In a September 17, 2026, speech before the United Nations Security Council, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Danny Danon pointed to a reality that few diplomats and world leaders dare to discuss: Turkey’s military presence in Syria. His remarks came in the context of justifying Israel’s own military presence in parts of southern Syria. Danon noted that Turkey occupies a much larger swath of territory in northern Syria than Israel does in the south. He is correct. Yet this reality has received little attention.
Some apologists for Turkey might argue that Turkey’s presence in Syria is different from Israel’s because Turkey and Syria are now allies, and Turkey’s military presence is at the invitation of Damascus—except, that is not the case.
Turkey occupies a much larger swath of territory in northern Syria than Israel does in the south. ... Yet this reality has received little attention.
The Turkish military maintains an expansive presence across Idlib, Aleppo, and Hasaka provinces, following major military offensives in 2016, 2018, and 2019, long before the current Turkey-friendly regime came to power in Damascus. While the latter two operations were explicitly aimed at pushing Kurdish forces out of areas such as Afrin and Ras al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê), the first operation, launched in 2016, was ostensibly aimed at fighting the Islamic State. In reality, however, Turkey’s intervention was to prevent Kurdish forces from capturing Islamic State-held territory in northern Aleppo, particularly towns like al-Bab and Jarablus.
Turkey had opportunities to confront the Islamic State before then, even before the United States began its partnership with Kurdish forces to fight the terrorist group. Instead, Ankara allowed its border to serve as a conduit for the Islamic State’s fighters, supplies, and illicit trade. That period saw an active movement of oil and other goods smuggled from Islamic State-controlled territory into Turkey.
Syria’s new Islamist leadership benefits from its relationship with Turkey, but interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa is keen to avoid being seen as subordinate to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Since seizing power in December 2024, he has sought to project the image of an independent Syrian leader. But the prominent Turkish presence across parts of northern Syria complicates that effort. The Syrian government is in no position to challenge Turkey’s occupation of Syrian soil when its political survival, economic recovery, and security architecture remain so closely tied to Ankara.
The reality is that Turkey views Syria as a strategic backyard. What Erdoğan has pursued elsewhere—linking diplomatic recognition and assistance to arrangements that secure a Turkish presence—could be applied even more readily in Syria. Libya offers a useful example. In 2019, Turkey and Libya’s Government of National Accord signed two separate memorandums: one delineating maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean and another providing for security and military cooperation. The agreements not only deepened Turkey’s strategic and military involvement in Libya but also tied Tripoli’s survival to its willingness to accommodate Turkey’s strategic interests.
Turkey appears determined not merely to have a voice in its future, but to ensure that its own security and geopolitical interests are embedded in Syria’s reconstruction.
For Erdoğan, Syria is about more than securing Turkey’s immediate border interests. Ankara has spent the past decade demonstrating a willingness to project military power beyond its borders, from Syria and Iraq to Libya and the Caucasus.
Syria now presents an even more consequential opportunity. After more than a decade of war, the country’s institutions, military, and economy have been shattered, and its new leadership remains dependent on external partners to rebuild the state. Turkey can translate the influence it accumulated during the Syrian war into a long-term regional presence. This is part of a broader pattern in which Ankara has used the collapse or fragmentation of neighboring states to expand its political and military reach. With Syria in its postwar phase, Turkey appears determined not merely to have a voice in its future, but to ensure that its own security and geopolitical interests are embedded in Syria’s reconstruction.
Calling on foreign military forces to leave Syrian territory would be legitimate if applied consistently. The focus should not fall exclusively on Israel while overlooking Turkey’s far larger and longer-standing military presence in northern Syria. A credible approach must avoid a double standard: If foreign military presence is considered a violation of Syrian sovereignty, that standard should apply equally to all external powers operating on Syrian soil.
