While 2025 proved an eventful year for Syria, it brought few surprises. The political and security developments that unfolded across the country mirrored established post-conflict patterns, albeit tailored to Syria’s unique character.
Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, the new Islamist authorities led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, once an Al Qaeda terrorist wanted by the United States, set the tone for Syria’s trajectory in 2025 and likely beyond. After assuming power, the interim president made numerous promises, but bringing democracy was not one of them. He proved his skeptics right by establishing a regime loyal to him and his Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham group, installing himself in all top government positions and appointing family members and close allies to the remaining key posts.
The interim constitution adopted in March … stipulates that the president of the Syrian Arab Republic must be Muslim and that Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.
Syria is supposed to be in a period of transition. In practice, however, what has unfolded since the toppling of Assad is a recycled form of authoritarianism. Rather than the Baathist model rooted in Arab nationalism, the emerging order combines Arab nationalism and Sunni Muslim supremacy. This was evident in the interim constitution adopted in March, which, among other provisions, stipulates that the president of the Syrian Arab Republic must be Muslim and that Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation. This provision alone excludes non-Muslim and non-Arab communities from participating in national politics on equal footing. The constitutional declaration was preceded by a so-called national dialogue conference—a hastily prepared gathering that served to demonstrate loyalty to al-Sharaa and his new regime. Al-Sharra made no serious attempt to engage genuine representatives of Syria’s ethnic and religious communities.
As a result of its failure to engage Syria’s diverse communities, Damascus not only tolerated but also participated in large-scale attacks against Alawis in March and Druze in July, further alienating key segments of Syrian society and undermining any prospect for meaningful reconciliation. Jihadist factions and other extremist groups that form the core of the new Syrian military played a key role in carrying out those massacres.
The only group the Syrian government has thus far avoided targeting directly is the Kurds. This restraint, however, is not due to al-Sharaa’s inclusive approach, but rather to the Kurds’ possession of a powerful military force—the Syrian Democratic Forces—and their backing by the United States. On March 10, the Syrian government and Syrian Democratic Forces signed an agreement to initiate the integration of the Kurdish-led forces and the areas under their control in the Northeast into the Syrian state. With the end of the year set as a deadline, many key aspects of that agreement have yet to produce tangible results. The process has not been without major setbacks and brief episodes of violence between the two sides. One of the main points of contention is whether the Syrian Democratic Forces should join the Syrian military as an intact unit or as individual fighters—the latter being a demanded by Damascus and Ankara, which insists on dissolving the Kurdish-led force it considers terrorist.
Syrian Kurds demand a decentralized form of governance that would allow local communities across the country to administer their affairs.
Another issue concerns the structure of the state: Syrian Kurds demand a decentralized form of governance that would allow local communities across the country to administer their affairs. Damascus, on the other hand, insists on a centralized state with limited administrative powers to provinces that even existed under the Assad regime. The Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government hold opposite worldviews, so the fate of this agreement could determine not only the future of Syria as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-sectarian state, but also the extent of Damascus’s agency moving forward—particularly in relation to Turkish interference.
On the transitional justice front, the Syrian government made little-to-no progress in 2025. Despite establishing commissions to address transitional justice, such efforts have yielded no meaningful outcomes, as the government defines transitional justice solely through the prism of crimes committed by the Assad regime, while ignoring serious abuses carried out by rebel groups, including al-Sharaa’s own faction, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Even this one-sided process frequently has been instrumentalized by Damascus as a tool for political retribution or strategic calculation.
In October, Damascus stage-managed an election for a parliament that would serve for the next two-and-a-half years—yet another tool for al-Sharaa to consolidate his rule. In a tightly controlled process that took place only in areas under government control, 140 of the 210 legislative seats were elected through a limited electorate of 6,000 people, while al-Sharaa directly selected the remaining seventy members. The Syrian government excluded from the vote three provinces in the Northeast under Kurdish control and one in the south under Druze control.
The Syrian government made it clear from the outset that it prioritized foreign engagement and international legitimacy over addressing domestic issues. Al-Sharaa’s government was effective in its diplomatic outreach to restore Syria’s ties with the international community, but much of the credit for this success, if not all, goes to other countries—namely, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar.
Extensive lobbying by these countries produced one of the few surprises for Syria in 2025, when President Donald Trump met with al-Sharaa in Riyadh in May and announced the removal of U.S. sanctions on the country. This was followed by al-Sharaa’s visit to the White House in November—the first such visit by a Syrian leader. Trump’s pledge culminated on December 18, when he signed the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, which included provisions for lifting the Caesar Act sanctions against Syria.
Without addressing fundamental political, societal, and intra-ethnic challenges, Syria will struggle to achieve durable stability.
The removal of such sanctions is a welcome step, offering Syrians an opportunity to begin rebuilding their devastated economy. Yet the manner of lifting sanctions surprised even the most optimistic advocates of U.S. support for Damascus. Prior to his Riyadh meeting with Trump, al-Sharaa had been prepared to make significant concessions in exchange for U.S. backing of his government. Since the fall of Assad, the United States has called for an inclusive governing system in which all ethnic and religious communities participate. Conditioning removal of sanctions would have functioned as leverage to ensure the emergence of a representative government in post-Assad Syria. Their rapid removal, however, undermined this leverage and signaled to al-Sharaa that Washington is not as resolute in defending Syria’s vulnerable communities.
Al-Sharaa and his allies envision an economic future for Syria grounded in free-market principles. While lifting U.S. sanctions may help advance this vision, it is far from sufficient. Experience in the region and beyond shows that economic development alone cannot stabilize states. Without addressing fundamental political, societal, and intra-ethnic challenges, Syria will struggle to achieve durable stability. Although there are no real prospects for a democratic transition under Islamist rule, the fact that Syria will formally remain “in transition” for the next four years offers a narrow glimmer of hope that a more participatory system of governance could at least prevent further devastation.
