The December 13, 2025, attack near the town of Palmyra in central Syria, which killed two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter and wounded three other service members, is a reminder of the challenges facing the United States as it seeks to forge a partnership with Syria’s new military.
Although U.S. Central Command initially attributed the ambush attack to an Islamic State gunman, a spokesman for Syria’s interior ministry acknowledged on state television that the attacker was, in fact, a member of Syrian security forces who adhered to an extremist ideology.
The incident exposes the Syrian military’s fragility and the structural weaknesses it faces in central Syria and other areas under its control.
Local sources said the attacker was the personal guard of the Syrian military commander responsible for central Syria. While Damascus has not confirmed this claim, the spokesman for the interior ministry said a vetting process two days prior to the Saturday assault had raised suspicions about the attacker. Despite these warnings, no action was taken to prevent him from carrying out the attack. Regardless, the incident exposes the Syrian military’s fragility and the structural weaknesses it faces in central Syria and other areas under its control.
Palmyra lies within the vast Syrian desert known as the Badiya, which long has been an epicenter of Islamic State activity, particularly after the group’s territorial defeat by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in eastern Syria in 2019. Although forces of the former regime of Bashar al-Assad, along with their Russian and Iranian allies, conducted operations against the Islamic State elements in the region, those efforts were largely unserious, as they prioritized fighting anti-regime rebels elsewhere in the country.
The interim Syrian government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, inherited a territory rife with Islamic State activity, which has intensified since Assad’s collapse in December 2024. But this is only one of the challenges confronting the new Syrian government. A deeper problem is within the military itself, which is largely composed of Islamist and jihadist factions long known for their anti-American views. As more people join the military, especially in central Syria, the pool of recruits inevitably will include individuals with ties to the Islamic State.
In November 2025, Syria officially joined the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State, another move by al-Sharaa to demonstrate his government’s seriousness on counterterrorism. Syrian government troops have aided U.S. forces in a couple of limited operations against the Islamic State, but this cooperation falls far short of representing a genuine counterterrorism partnership.
This attack underscores the urgent need for the United States to reassess its partnership with the new Syrian military, particularly since the relationship is still in its formative stage. Washington cannot risk partnering with a military that lacks the capacity of basic vetting. Without such capabilities, similar insider attacks by extremist elements could put U.S. troops at risk during joint patrols with their Syrian counterparts.
This attack underscores the urgent need for the United States to reassess its partnership with the new Syrian military.
Now is an opportune moment for the United States to increase its engagement in the ongoing integration talks between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. American officials should ensure that any integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian military includes two key conditions: first, the Syrian Democratic Forces join as an intact force, rather than as individual members; and second, Kurdish commanders are allowed to assume senior positions within the Syrian military, particularly in counterterrorism roles.
Since its founding in 2015, the Syrian Democratic Forces has maintained a successful partnership with the United States. Together, they liberated vast territory previously held by the Islamic State, culminating in the group’s territorial defeat in Baghuz in 2019.
During this decade-long collaboration, there has been no incident in which U.S. personnel were attacked by their Syrian Democratic Forces counterparts, something remarkable given the fact that the Syrian Democratic Forces is a non-state actor operating in a complex and volatile part of the Middle East. I was once embedded with American troops in northeast Syria. I saw firsthand how U.S. soldiers built strong bonds with their Kurdish counterparts. A senior U.S. commander on the ground told me that their partnership with the Kurdish forces in Syria was one of the most successful examples of genuine collaboration between U.S. forces and local actors.
The Syrian Democratic Forces has demonstrated effectiveness and discipline. Their capabilities could be a major asset for the new Syrian military, and the United States is in a unique position to leverage its relations with Syrian Kurds and Damascus to facilitate meaningful integration between the Kurdish Forces and the Syrian military.
