Turkey’s Maritime Strategy Heightens the Risk of a New Eastern Mediterranean Crisis

Ankara’s New Legislative Initiative May Appear Technical or Bureaucratic, but It Represents a Calculated Escalation by Erdoğan

The Greek island of Kastellorizo sits only a few miles off the southern coast of Turkey.

The Greek island of Kastellorizo sits only a few miles off the southern coast of Turkey.

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Turkey is once again seeking to alter the maritime boundaries of the Eastern Mediterranean. According to a recent Bloomberg report, Ankara is preparing legislation to formalize its claims to disputed maritime zones in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. The proposed legislation reportedly would codify Turkey’s long-standing “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) doctrine into Turkish law, institutionalizing expansive claims that overlap with the exclusive economic zones claimed by Greece and Cyprus.

“Blue Homeland” projects a maximalist interpretation of Turkey’s maritime borders that contradicts established maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Across television stations, the print press, and social media, personalities ranging from senior military figures to government elites to pundits project maps of “Blue Homeland,” leading many Turks to believe that this revisionist interpretation of Turkey’s maritime borders is, in fact, real and accepted.

Although Ankara’s new legislative initiative may initially appear technical or bureaucratic, it represents a deliberate, calculated escalation by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This action is intended to challenge the regional order in the eastern Mediterranean, exert pressure on neighboring states, and position Turkey as the dominant maritime power between Europe and the Middle East.

“Blue Homeland” projects a maximalist interpretation of Turkey’s maritime borders that contradicts established maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The timing of this plan is particularly inopportune. The Eastern Mediterranean is one of the most militarized and politically volatile regions in Europe. The continuing conflict in Gaza, heightened tensions between Israel and Iran, instability in Syria, and renewed great power competition have increased regional anxieties. By seeking to codify expansive maritime claims that contravene international legal norms, Ankara risks escalating long-standing disputes into a significantly more dangerous confrontation.

At the heart of the problem lies Turkey’s rejection of the modern international maritime framework. Ankara is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the legal framework regulating maritime rights and exclusive economic zones. Washington also is not a signatory but successive U.S. administrations abide by it and respect it because it is based on common and established maritime law. Turkey, however, argues that Greek islands close to the Turkish mainland should not enjoy full maritime zones, particularly islands such as Kastellorizo, which sits only a few miles off the southern coast of Turkey. By contrast, Greece and Cyprus insist that islands are entitled to full maritime rights under international law.

Even if Turkey believes it has a legal claim, it has pursued it less through diplomacy and more through aggressive rhetoric and overt military threats against Greece and Cyprus. In recent years, Turkey repeatedly has used naval deployments, seismic survey vessels, and military escorts to contest Greek and Cypriot claims. Turkish exploration ships operating in disputed waters have often triggered crises with Athens and Nicosia. In 2020, the deployment of the Turkish research vessel Oruç Reis into contested waters brought Greece and Turkey, both NATO allies, to the brink of a military confrontation.

The current risk of escalation is arguably greater than in the past. Unlike previous incidents, Turkey now seeks to institutionalize these claims through parliamentary legislation. This development is significant because it reduces Erdoğan’s flexibility for compromise and champions confrontation within state policy. Once such claims are codified into law, reversing them becomes politically costly domestically and strategically challenging internationally. Furthermore, Ankara’s actions extend beyond maritime boundaries and form part of a broader revisionist foreign policy agenda that Turkey has pursued across multiple regions over the past decade.

The risk of accidental or intentional confrontation between Greece and Turkey is now a serious concern.

Turkey’s intervention in Libya in 2019 offers an instructive example. Ankara’s military backing of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord was not merely ideological or geopolitical. In exchange for military support, Turkey secured a maritime delimitation agreement with Libya that dramatically expanded Turkish claims across the Mediterranean while disregarding Greek maritime zones. At the most extreme, the agreement ignored the existence of the Greek island of Crete. The European Union and regional states condemned the agreement as legally dubious and destabilizing.

Similarly, Turkey has combined maritime claims with military coercion in other contexts. Ankara has deployed drones, naval assets, and missile systems in the Eastern Mediterranean while intensifying nationalist rhetoric against Greece and Cyprus. Erdoğan has threatened Greece that Turkey could “come suddenly one night,” a statement that many Greek officials interpret as a military threat.

This combination of legal revisionism and military signaling generates a dangerous environment. The risk of accidental or intentional confrontation between Greece and Turkey is now a serious concern. Both countries maintain heavy armed forces in proximity across the Aegean. Airspace violations, naval shadowing incidents, and competing military exercises often occur. A collision, miscalculation, or a politically motivated escalation could develop quickly into a larger crisis involving NATO and the European Union.

Cyprus represents a volatile flashpoint. Turkey is the only country to recognize the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and maintains tens of thousands of troops on the island following its 1974 invasion. Ankara increasingly has linked maritime disputes to Cyprus’s energy exploration activities, threatening companies and states cooperating with the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus.

The more significant consequences go beyond regional tensions. Turkey’s actions undermine energy cooperation projects that could contribute to Europe’s energy security amid major geopolitical uncertainty. These actions discourage investment, weaken diplomatic coordination, and intensify mistrust among NATO allies at a time when Western cohesion is already under strain. Ankara’s posturing is also likely to undermine its efforts to position itself as a new trade and energy corridor, as evidenced by its plans to promote the “Middle Corridor” and the “Iraq Development Road.”

The “Blue Homeland” concept is not solely a defensive naval strategy; it reflects an increasingly nationalist and neo-imperial worldview.

The ideological framework underlying Turkey’s maritime doctrine is also a cause for concern. The “Blue Homeland” concept is not solely a defensive naval strategy; it reflects an increasingly nationalist and neo-imperial worldview Erdoğan and segments of Turkey’s military and political establishment promote. This doctrine envisions Turkey as a dominant regional power with the right to project influence across extensive maritime areas, from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. This ambition places Ankara on a collision course with not only Greece and Cyprus, but also other regional state actors.

Supporters of Turkey contend that Ankara is defending its legitimate interests against efforts to exclude it from Eastern Mediterranean energy arrangements. While it is accurate that regional frameworks often exclude Turkey, coercion and legal revisionism do not constitute productive alternatives to diplomacy. Rather than promote regional integration, Turkey’s actions risk increasing its isolation.

At a time when the Eastern Mediterranean requires de-escalation, energy coordination, and security cooperation, Ankara appears determined to provoke another crisis. The risk is that Erdoğan’s government may perceive confrontation as serving Turkey’s interests by mobilizing nationalist sentiment domestically and extorting concessions internationally. Erdoğan is keen to be re-elected for a fourth presidential term but will have to be creative in wooing Turkish voters who are dissatisfied with his economic management of the country. Stirring tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean is a tried-and-tested method likely to win over some skeptical voters.

Turkey’s repeated escalations in the Eastern Mediterranean have created distrust, catalyzed counter-alliances, and sparked growing concern within NATO regarding Ankara’s long-term trajectory. Formalizing contested maritime claims through legislation risks entrenching these divisions for years to come. In one of the world’s most fragile geopolitical regions, such a gamble is one the region can scarcely afford.

Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow and director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an associate professor of national security studies at the Marine Corps University.
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