Erdoğan’s Qatar Alliance Deepens as His Islamist Model Comes Under Strain at Home

A Sweeping Investment Funds Scandal Is Currently Shaking Turkey’s Financial System

While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's regional partnerships and soft-power networks are visibly expanding abroad, the political and institutional credibility of his Islamist governing model is deteriorating at home. Nowhere is that domestic accountability crisis clearer than in the sweeping investment funds scandal currently shaking Turkey's financial system and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Image: Erdoğan in Istanbul, May 18, 2018.

While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regional partnerships and soft-power networks are visibly expanding abroad, the political and institutional credibility of his Islamist governing model is deteriorating at home. Nowhere is that domestic accountability crisis clearer than in the sweeping investment funds scandal currently shaking Turkey’s financial system and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Image: Erdoğan in Istanbul, May 18, 2018.

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani at Istanbul’s Dolmabahçe Palace on Friday, November 13. At the 12th session of the Turkish-Qatari High Strategic Committee, the two leaders signed a mutual-defense agreement, while officials signed three additional agreements and memorandums covering consumer protection, education, and cooperation on peace, reconciliation, and conflict resolution. The two sides also issued a joint statement.

Both governments have historically backed movements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East, and Doha has long hosted the political leadership of Hamas while Ankara provided the group with vocal diplomatic and political cover.

Turkey and Qatar have shared an unusually close political relationship for more than a decade, grounded in an ideological alignment that sets their partnership apart from conventional Gulf diplomacy. Both governments have historically backed movements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East, and Doha has long hosted the political leadership of Hamas while Ankara provided the group with vocal diplomatic and political cover.

The 2014 military cooperation agreement laid the groundwork for a Turkish military presence in Qatar, which subsequently became an important pillar of their strategic relationship. While the new agreement does not establish a unified regional military command, it elevates an already deep partnership into a more explicit mutual-defense arrangement. Doha is not simply another commercial client for Ankara. It is one of Erdoğan’s closest political and ideological partners in the Arab world.

Yet a fuller reading of Turkish foreign policy this week requires separating Ankara’s ideological partnership with Qatar from its broader defense-industrial and strategic diplomacy elsewhere in the region. Treating Doha and Riyadh as interchangeable parts of a single project would misread how Erdoğan actually operates. With Qatar, the alignment is overtly political, military, and ideological, rooted in shared sympathies toward regional Islamist movements. With Saudi Arabia, by contrast, the relationship is driven primarily by defense-industrial cooperation, technology transfers, localization, and strategic security arrangements. That distinction was evident on Wednesday and Thursday when Istanbul hosted the Turkish-Saudi Defense Industries Days. The event brought together 69 Turkish and 30 Saudi companies for 601 bilateral meetings as Saudi officials explored local supply chains and technology partnerships under Vision 2030.

Alongside state-to-state defense agreements, Turkey is also deploying a quieter form of family-linked soft power across the Levant. On Thursday and Friday, the Turkish president’s son, Bilal Erdoğan, visited Lebanon in his capacity as head of the Foundation for the Dissemination of Knowledge, a Turkish religious and educational foundation. Although Bilal Erdoğan holds no official post in the Turkish government, his itinerary resembled that of a senior envoy. In Beirut, he met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Latif Derian before traveling north to Tripoli on Friday for community outreach and meetings with local religious and civic figures. His visit illustrates how family-linked cultural and religious institutions allow Ankara to cultivate influence among Sunni communities in Lebanon outside the formal channels of conventional state diplomacy.

While Erdoğan’s regional partnerships and soft-power networks are visibly expanding abroad, the political and institutional credibility of his Islamist governing model is deteriorating at home. Nowhere is that domestic accountability crisis clearer than in the sweeping investment funds scandal currently shaking Turkey’s financial system and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). In September, Turkey’s Capital Markets Board ordered the liquidation of 131 investment funds managed by seven portfolio management firms after a market selloff exposed serious liquidity problems and suspected manipulation in thinly traded stocks.

Earlier this week, a catastrophic explosion tore through the Habaş steel plant in Aliağa, north of Izmir, after an overhead crane collapsed into an electric-arc furnace during boiler-replacement work.

Most significantly for Erdoğan’s party, the investigation has reached its former senior leadership. Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, the former Family and Social Services Minister and former AKP deputy chairwoman, resigned from the party’s leadership in September and subsequently left the party. On November 6, she was arrested and remanded in custody over alleged involvement in the scandal. Prosecutors have accused her of violations of capital markets law and membership in a criminal organization. She has not been convicted, but the detention of a former cabinet minister who once occupied a senior position within Erdoğan’s governing movement has raised profound questions about political patronage and the adequacy of Turkey’s regulatory oversight.

The human cost of weakened accountability inside Erdoğan’s Turkey is even starker in the country’s industrial heartland. Earlier this week, a catastrophic explosion tore through the Habaş steel plant in Aliağa, north of Izmir, after an overhead crane collapsed into an electric-arc furnace during boiler-replacement work. One worker told reporters that the failure sent approximately 120 tons of molten steel onto the furnace. According to updated figures reported by the Turkish Metal Workers’ Union on Friday, the death toll from the disaster has risen to 19 workers. In the judicial investigation that followed, authorities detained 11 people, with nine suspects remanded in custody and two placed under house arrest, including Habaş chairman Mehmet Rüştü Başaran.

For the workers who survived, however, the judicial steps did little to ease fury over working conditions at the plant. On Friday, November 13, Turkish security forces detained at least nine protesters during a protest outside the Aliağa facility. Workers’ representatives alleged that the company had long neglected mandatory workplace safety measures to maintain production schedules. The subsequent ban on mobile phones inside the factory also fueled suspicions among workers that management wanted to prevent photographs of hazardous conditions from reaching the public. The contrast could hardly be sharper: at the exact moment Ankara is marketing itself to Saudi Arabia and the wider region as an advanced defense-industrial powerhouse, nineteen steelworkers are dead in Izmir and their protesting colleagues are being led away by police.

These twin crises strike directly at the AKP’s claim that its Islamist roots would produce a more ethical and socially responsible form of government. When the AKP first rose to power more than two decades ago, it presented itself as a morally grounded alternative to the corruption, cronyism, and institutional failures of Turkey’s secular political establishment. Its appeal to pious working-class and middle-class voters rested partly on promises of cleaner government, greater social justice, and an alternative to the corruption associated with Turkey’s old political establishment. Today, the investment funds scandal raises uncomfortable questions about whether political connections and insider privilege have replaced the moral principles the movement once claimed to defend. The Habaş steel disaster adds an equally damaging dimension: a governing movement that speaks endlessly about Islamic solidarity, social justice, and national dignity abroad must also answer for the safety and treatment of its own workers when they demand basic accountability at home.

Erdoğan may continue expanding Turkey’s influence abroad, but he cannot indefinitely separate that ambition from the failures of the system he has built at home.

Erdoğan’s Gulf partnerships offer Turkey valuable opportunities for defense exports, technology cooperation, and foreign investment at a time when its domestic economic credibility is under severe pressure. Qatar provides Ankara with an established strategic, ideological, and political partner, while Saudi Arabia offers a separate opportunity to expand Turkey’s defense-industrial reach and manufacturing partnerships. These partnerships offer Erdoğan something his domestic political record increasingly struggles to provide: visible achievements, international prestige, and opportunities to present Turkey as a rising regional power. They do not repair the institutions damaged by political patronage or restore the confidence of investors and workers who have lost trust in the system.

Israel should not mistake Turkey’s domestic problems for strategic weakness. Erdoğan retains a formidable defense industry, important regional relationships, and the political machinery to project influence beyond Turkey’s borders. For Israel, the concern is not simply the expansion of Turkish defense exports, but the consolidation of a regional network in which Ankara’s military partnerships, Doha’s political influence, and family-linked cultural outreach operate alongside one another. At home, however, the investment scandal and the deaths of steelworkers raise fundamental questions about the institutions governing the country. An Islamist movement that once promised moral renewal now faces the consequences of political patronage and weakened accountability. Erdoğan may continue expanding Turkey’s influence abroad, but he cannot indefinitely separate that ambition from the failures of the system he has built at home.

Published originally on November 14, 2026.

Amine Ayoub is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. His media contributions appeared in The Jerusalem Post, Yedioth Ahronoth , Arutz Sheva ,The Times of Israel and many others. His writings focus on Islamism, jihad, Israel and MENA politics. He tweets at @amineayoubx.
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