In what could prove to be the most consequential targeted killing of Iranian officials since the U.S.–Israeli air campaign began, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on March 17, 2026, that overnight strikes killed Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The Israeli Defense Forces also reported that a separate strike killed Basij commander General Gholamreza Soleimani and his deputy.
Larijani, a three-term former parliament speaker, assumed a central role after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening hours of hostilities on February 28, 2026. Observers saw him as a key pillar among the remaining leadership, bridging the political and military wings of the Islamic Republic. Tehran’s state media circulated what it described as a handwritten note from Larijani praising the navy, though the note was undated.
Observers saw [Larijani] as a key pillar among the remaining leadership, bridging the political and military wings of the Islamic Republic.
Gholamreza Soleimani had led the paramilitary Basij for six years, during which the paramilitary force served as a primary instrument of internal repression, including during nationwide protests in 2022 and January 2026. The Israel Defense Forces said that “under Soleimani, the Basij unit led the main repression operations in Iran, employing severe violence, widespread arrests, and the use of force against civilian demonstrators.”
These strikes could impose significant costs on an already strained leadership at a time when the status of Iran’s newly selected leader remains uncertain. Mojtaba Khamenei has not appeared in public since his father’s death, and no video or audio has emerged confirming that he is alive and exercising authority.
An unnamed Iranian source told Reuters that Mojtaba has rejected proposals to reduce tensions or pursue a ceasefire with the United States that were conveyed through two intermediary countries.
At the same time, senior Iranian officials have signaled a more confrontational posture in the Strait of Hormuz. Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf sought to justify restrictions on navigation, saying, “If the Strait of Hormuz is closed today, it is not because we intended to close it, but because we must defend ourselves.” Yet this position contradicts his broader assertion that the Strait’s legal and operational status will not return to normal, and that transit may depend on Iranian approval.
Reports on March 16 indicated that a limited number of commercial vessels passed after Iranian authorities verified their ownership. This points to a possible strategy of selective access, enabling Tehran to restrict navigation for states it considers adversaries and to use the waterway as leverage.
Ghalibaf reiterated that “from now on, given the interventions that have taken place, the Strait cannot, in legal terms or in traffic, function as it did in the past. … The situation will not return to its previous state.”
Some analysts argue that even a significantly degraded Iranian military could still pose a serious threat to commercial shipping.
Whether Tehran can sustain such a posture remains a question in the conflict. Some analysts argue that even a significantly degraded Iranian military could still pose a serious threat to commercial shipping. Continued U.S. strikes on coastal installations may reduce that risk, but it is unclear whether conditions would permit naval escorts for oil tankers in the near term.
Ali Abdollahi, a senior commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, reinforced this position on March 17, saying that “the armed forces are determined to use all geopolitical capacities, including managing and controlling transit through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, to bring aggressor enemies … to their knees.”
Sustained airstrikes and the apparent systematic removal of senior figures raise broader questions about the regime’s durability. Reports point to growing disarray within the security forces, including defections and declining morale, driven in part by irregular pay and the constant threat of attack—even in urban areas.
