Events in al-Suwayda': The Perspective of Liwa al-Jabal

Fighters and military vehicles belonging to the Syrian government forces in al-Suwayda’, Syria; July 20, 2025.

Fighters and military vehicles belonging to the Syrian government forces in al-Suwayda’, Syria; July 20, 2025.

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Nearly a month since the outbreak of major fighting within the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ and the subsequent U.S.-brokered ‘ceasefire’, it is notable how many supporters of the Syrian government continue to frame the conflict as one against ‘al-Hijri’s militia/militias/gangs’ (referring to Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the three most senior Druze spiritual leaders in Syria). The tweet below (highlighted by secular Syrian commentator Rami Jarrah) is an example of this kind of messaging:

The framing may sound like convenient messaging that tries to avoid sectarian language against the Druze, but in fact it drums up support for continued aggressive action against al-Suwayda’ by framing military action and harsh measures as a justified war against outlaws and ‘Israeli proxies’. Besides the harmful effect of this framing, it is also simply inaccurate, downplaying or omitting the mobilisation of other Druze factions that do not declare themselves followers of al-Hijri but were in fact willing to engage with the government prior to these latest events, with Liwa al-Jabal being one prominent example.

Liwa al-Jabal’s spokesman, Ziyad Abu Tafesh, referred me to a recent set of statements he gave to an outlet called ‘Hashtag Syria’ clarifying some of the events in al-Suwayda’, such as the widespread perception among Druze in the province that the government is imposing a siege by restricting entry of goods. However, he also wanted to add the following:

(i) In the first instance, he rejects the notion that al-Hijri is the primary person to blame for the fighting that broke out in July or that al-Hijri effectively sabotaged a deal that would have succeeded had it not been for his scheming. Rather, according to Ziyad, the original joint statement seemingly ‘welcoming’ the entry of government forces was imposed by Ahmad al-Dalati (the government’s head of ‘internal security’ for al-Suwayda’) on the basis that the statement would ensure the entry of government forces without violence after they had already reached the peripheries of al-Suwayda’ city following fighting with Druze factions.

Ziyad rejects the claim that the violations against Druze in al-Suwayda’ only began after an ambush of government forces by militiamen declaring affiliation with al-Hijri.

(ii) Ziyad also rejects the claim that the violations against Druze in al-Suwayda’ only began after an ambush of government forces by militiamen declaring affiliation with al-Hijri. Rather, the violations began when the government forces first entered the province and they continued even after the joint statement, which was why al-Hijri then issued his own subsequent statement saying that the original joint statement had been imposed and that there needed to be resistance in response to the ongoing violations.

(iii) He thinks that the Israeli intervention played a noteworthy role in stopping the governmental forces’ initial assault, though he frames it as being within the framework of Israeli Druze lobbying and international understandings and conventions for the protection of minorities such as the Druze.

(iv) Neither Layth al-Balous nor Sulayman Abd al-Baqi (two Druze figures most willing to engage with the government) represents a significant contingent within al-Suwayda’.

(v) In relation to the recent reports of clashes between government forces and Druze fighters on Tel Hadid hill in western al-Suwayda’, Ziyad rejects the claim that the fighting was simply between ‘loyalists’ of al-Hijri and the government forces. Rather, Liwa al-Jabal participated in the fighting too.

(vi) For Ziyad, the current government is ‘Daeshi’ (Islamic State-like) in its behaviour towards the Druze, and the only way for the government to make proper amends and regain trust is to bring Ahmad al-Sharaa (the president) and al-Dalati to al-Suwayda’ and have them executed for crimes against the Druze.

None of the above should be taken as an endorsement of Ziyad’s personal positions, particularly in relation to the last point. I rather just wish to illustrate the trust gap that now exists between the wider Druze community of al-Suwayda’ and the government when even a person who was originally more open to engagement and actually felt that al-Hijri’s positions were obstructionist is talking in this way.

Government supporters can share social media graphics saying how ‘al-Suwayda’ is in the heart’ (see below), but such gestures will do little to gain trust. Rather, restrictions on entry of goods into al-Suwayda’ need to be lifted and not cynically used as a pressure tactic, there needs to be proper accountability for the violations that occurred, and, as Yassin al-Haj Saleh highlights, a proper national army and security apparatus need to be built, so that the government can prove that it can impose state authority in a way that allays concerns about sectarian conduct and abuses and proves that calls for international protection of minority communities are wholly unnecessary.

Below is the ‘Hashtag Syria’ article translated by me.
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Hashtag- Special [2 August 2025]

After around ten days since the suspension of the military attack and ‘tribal reinforcement’ against al-Suwayda’ province in southern Syria, the province is still suffering from those attacks’ ramifications and the siege imposed on it to the degree that those leaving the province speak of a ‘city disaster zone’ by all standards, despite the fact that the Syrian authorities began to allow in aid convoys several days ago in coordination with local and international humanitarian organisations.

Around 4000 killed and wounded

According to Ziyad Abu Tafesh, who heads the media office in Liwa al-Jabal’s factions, initial estimates suggest that “the number of martyrs in the attack on al-Suwayda’ is more than 2000 people while the injured also exceed 2000 as well in an approximate estimate that is not yet finalised. 90% of them are unarmed civilians who were safe in their homes.”

Abu Tafesh said in statements to Hashtag that “these people were executed in their homes and houses in an act of genocide, and the videos have proven these violations and how the armed men led them to the squares, in addition to the civilians they burned in their homes.”

The media official clarifies that “the fighters do not exceed 10% of the casualties and those who were martyred on the fronts of fighting and confrontation,” affirming that the people of al-Suwayda’ defended their land and homes. He said: “We did not attack their homes and places of their presence. They [the armed forces of the government and tribes] are the ones who entered al-Suwayda’ on the pretext of imposing the state’s control, imposing stability and preventing clashes between the Druze and the Bedouin tribes.”

“These people were executed in their homes and houses in an act of genocide, and the videos have proven these violations and how the armed men led them to the squares, in addition to the civilians they burned in their homes.”

Ziyad Abu Tafesh

The Syrian Network for Human Rights announced that it had documented the killing of no less than 814 people, including 34 women and 20 children, and the wounding of more than 903 others in the clashes seen by al-Suwayda’ province from 13-24 July.

What happened in al-Suwayda’ was planned

Abu Tafesh clarifies that the people of al-Suwayda’ have been living with the Bedouin tribes for more than 300 years in the land of the mountain (al-Suwayda’), even though disputes and tensions always arose in those years, but there would be resolved in a tribal and social way with minimal losses “through affection and kindness.”

He considers that the recent problem with the Bedouin tribes in al-Suwayda’ “was contrived” to create a crisis between the tribes and the people of al-Suwayda’ and find “a pretext and excuse for the military forces to enter al-Suwayda’,” pointing out in this regard to the kidnapping of the young man Fadlallah Dawara on the Damascus-al-Suwayda’ route by an armed group from the Bedouin tribes on 12 and 13 July, some kilometres after the General Security checkpoint.

The media official affirms that the problem was on the verge of being resolved and there had been an agreement for handing over and receiving the kidnapped from both sides, but people from the Bedouins impeded the agreement in order to stir up the fire of fitna, accusing sides in the authorities of planning the problem.

More than 31 villages have had their inhabitants expelled

According to the media office official in the factions of Liwa al-Jabal, the attack on al-Suwayda’ led to the destruction and burning of multiple villages in the western and northern countryside of the province and the deportation of their inhabitants to other areas inside the province, far away from the areas where the clashes take place.

Among those villages: al-Sura, Jarin, Labin, Ta’ara, al-Dur, al-Duwayr, Harran, Qarasa, Najran, al-Tha’ala, Kanaker, al-Mujaymar, Ara, al-Khalidiya, al-Salimiya, al-Haqaf, al-Hit, al-Hayat, and these are areas exposed to repeated gunfire from areas where the armed Bedouin groups are stationed. The people of these villages have been displaced and the contents of their homes have been stolen and burned, including the elderly who remained in them and could not leave, per Abu Tafesh.

No dialogue with this authority

In response to the question about the possibility of opening channels of dialogue again with the central authorities regarding the province’s future and its relation with Damascus after the fighting stops, the media official in the factions of Liwa al-Jabal affirmed that “there is no longer space for dialogue or discussion” with this government after all al-Suwayda’ has faced from it.

Abu Tafesh pointed to the “attacks and violations” that were carried out against the people of al-Suwayda’ when the government forces entered the province, with some documented through many videos.

No links with external actors and the compass of the people of al-Suwayda’ is clear

Regarding the accusations that some factions and religious authorities in al-Suwayda’ with external agendas and in particular Israel, Abu Tafesh denied that the people and factions of al-Suwayda’ have links with anyone and said: “There is an international decision to protect the minorities from the oppression of this authority,” and that the Israeli bombing of the forces attacking al-Suwayda’ came within an international agreement “to reduce the bloodshed.”

Regarding the accusations that some factions and religious authorities in al-Suwayda’ with external agendas and in particular Israel, Abu Tafesh denied that the people and factions of al-Suwayda’ have links with anyone.

Abu Tafesh affirmed that “the people of al-Suwayda’ do not demand protection from anyone and we are capable of protecting ourselves, but “the intervention of the international coalition reduced the bloodshed for us,” and what happened came within international laws and codes “to protect the minorities” from oppression and killing.

He asked why it was acceptable for demonstrators to raise placards demanding international protection at the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011 in Syria’s squares and it was acceptable for them to thank Israel for its intervention in bombing the Assad regime at that time, while it is forbidden for the people of al-Suwayda’ to demand international protection from killing and oppression.

Abu Tafesh affirmed that the history of the people of al-Suwayda’ bears witness to their patriotism, national belonging and defence of the homeland. He said: “No one can engage in one-upmanship against the people of al-Suwayda’ for their patriotism and love of the soil of the land and homeland. We have shed our blood since the days of our ancestors against the French and Ottoman colonisers, and credit was due to our ancestors for the uprising of the Great Syrian Revolution and liberating Syria more than once from the aggressors and invaders in cooperation with our brothers and people in the other provinces when they gave entrusted leadership of the Great Syrian Revolution to Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, and when the Banu Marouf’s vanguards- the guardians of the fronts- fought with al-Sharif Husayn against the Ottoman occupation and liberated the land from them.”

al-Suwayda’ is a disaster zone and is still facing the siege

Despite the Syrian government’s denial of a siege on al-Suwayda’ province and that supplies of flower, food and medicine and fuels are regularly entering through convoys of humanitarian aid, the media official in the factions of Liwa al-Jabal affirms that “al-Suwayda’ is a disaster zone province in all meanings of the word and it is besieged.”

He clarifies that the aid that enters is “drip aid that does not suffice for 50% of the inhabitants and in particular the fuel that would enter daily before the events was 8 tankers of gasoline and 8 tankers of diesel. Today only two tankers enter, which only suffice to operate the ovens and hospitals especially with the electricity being cut off for long periods.

He adds that this is happening alongside the people of al-Suwayda’ in the northern and western regions being deprived from going to their fields and farms to practise agriculture and harvest crops, or even taking water provision from the wells there to meet the inhabitants’ need.

The bodies buried in the mass grave of the people of al-Suwayda’

“We have been compelled to bury our martyrs in mass graves because of the decomposition of bodies, since the national hospital was outside of service” and the medical staff exhausted.

Abu Tafesh

Abu Tafesh affirms that the claims circulated by some of the ruling authority’s supporters that those buried in the mass grave in al-Suwayda’ are members of the Public Security or Defence Ministry are “pure lies and fabrications” and that the bodies buried in a mass grave after day five of the clashes belong to the people of al-Suwayda.

He clarified that “the situation did not allow for every family to bury their sons especially given that there are families that have been entirely liquidated” such as the al-Radwan family, of whom 10 people were executed in one of the guesthouses, and likewise the defenceless Badr family, of whom 13 members were executed, and the Saraya family, of whom only one person has remained outside the country: “They were executed in cold blood at Tishrin Square.”

He added: “We have been compelled to bury our martyrs in mass graves because of the decomposition of bodies, since the national hospital was outside of service” and the medical staff exhausted.

No remnants in al-Suwayda’

Abu Tafesh says that there are those who “try to portray us as regime remnants or al-Hijri’s militias,” affirming that there are no regime remnants in al-Suwayda’, and that the people of al-Suwayda’ who were officers in the police or army back then were not involved in shedding Syrians’ blood.

He affirmed that when the people of al-Suwayda’ “are exposed to an existential threat and extermination” it becomes the obligation of any person bearing arms to defend his land, and this is “a sacred right” enshrine in all international and religious codes and laws: “that we should defend our people, honour and dignity,” considering that “the tribes were pushed into attacking after help was officially demanded from them.”

Published originally on August 6, 2025.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, a Milstein Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum, is an independent Arabic translator, editor, and analyst. A graduate of Brasenose College, Oxford University, he earned his Ph.D. from Swansea University, where he studied the role of historical narratives in Islamic State propaganda. His research focuses primarily on Iraq, Syria, and jihadist groups, especially the Islamic State, on which he maintains an archive of the group’s internal documents. He has also published an Arabic translation and study of the Latin work Historia Arabum, the earliest surviving Western book focused on Arab and Islamic history. For his insights, he has been quoted in a wide variety of media outlets, including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and AFP.
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