Syrian government forces launched a new wave of attacks on January 6, 2026, on two predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo, killing at least seven civilians and wounding more than fifty others. The violence has forced tens of thousands of Kurdish residents of Sheikh Maqsud and Ashrafiyeh to flee their homes.
Syrian government forces initiated this week’s attacks, yet Damascus blamed the Syrian Democratic Forces for striking first.
This is not the first time these two neighborhoods, home to some 400,000 people, have witnessed violent clashes since the Islamist government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa assumed power in December 2024. Despite a compromise to jointly administer the two neighborhoods in northern Aleppo—reached as part of a March 2025 agreement between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and the interim government in Damascus—there have been at least a half-dozen episodes of violence between Syrian government forces and internal Kurdish security forces in and around the two neighborhoods. This time, however, the situation appears different, not least because of the government’s escalatory actions both on the ground and through its media apparatus.
Sheikh Maqsud and Ashrafiyeh, long considered Kurdish strongholds in Aleppo, have been under the control of Kurdish forces since 2012, shortly after the outbreak of the Syrian conflict. Despite occasional tensions with the regime of former President Bashar al-Assad, the presence of Kurdish forces in both neighborhoods largely spared them from the violence that engulfed other parts of the city.
Syrian government forces initiated this week’s attacks, yet Damascus blamed the Syrian Democratic Forces for striking first. The irony is that the Syrian Democratic Forces has no presence in Aleppo city. Under an April 2025 agreement, fighters affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces withdrew from the city to northeast Syria, leaving behind only internal Kurdish security forces who were placed under the command of Syria’s interior ministry. These local Kurdish security forces—now resisting government attacks—retain a limited degree of autonomy within Aleppo.
Militarily, Syrian government forces could seize full control of these neighborhoods, which are, in effect, besieged on all sides. Politically, however, such a move could prove costly for Damascus. It could further jeopardize the already fragile March agreement, which is aimed at integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces and its civilian institutions in northeast Syria into the state structure. It also could trigger clashes elsewhere between government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, particularly in other parts of Aleppo province and in Deir Ezzor further east, where the Kurdish-led forces have the upper hand.
The Syrian government forces poised to enter the Kurdish neighborhoods are largely the same extremist factions that have carried out atrocities against Kurdish civilians elsewhere in northern Syria. Notably, Turkey-backed rebel groups that are now formally incorporated into Syria’s defense ministry continue to take their orders from their militia commanders, who, in turn, are directed by Turkish military and intelligence officials. This dynamic helps explain why Ankara may be instigating the violence in Aleppo.
The only actor with both the leverage and interest to intervene diplomatically is the United States.
Indeed, nearly every time Kurdish and Syrian officials meet to negotiate the implementation of the March agreement, a new wave of violence follows. Turkey, which labels the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces as a terrorist organization, is determined to prevent Damascus from making any political or military concessions to Kurdish forces. Turkey’s demand from this integration process is a full surrender of the Syrian Democratic Forces.
While Damascus recently has appeared open to integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian military in the form of three divisions, President al-Sharaa’s government would not object if pressure on the Kurds in Aleppo—or even the takeover of their neighborhoods in the city—were to force their hand into accepting integration on Damascus’s terms.
The latest eruption of violence coincided with a new round of talks between Syria and Israel. Attacks on Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo also may serve as a distraction for the more radical within al-Sharaa’s support base who oppose any form of deal-making with the Jewish state.
The situation in Aleppo requires a permanent solution. If it spirals out of control, it could trigger large-scale violence in Syria, further inflaming ethnic tensions between Sunni Arabs and Kurds. The only actor with both the leverage and interest to intervene diplomatically is the United States. Washington is uniquely positioned to bring the two sides back to the negotiating table over Aleppo and other longstanding issues, the resolution of which could create conditions for greater stability in Syria and beyond.
