The moment of truth for the Kurds in Syria arrived in a dramatic fashion: There will be no autonomy in the way that many Kurds had envisioned for themselves after exercising de facto self-rule for more than a decade. In the span of just two weeks, Kurdish-led forces have lost more than two-thirds of the territory they controlled in northeast Syria.
Shortly after taking over the two predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo earlier in January, Syrian government forces and affiliated militias launched another large-scale offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces across the eastern part of Aleppo province, as well as Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. With few exceptions, most cities and towns fell rapidly as Kurdish-led forces withdrew. Most of these areas had been under the Syrian Democratic Forces’ control for nearly a decade, following their liberation from the Islamic State with the support of the U.S.-led global coalition.
In the span of just two weeks, Kurdish-led forces have lost more than two-thirds of the territory they controlled in northeast Syria.
The offensive culminated on January 18, 2026, with the announcement of a new agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces, replacing their March 10, 2025, agreement. The new deal strips the Kurdish forces of most of its authority. With a complete Syrian government takeover, the Syrian Democratic Forces no longer will have a presence in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. In the Kurdish-majority Hasaka province, all civilian institutions will be integrated into the state structure, and fighters with the Syrian Democratic Forces will be integrated into Syria’s defense and interior ministries as individuals, rather than an intact force. A similar arrangement will be made for the city of Kobani, which is part of Aleppo province.
All in all, the fourteen-point agreement represents a major setback for Syrian Kurds and their political aspirations.
What lies ahead for the Kurds is a constrained—and likely largely nominal—form of administrative autonomy in Hasaka province and Kobani. The other Kurdish region, Afrin in northwest Syria, will remain under direct Syrian government rule.
For years, the Syrian Democratic Forces and its civilian institutions attempted to build an multi-ethnic, multi-religious political entity in areas under their control. That project effectively collapsed on January 18. The rapid and widespread defections of Arab tribes and prominent Arab figures from the Syrian Democratic Forces and its Autonomous Administration underscores the failure of Kurdish efforts to redefine social and political relations with Arab communities. The reality is that most Arabs did not accept Kurdish-led governance in their areas, even though the Syrian Democratic Forces’ model bore no resemblance to the authoritarian nationalist Arab regimes that historically oppressed the Kurds across the region.
Syrian Kurds are deeply disappointed by the turn of events. A prevailing sentiment among them is one of abandonment by friends and allies. Over the last decade, they viewed themselves as close partners of the United States—not only in the fight against the Islamic State, in which the Kurds lost more than 12,000 fighters, but also because they are genuinely pro-American and pro-Western. But it has become clear to them that the United States and the West have sided with the Syrian state, even though it is led by a former jihadist.
The Kurds are the last hope for a democratic Syria. However, with their military and political institutions now in disarray, they are unlikely to serve as an effective force in steering Syria toward a pluralistic system in which all ethnicities, religions, and sects enjoy equal rights and representation.
Syria’s interim government authorities ... will soon take control of camps and detention centers that hold thousands of dangerous Islamic State terrorists and their families.
Syria today is governed by not only former jihadists, but also significant elements within its military and administrative structures that adhere to extremist ideologies. It is a mix of radical currents ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to Salafism. Massacres against the Druze and Alawi communities, and most recently the Kurds in Aleppo, demonstrate that the country is unlikely to move toward stability anytime soon.
Washington’s hope for long-term stability in Syria may prove illusory. Syria’s interim government authorities, as part of the January 18 agreement, will soon take control of camps and detention centers that hold thousands of dangerous Islamic State terrorists and their families. Beyond having members of its military forces who hold sympathy for the Islamic State, the Syrian government has failed to demonstrate effective capacity to address the threat posed by the group.
The attack in Palmyra in December 2025, which killed two U.S. servicemembers and a civilian translator, was carried out by a member of the Syrian government security forces. If that incident showed anything, it is that the threat facing U.S. interests in Syria is not confined to terrorist groups.
