The United States Exiting Kurdish Syria Is a Mistake

On April 16, 2026, the U.S. military evacuated its final base in northeast Syria, effectively ending a partnership of more than a decade with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. The handover of the Qasrak base in Hasaka to the Syrian government marked not the natural conclusion of a successful campaign against the Islamic State, but rather, a pattern of premature disengagement in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

Since 2014, the United States and Kurdish forces in Syria have built a strong partnership against considerable odds. Beyond their battlefield successes against the Islamic State, the Kurdish population welcomed American troops and saw their presence as protection against both internal and external threats. In a hostile environment, that backing helped sustain local governance structures and gave Kurdish communities a degree of confidence about their future.

Over the years, whenever talk surfaced of a possible U.S. withdrawal from Syria, Kurds voiced concern about their future. When U.S. forces partially withdrew from northeast Syria during President Donald Trump’s first term in 2019, Kurdish protesters decried the decision, fearing that they would be left vulnerable to attacks by Turkey and other actors.

Yet, when the last plumes of smoke from burn pits rose over the Qasrak airbase, local Kurds did not respond with anger or fear. That’s because they had already absorbed the shock of American abandonment earlier in 2026. The United States had played a significant role in the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a process set in motion by a January 29 agreement between the Kurds and Damascus’s interim authorities. For Kurdish leaders, the deal signaled what was to come: an eventual U.S. troop withdrawal.

Syrian Kurds took pride in their unique partnership with the United States. The feeling was mutual. During many visits to northeast Syria over the years, U.S. soldiers and commanders often spoke of their admiration for a force they described as disciplined, resilient, and reliable under pressure.

While Syrian Kurds submitted to their fate and accepted an integration deal imposed upon them, the United States still had an opportunity to maintain its military presence in the Kurdish region, regardless of the changing status of Kurdish forces.

The Iraq case offered a precedent. The Obama administration’s withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011 was consequential. In 2011, Iraq was still taking tentative steps to build its security institutions and state functions and, like Syria, its military lacked capacity. Less than three years later, the rise of the Islamic State in the vacuum forced President Barack Obama to redeploy U.S. forces.

A similar set of circumstances now unfolds in Syria. The country has been undergoing a fragile Islamist-led transition since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in 2024. In recent months, it has faced significant security challenges, while its military and security institutions, many of whose members have roots in extremist jihadist groups, remain ill-prepared and far from cohesive. If anything, Syria’s situation today is even more precarious than was Iraq’s in 2011.

The Middle East is at one of its most unstable moments in recent years. Terrorist groups are poised to exploit the prevailing insecurity across the region, seeking to make gains in weak states like Syria.

The United States still retains political and military leverage in Syria. U.S. military officials say they will continue partner-led counterterrorism efforts in Syria. But Washinton may no longer have the same partnership with Syrian Kurds, not least because Kurdish forces are now, in practice, dissolved into the Syrian military structure. Yet even a limited U.S. military presence in Syria could help shape a more effective counterterrorism effort—one that avoids costly reversals.