Tehran is following its usual script. Fresh Iranian drone and missile strikes have hit Bahrain (including some near the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama) while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps threatens to set ships on fire in the Strait of Hormuz. Ironically, in parallel, the Mullahs’ regime is now offering a “new regional security framework” led by them. This way, Tehran puts military pressure on Abraham Accords states and then offers an Iranian-led alternative designed to push Israel and the emerging “Abrahamic NATO” security architecture aside.
Tehran puts military pressure on Abraham Accords states and then offers an Iranian-led alternative designed to push Israel and the emerging “Abrahamic NATO” security architecture aside.
The cost of Iran’s blackmail is already visible in shipping flows. Before the current escalation, roughly 20.7 million barrels per day of crude, condensate, and petroleum products transited the Strait of Hormuz—about one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. Iranian mine-laying, ship seizures, and repeated threats to close the waterway drove that volume down to 14.6 million barrels per day during the first quarter of 2026. Bahrain, the UAE, and other Gulf exporters absorbed the revenue shock immediately.
That is what makes Tehran’s latest proposal so revealing. Iran is recycling the language of its earlier Hormuz Peace Initiative, which calls for the Strait to be managed exclusively by littoral states. In practice, that formula sidelines Israel and limits any meaningful outside security role. The timing leaves little doubt about Tehran’s purpose: these offers followed documented strikes on Bahraini targets.
Far from serious diplomacy, the proposal is a tactical instrument designed to fracture the coalition forming around Israel and give Tehran effective veto power over Gulf energy exports.
No Gulf government has reason to treat Iranian assurances as credible. Tehran has long used the Strait as a pressure point. Its position along the waterway, the narrow shipping lanes, and its arsenal of asymmetric tools—swarming fast boats, covert mines, and shore-launched missiles—give the regime the ability to disrupt traffic and extract political or economic concessions.
The 2019 tanker attacks followed the same pattern: Tehran escalated first, then offered dialogue on its own terms. That pattern is repeating now. Any agreement negotiated while Iran retains both the capacity and demonstrated willingness to choke commercial shipping would not restrain Tehran but reward coercion and formalize their advantage over Gulf energy exports.
The imbalance is economic as much as military. Gulf governments rely on uninterrupted hydrocarbon exports, so even a brief disruption in Hormuz can hit their budgets hard. Iran, by contrast, can absorb more of the damage through overland routes, sales of shadow-fleet equipment to China, and storage capacity.
By attacking Abraham Accords states and then inviting them into a “regional” arrangement, Tehran is reviving a familiar divide-and-rule strategy. The ‘January 2026 butchers’ solely aim to weaken the coalition forming around Israel, isolate the Jewish state, and establish Iran as the Gulf’s indispensable power broker.
By attacking Abraham Accords states and then inviting them into a “regional” arrangement, Tehran is reviving a familiar divide-and-rule strategy.
For Abraham Accords governments, the choice is no longer theoretical: strengthen security ties with partners prepared to confront Iranian coercion, or let Tehran use diplomacy to dismantle the coalition it fears most. The first course demands three steps to turn Iranian pressure into momentum for a stronger regional order—and make Tehran’s offers far less attractive.
First, Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE should jointly develop an Abrahamic Undersea Sentinel Network, deploying Israeli-designed autonomous underwater vehicles and seabed sensors at the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz and along critical shipping lanes. Israeli artificial intelligence would fuse acoustic, magnetic, and visual data to deliver real-time mine detection, IRGC vessel tracking, and anomaly alerts shared through encrypted links among partners.
Presented publicly as a Gulf-led maritime safety and environmental system, with Israeli technology routed through joint ventures or discreet channels, the network could help neutralize Iranian mine-laying and swarm tactics. Meanwhile, this would also create lasting operational interdependence among the core Abraham Accords states and provide a scalable platform for others to join.
At the same time, reducing dependence on Hormuz is critical. Bahrain and the UAE, supported by Israeli technology and intelligence, may fast-track alternative export infrastructure such as expanded Red Sea pipelines or modular floating terminals. Israeli desalination, precision agriculture, and cyber hardening for critical nodes could reinforce that effort.
In exchange, the parties would formalize deeper contingency planning, including Israeli intelligence and munitions support for protected corridors. This package would deliver concrete resilience and growth benefits that Iranian framework proposals cannot match, while tying those gains to the existing Abrahamic alliance.
Finally, a standing Mini-Lateral Hormuz Freedom Corridor Task Force, backed by Israeli technological and intelligence contributions, could help guarantee safe passage through the Strait and the Gulf of Oman. The Jewish state’s role would focus on drone swarms for overwatch, electronic warfare against Iranian targeting and jamming, and artificial-intelligence satellite fusion for rapid attack attribution.
Gulf states do not become safer by rewarding Iranian blackmail at the Strait of Hormuz.
Framed as an open initiative for any state committed to freedom of navigation, with Israeli economic and technological incentives for deeper alignment, the task force would offer a visible, functioning alternative to Iranian narratives and steadily expand the coalition around proven Abrahamic capabilities.
These measures would not erase the Iranian threat, but they would deny Tehran the leverage it seeks: a veto over Gulf sovereignty. Gulf states do not become safer by rewarding Iranian blackmail at the Strait of Hormuz.
Published originally on June 28, 2026.
