War Talk Spreads in Iran as Protests Continue

Iran’s information dam has broken. Government-controlled media have begun coverage of the massive U.S. air and naval buildup in the region. While Tehran’s outlets frame the developments through interviews with regime officials and loyal pundits, previously taboo subjects—including the possible toppling of the Islamic regime—now appear in print.

Meanwhile, widespread protests have continued across Iran since February 18, 2026, including demonstrations at major universities and gatherings by families who lost relatives in the January crackdown. Security forces have used violence in some areas, but authorities have largely refrained from intervening in large memorial ceremonies for slain protesters. Notably, many of these events omitted Islamic prayers and instead featured defiant mourning rituals, including dance and protest songs. On several campuses, students clashed with Basij paramilitary members, with reports of injuries.

Much of the media discussion on February 22 centered on the potential objectives of an American strike: Would it be limited in scope and duration, or would it aim at dismantling the regime altogether? Newspapers and websites cite Western media assessments of U.S. strategy and regional dynamics. This approach allows them to discuss sensitive issues while shielding themselves from state censors, presenting the analysis as foreign reporting rather than their own position. The selections tend to highlight articles that suggest either a limited military operation or the continued possibility of diplomacy.

The relatively moderate Rouydad24 published a summary of a recent article by Marc Lynch, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University and director of the Project on Middle East Political Science. Lynch argues that if conflict erupts, Washington is unlikely to pursue a long-term occupation, since the U.S. posture emphasizes airpower and naval assets rather than ground forces. He suggests American planning envisions regime change without invasion and explores several post-conflict scenarios, ranging from political fragmentation to internal reform or power-sharing arrangements. Rouydad24, however, underscored Lynch’s warning that if the regime survives, it could emerge strengthened and suppress internal dissent.

An article in Nour News, close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, struck a confrontational tone. It warned that any U.S. or allied strike would carry consequences well beyond a “limited” operation. Emphasizing Iran’s strategic position in the Persian Gulf, the piece argued that under international law a coastal state facing a direct threat may adopt defensive measures, including restricting or temporarily blocking shipping through vital waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz. As Nour News stated, “In conditions of direct threat, a coastal state can take action to limit or even temporarily block international waterways in order to protect its national security.” The article said that more than 20 percent of global oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz and that disruption would send shockwaves through international energy markets.

In an interview with the Tehran-based website Fararu on February 22, Hossein Kanaani-Moghadam, a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander turned political analyst, described the current U.S. military posture as resembling preparations for a far broader conflict. He dismissed talk of a “limited strike” as political theater designed to preserve American credibility. “When talk turns to a limited operation, it means saving face,” he said, arguing that Washington uses the phrase to cushion itself if it fails to execute wider threats. Kanaani-Moghadam further implied that any strike would trigger retaliation—including against Israel—and could rapidly escalate into a regional war. He described the probability of conflict as “very high.”

It remains uncertain how events would unfold domestically if air strikes were to target military installations and possibly anti-riot forces. Many Iranians appear primed for renewed unrest, particularly those who lost friends and relatives in January 2026, when Iranian security forces killed an estimated 35,000 people, mostly ages 16 to 30. Ongoing protests in the streets and on university campuses present a challenge for a government that, under heavy bombardment, may be forced to disperse or conceal its forces—a dynamic that could embolden anti-regime protesters.