Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated Tehran’s conditions for ending the conflict with the United States and Israel in a March 15, 2026, interview. He demanded guarantees that no further attacks would occur and demanded reparations. The interview, conducted with the Tehran correspondent of an Arabic outlet, appeared to be aimed at public diplomacy toward neighboring states after Iran launched hundreds of missiles and drones at the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Oman.
Araghchi insisted that the Islamic Republic had not targeted civilian areas in those Arab countries and argued that the United States was using replicas of Shahed drones to cause damage and blame Iran. He also alleged that “the Americans are hiding behind residential areas” in the United Arab Emirates while firing High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) missiles at targets in the Persian Gulf.
“The Strait of Hormuz is closed only to American and allied ships and oil tankers because they are fighting us, but it is open to others.”
Araghchi reaffirmed that Tehran intends to continue restricting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, though he maintained that Iran is not targeting all vessels. “I must make this perfectly clear. The Strait of Hormuz is closed only to American and allied ships and oil tankers because they are fighting us, but it is open to others,” he said, without specifying which countries he considers U.S. allies. He added that Iran would not allow free navigation “as long as the attacks continue.”
When asked whether the recent U.S. airstrike on Kharg Island—Iran’s main oil export hub—could be a prelude to an American landing and possible occupation, Araghchi replied that “the attack on Kharg was a mistake, and occupying Kharg would be an even bigger mistake.” He suggested that the Islamic Republic was not afraid of a U.S. ground operation because “we know how to confront them.”
Meanwhile, the United States has dispatched a Marine Expeditionary Unit of roughly 2,500 Marines to the Middle East. Such units function as rapid-reaction forces capable of conducting limited ground operations, securing ports and critical infrastructure, or seizing key maritime terrain such as islands and strategic shipping routes. While this force could be used to secure Iranian coastal territory along the Strait of Hormuz, it also could be deployed in a contingency operation involving Kharg Island.
Some Iranian observers say the Islamic Republic and its supporters still believe the current war is temporary. Once the bombing stops and the skies become safe again, they believe, the regime will return to its familiar cycle: rebuilding damaged military infrastructure, resuming oil exports, restoring its regional proxy network, and reviving its nuclear program until the issue resurfaces in future negotiations. Domestic politics also would revert to routine—with controlled elections, periodic hostage-taking, and renewed repression—while an exhausted population falls back into line. Critics argue that such thinking shows the leadership has not yet grasped how the conflict may have altered Iran’s strategic position.
Armed security forces and plainclothes agents continue to patrol the streets, despite the risk of Israeli drone strikes.
At the same time, some analysts contend that the regime’s calculations underestimate the scale of damage already inflicted on its internal security apparatus. According to Iranian commentator Ali-Hossein Ghazizadeh, the Islamic Republic’s ability to suppress unrest depended on not only armed personnel in the streets but an extensive network of command centers, surveillance systems, intelligence databases, and logistical bases. He says many of these structures—including control rooms coordinating thousands of cameras and drones, police stations used as firing positions, intelligence databases, and logistical hubs—have been destroyed or disrupted. Without those supporting systems, security forces operating on the streets lose the centralized guidance, information flow, and logistical backing that previously enabled them to track protesters, coordinate deployments, and sustain large-scale repression.
This paralysis could lead to the final phase of the conflict that many Iranians hope will culminate in an uprising. In such a scenario, protesters would be able to gather in large numbers and seize regime power centers without facing the mass repression witnessed in January 2026, when security forces reportedly killed around 35,000 people.
Political and military officials who remain alive appear determined to prevent such a scenario. Armed security forces and plainclothes agents continue to patrol the streets, despite the risk of Israeli drone strikes targeting even small concentrations of personnel. How long the regime can maintain this presence remains uncertain.
