Israel’s dispatch of a 16-man search and rescue team to Venezuela and Acting President Delcy Rodríguez’s acknowledgment of their professionalism contrast to her previous charges of “Zionist genocide” against Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Venezuela’s earthquake death toll has surpassed 5,500 people. The disaster diplomacy offers Jerusalem a window to target the Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remnants that threaten American and Israeli interests in the Western Hemisphere.
The interim administration’s readoption of the national Chavista script implies that Israel must design any engagement by Israel around strategic uncertainty.
The Iranian terrorist scheme in Latin America survived Venezuela’s presidential transition. Regime insider Diosdado Cabello’s political and business patronage reinforces Hezbollah’s presence on Margarita Island, as well as their connections to the regional cocaine trade. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has documented extensive collaboration between Venezuelan officials and Hezbollah in smuggling, logistics, and arms deliveries. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force has preserved its presence on Venezuelan territory. These networks continue to rely upon corrupt organs of the security apparatus.
The earthquake has created a window of opportunity for Israel. Still, its value must be instrumental, limited to the extent that Jerusalem can employ its technical expertise to extract specific concessions. The interim administration’s readoption of the national Chavista script implies that Israel must design any engagement by Israel around strategic uncertainty. Therefore, any aid not tied to permanent institutional transformation will ultimately advance the interests of the cartels that dominate the domestic security apparatus.
While Israel’s Home Front Command can provide Venezuela with assessments of building structures and survivor locations to its emergency management, Israel should condition technology transfer and expertise to the completion of a joint American-Israeli intelligence confirmation of the dissolution of the Chavista security apparatuses that continue to protect Hezbollah and Cabello’s drug alliance. Any delay in this initiative should result in the immediate curtailing of technical support.
Israeli agricultural expertise could boost Venezuelan crop yields and close the logistical gaps cartels exploit. Jerusalem should make access to that technology contingent on independent verification that Caracas has mapped the agricultural assets and Orinoco River export routes used to finance and arm the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In parallel, Washington should intensify pressure on the Chavista intermediaries funneling money and materiel to those networks. Unless that support declines, the partnership should go no further.
The Jewish state’s expertise in cyber-defense, critical infrastructure protection, and interdiction training can secure Venezuela’s reconstruction capability. This expertise also must be conditional upon the opening of a permanent joint Israeli-American intelligence channel monitoring the logistic, personnel, and financial flows of Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps inside Venezuelan territory.
Margarita Island is the keystone in Iran’s Western Hemispheric geopolitical structure. Washington and Jerusalem should withhold any further intelligence from Rodríguez’s government until the Venezuelan government removes Hezbollah and Iranian personnel, funding, and organizational infrastructure from Margarita Island. At the same time, the United States should implement a security umbrella over Margarita Island and turn it into a permanent Caribbean foothold by taking over its ports, airports, and commercial infrastructure.
This might lead to a tripartite strategic security pact between Washington, Jerusalem, and Caracas under which Israel would deliver Elbit Hermes 900 unmanned autonomous vehicles, coastal defense radar systems, and signals intelligence assets while training Venezuelan military personnel.
In return, Caracas could obtain territorial integrity guarantees, preferential access to the U.S. energy markets, and investments in its tourism industry and infrastructure. The resulting defensive American-Israeli outpost in Margarita should be tasked only with keeping Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps terrorists away from the area’s financial and transport infrastructure. Simultaneously, Washington should intensify its economic pressure on the residual Chavista networks that continue to facilitate Hezbollah’s regional activities.
The United States should implement a security umbrella over Margarita Island and turn it into a permanent Caribbean foothold.
Rodríguez’s recent visit to Ankara to discuss energy, trade, and mining partnerships suggests that Turkey is trying to make similar attempts—emulating Iran’s Latin America geopolitical strategy—to position itself as a partner to Venezuela. Ankara’s outreach to Caracas must be interpreted within the wider context of its global ambitions, driven by oil acquisition, infrastructure development, and arms sales.
The end of the Qatari oil transit routing to Turkey, due in part to the United States Treasury’s regulatory reviews, has created additional space for Turkish investment in Venezuela’s mining sector. Israel’s technical partnerships in resource management and institutional development can serve as serious alternatives to the patronage-based relationships promoted by Ankara. These efforts could help Venezuela safeguard its strategic autonomy against Turkish inroads.
The earthquake did not create new fault lines in Venezuela’s politics; it simply laid bare an interim government still incompetent to govern. By concentrating on the areas where it can deliver real assistance, Jerusalem—alongside Washington—can extract strategic concessions that would fundamentally strengthen Venezuela’s national security character.
