Syria: The Misplaced Focus on ‘Misinformation’

A talking point that has been promoted by the Syrian government on more than one occasion is that the government is being subject to a massive disinformation and defamation campaign. This talking point has been amplified by some analysts and pundits.

In the words of pro-government pundit Michael Arizanti:

However, I would argue that this focus on ‘misinformation’ is misplaced. False and misleading information, amplified on social media channels and sometimes clearly promoted , can be found on any number of topics, but the existence of such misinformation does not necessarily detract from broader truths and realities.

Consider the Gaza war as an example. On occasion, commentators have shared footage and images from the days of the Syrian civil war and wrongly portrayed the content as coming from Gaza. Further, in May, the UN humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher claimed that 14,000 babies in Gaza were at risk of death within 48 hours. This claim later turned out to be based on a misreading of report that warned of 14,100 cases of severe acute malnutrition among children aged six to 59 months in the period April 2025-March 2026. Of course, misinformation should be corrected for the sake of accuracy and truth, but no one should use the aforementioned examples to claim that Israel’s military actions have not resulted in the destruction of a huge portion of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure or that there is no issue of widespread hunger within Gaza.

The same general observation applies to Syria. In talking about ‘misinformation’, the government and its supporters and sympathizers are for the most part referring to reports and claims of sectarian violence against minority communities. No doubt there have been incorrect reports on the matter, some of them undoubtedly pushed by supporters of the ‘resistance axis’ (for example) out of opposition to the new government.

However, none of this changes the fact that there have been very real cases of substantial sectarian violence committed by pro-government forces with the sharing of real footage and photos that document this violence. Both the coastal massacres in March that targeted members of the Alawite community and the more recent massacres in the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ come to mind. And the fact is that in the latter case in particular, the same issue of misinformation can apply to the government and its supporters. For example, when footage emerged from the Radhwan family guesthouse in al-Suwayda’ showing that a massacre had taken place there and that the guesthouse had been vandalised, some government supporters were quick to claim, without evidence, that the victims were Bedouins killed by members of ‘Hijri’s militias’ (referring to Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the three most senior Syrian Druze spiritual leaders). Subsequent testimony from the Radhwan family contradicted this claim. Some other images that were framed as violence by Druze militias against Bedouins turned out to be violence by pro-government forces against Druze. However, in turn, such misinformation does not contradict the reality that some very serious violations have been committed by Druze militiamen against Bedouins and that Bedouin of al-Suwayda’ have been displaced en masse from the province.

Even going beyond larger scale incidents, reports continue to emerge of real violations against individual members of minority communities that are reflective of broader problems. Consider the case of Qays Ghreeb, a member of the Twelver Shia community in Nubl and al-Zahara’ in Aleppo province. On 13 August, reports emerged within the community that he had been missing since 11 August after he had been asked to deliver sand to a customer in the Aleppo town of al-Bab. Today, reports circulated within the same community that he had been killed: the story being that a gang lured him to al-Bab on the pretence of delivering sand and then kidnapped him, demanding that his family pay a ransom. The family reportedly paid the ransom ($10,000) but he did not return, and yesterday the security apparatus arrested some of his kidnappers who admitted that they killed him before the family paid the ransom, with his body discovered in an area near Dayr Hafir.

Is this incident reflective of sectarian violence against Twelver Shia? More investigation is needed, but for understandable reasons some people within Nubl and al-Zahara’ think it is a clear case of identity-based killing. This incident and similar cases make some within Nubl and al-Zahara’ reluctant and afraid to venture outside the two villages, or to tell people within Aleppo city (where they may need to go for shopping purposes or work) that they are from Nubl and al-Zahara’. This fear is amplified by the fact that whereas the communities of Nubl and al-Zahara’ have disarmed (which explains why there have been no notable security incidents there- and that is obviously a good thing), the surrounding Sunni villages and localities still retain weapons. Indeed, on the broader level, I have got the sense from some Sunni supporters of the government that they do not believe that disarmament should or will be applied to the Sunni Arab community, and it was notable how Hurras al-Din (the Syrian al-Qa‘ida affiliate that announced its dissolution in January) touched on this very issue in its final statement, urging the new government to allow Sunnis to retain their weapons. But if Syria is going to have lasting stability, then disarmament for the sake of enforcing law and order needs to apply to all communities.

Instead of focusing on misinformation then, the government and its supporters should work on putting their own house in order.

Published originally on August 24, 2025.