the region.

Q: In short what are your demands in this stage?

A: That the Kurds should attain their rights in the new Syria and there should be no sectarian or ethnic discrimination as is currently the case.

Published originally on January 20, 2026.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, a Milstein Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum, is an independent Arabic translator, editor, and analyst. A graduate of Brasenose College, Oxford University, he earned his Ph.D. from Swansea University, where he studied the role of historical narratives in Islamic State propaganda. His research focuses primarily on Iraq, Syria, and jihadist groups, especially the Islamic State, on which he maintains an archive of the group’s internal documents. He has also published an Arabic translation and study of the Latin work Historia Arabum, the earliest surviving Western book focused on Arab and Islamic history. For his insights, he has been quoted in a wide variety of media outlets, including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and AFP.
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