What explains the recent violence in the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria?
Initially, as explained to me by Ziyad Abu Tafesh (spokesman/media activist for a local Druze faction called Liwa al-Jabal) the violence began as clashes within the province between Druze and Bedouin gunmen (not intra-Druze violence, as was claimed by some) after a spat of tit-for-tat kidnappings, after a Druze individual called Fadlallah Duwara was stopped on the Damascus-Suwayda’ route and was robbed of his money and mobile phone and subjected to beating and insults.
In addition, unidentified armed groups (likely consisting of Bedouins) fired projectiles at Druze localities on the peripheries of the province—something that had been ongoing for some time before this incident and was seen as a justification for continued mobilisation of local armed Druze factions, despite an earlier understanding reached with the central government to activate the local police and law enforcement apparatus in al-Suwayda’ province.
This contravened a common demand of local Druze factions that external security and military forces should not enter the province—a position that was reinforced by the perception that these forces were effectively coming to aid the Bedouins against the Druze.
Subsequently, the central government decided that attempts to reach a negotiated settlement with the province were futile without the use of force as a means of pressure, and thus began sending military and security forces from outside the province into al-Suwayda’. This contravened a common demand of local Druze factions that external security and military forces should not enter the province—a position that was reinforced by the perception that these forces were effectively coming to aid the Bedouins against the Druze.
Accordingly, all the Druze factions mobilised to try to repel the advance of the government forces, including those that had previously been coordinating with the Ministry of Defence such as Rijal al-Karama. Some pro-government commentators tried to downplay this reality and effectively portray Druze resistance to the entry of these forces as simply being stubbornness on the part of Hikmat al-Hijri (one of the three most senior Druze spiritual leaders in Syria) and his self-declared followers, who have called for constitutional guarantees of a de-centralised and secular state and during these recent events reiterated calls for international protection of the Druze community.
However, despite some Israeli strikes that came within the framework of prior Israeli rhetoric about defending the Druze and were clearly intended to deter the advance of government forces, it appears that the Druze spiritual and factional leaders have realised that the balance of forces is against them. Accordingly, Hikmat al-Hijri and other spiritual, faction and provincial leaders have issued a joint statement declaring that they ‘welcome’ the entry of the external military and security forces into the province- in other words, dropping a key position of al-Suwayda’ Druze that previously rejected their entry. In addition, the statement calls on all the local factions to cooperate with these forces and hand over their weapons to the Interior Ministry- a compromise on a prior refusal to disarm among al-Suwayda’ Druze. In effect, the statement is calling on these factions to dissolve.
While armed clashes and some local Druze resistance may continue for a period, it is clear that the trajectory is going in favour of the government, even as Hikmat al-Hijri has also issued his own subsequent video statement saying that the ‘humiliating’ joint statement was effectively imposed by Damascus and external pressure and, amid ongoing clashes, is calling for external Druze help to resist this ‘barbaric campaign’ against the Druze of al-Suwayda’.
In short, the entire affair represents a notable step forward for the central government’s attempts to consolidate security and military control over the country, and the agreement here is similar to what happened in the Druze-populated Damascus suburbs of Jaramana and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya affair in late April and early May, which also effectively saw the forcible entry and deployment of external security and military forces, legitimised by an agreement with local notables.
The al-Suwayda’ affair is likely to have implications for the ongoing discussions and negotiations between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the central government.
The al-Suwayda’ affair is likely to have implications for the ongoing discussions and negotiations between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the central government, in which the SDF is effectively seeking to be incorporated into the Syrian state in the way that Iraqi Kurdistan is incorporated into federal Iraq, despite the agreement reached between President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi in March. In contrast, the central government effectively wants the SDF to dissolve and incorporate its members into the army and security forces as individuals. If the central government sees that it cannot get its way with the SDF through negotiations, it is likely that the government will eventually resort to using force to try to pressure the SDF into effective submission. In such a scenario, one could envision Turkey aiding the Syrian government militarily.
Below is the joint statement translated by me.
After the recent events that befell al-Suwayda’ province in recent days with a large number of victims falling as a result of them, and out of a desire to prevent bloodshed and restore security and stability in the province, and out of a belief on our part that realising this requires the imposition of the state’s authority over the province through the official institutions and in particular the security and military institutions, therefore:
1. We welcome the entry of the Interior and Defence Ministries’ forces in order to impose control over the security and military centres and to secure the province.
2. We call on all the armed factions in al-Suwayda’ province to cooperate with the forces of the Interior Ministry and not resist their entry, and to hand over their weapons to the Interior Ministry.
3. We also call for the opening of a dialogue with the Syrian government to resolve the ramifications of the events and to activate the state’s institutions in cooperation with the province’s people in their cadres and capabilities in the various fields.
