President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (“Irro”) continues his visit to the United States, with a heavy schedule of government and think tank meetings in Washington. Still, the drive for U.S. recognition of Somaliland appears to be stalled. While the Trump administration remains tight-lipped, insiders place the blame on two offices: One is Deputy Secretary of State Chris Landau, who, short of being told otherwise, is unwilling to buck a Mogadishu-centric policy that dates to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The other block reportedly is the National Security Council’s counterterrorism office. Officials there worry that recognition of Somaliland will undercut ongoing U.S. counterterrorism cooperation with Somalia.
While President Donald Trump withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia during his first term, President Joe Biden returned them after he took office.
The U.S. military long has deployed trainers and special operators to Somalia to bolster that country’s fight against Al Shabaab and to help support African Union peacekeepers. While President Donald Trump withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia during his first term, President Joe Biden returned them after he took office. There reportedly are small contingents of U.S. troops at the Baledogle airfield, an old Italian base, inland from Mogadishu, and some U.S. personnel reportedly operate in the Halane compound area they share with the United Nations and African Union missions. There also reportedly are some Navy SEALS and other special operators in Bosaso and Kismayo. There have been, at least temporarily, U.S. personnel in Baidoa, Dhusamareb, and Jowhar.
In addition, U.S. military and intelligence officials increasingly support the counterterrorism mission from Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, Kenya, and Somaliland itself. There have been two main targets for U.S. action: the Islamic State encampment in the Golis Mountains in Puntland, near Bosaso, and the broader fight against Al Shabaab.
The idea that supporting Somaliland means sacrificing Somalia’s cooperation rests on foolish assumptions and inherently highlights how poor the partnership with Mogadishu is.
First, consider Puntland and the fight against the Islamic State. Puntland resents the federal government in Mogadishu, because Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—selected, rather than elected, and now past his constitutional term—rejects the federal rights of states like Puntland. Although Puntland and Somaliland are rivals and have a border dispute, they also cooperate. While Puntland remains in the federal government for now, Mogadishu’s centralization drive is as likely to force Puntland to follow Somaliland’s path as it is to bring Puntland to heel.
Nor does it make sense that Puntland would stop assistance containing and countering the Islamic State. While some Somali officials and the Turkish intelligence officials who support them dream they can leverage the Islamic State against Somaliland, Puntland is unlikely to stop counterterrorism cooperation. Its capital, Garowe, is a sleepy, inland town, ironically dependent on Somaliland trade; Puntland’s broader economic future rests with its Bosaso port, located just 44 miles from the Islamic State Somaliland’s mountain headquarters.
Somalia’s cooperation with Al Shabaab is trickier. While Al Shabaab threatens President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s appointed government, the president’s corruption ensures that even the U.S.-trained Danab Special Forces cannot win. Meanwhile, the Turkish-trained Gorgor unit is as likely to support Al Shabaab as to fight its members. Repeatedly, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has shown himself more willing to deploy Somali forces against his political competitors or federal state challengers than to defeat the Islamists. Today, it is impossible to run a business or construct a building in Mogadishu without an Al Shabaab permit. Somalis are more willing to trust Al Shabaab justice than state courts due to speed of operation and perceived lack of corruption.
While Al Shabaab threatens President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s appointed government, the president’s corruption ensures that even the U.S.-trained Danab Special Forces cannot win.
In effect, the pattern in Somalia now is akin to what the United States experiences in Pakistan. As Washington shelled out billions of dollars to support Pakistani counterterror efforts, it created a moral hazard in which continuation of lucrative military assistance required that Pakistani forces never completely defeat the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or other radial Deobandi groups. If the National Security Council believes defeating Al Shabaab requires sacrificing the aspirations of democratic, pro-West, and secure Somaliland and wining the good graces of a Mogadishu government that repeatedly has shown itself to be little more than a Chinese puppet and a Turkish satrapy, Americans will die.
Counterterrorism cooperation and extortion are not synonymous. The only way to truly secure the Gulf of Aden and, eventually, roll back Al Shabaab’s gains in Somalia will be to recognize and partner with Somaliland, then to consolidate security in Puntland and Jubaland, and finally to extricate and then deal with Al Shabaab, despite Mogadishu rather than necessarily in partnership with it.
