The January 2026 attacks by Syrian government forces and their tribal allies against the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the agreement that interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s regime subsequently imposed, ushered in a new reality in the relationship between Damascus and the Kurds. Damascus won, while the Syrian Democratic Forces suffered defeat. It is this reality that defines the new equation and drives the current dynamics between the two sides.
From this reality, al-Sharaa’s government treats the integration deal as synonymous with assimilation and acts accordingly. Damascus wants the Kurds to understand that the central government is in charge of the Kurdish areas. A recent incident illustrates this. On May 6, 2026, the government removed a bilingual Arabic-Kurdish sign for the main courthouse in Hasaka Province and replaced it with a new one in which English replaced Kurdish, even though Damascus now recognizes Kurdish as a national language. The move angered local youths, who tore down the sign.
Damascus wants the Kurds to understand that the central government is in charge of the Kurdish areas.
The incident shows Damascus’s broader effort to assert its authority and reshape the political reality in the region. It also demonstrates that the Kurdish governor, an operative of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and other officials appointed under the recent deal yield limited powers.
Al-Sharaa’s regime does not hide its intention to impose a monolithic cultural character for Syria, or at least one that aligns with its Islamist vision. For the Kurds, it seeks to cultivate a Kurdish identity that it distorts, subordinates, and largely strips of its distinct political character. Al-Sharaa and his militant backers wants to exploit the current balance of power, which favors Damascus, to alter long-standing realities in the Kurdish region.
But Damascus is not the only party to blame for this situation. The Syrian Democratic Forces is also complacent. Its leadership wants to present this integration as an opportunity to become part of the state. But for that to happen, both sides would need to stand on equal footing. That is not the case. The Syrian government treats the Syrian Democratic Forces as a subordinate actor, and the latter appears either oblivious to that reality or simply willing to accept it in exchange for a share of power, however small that might be.
It is difficult for any party in a conflict to admit defeat. But if the Syrian Democratic Forces wants to keep its political structure relevant in the long run, it needs to be candid with its supporters. That has not happened yet. With a few exceptions among second- and third-tier officials, leaders in the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria not only have refused to acknowledge their failure but also have doubled down on portraying the integration process as a success.
Nothing is democratic about a process imposed on the Syrian Democratic Forces by military force.
In a recent pan-Arab podcast, Syrian Democratic Forces commander Mazloum Abdi appeared regretful when asked about hosting a religious dialogue conference held in August 2025 that included Druze and Alawi figures considered strong opponents of Damascus. Another senior official from the Democratic Union Party, the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces, described the current situation as “democratic integration.” Such framing does little to advance their position. If anything, it is backfiring within large segments of a frustrated Kurdish community, because the reality is clear: Nothing is democratic about a process imposed on the Syrian Democratic Forces by military force.
The Syrian regime has proven its effectiveness in manipulating semantics. With support from its new partners in Washington, its use of “integration” as a concept has allowed it to recentralize Syria, while rendering the Kurdish experiment in autonomy largely meaningless. But the Kurds should not raise the flag of surrender. They still have influential backers in Washington, particularly in Congress, who may help prevent their position from being fully absorbed into a heavily centralized Syrian state.
