Saudi Arabia has a Sudan problem. While the Sudanese civil war has taken on an element of a proxy war, Saudi Arabia’s chief protégé, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, suddenly refuses to play ball and obey his Saudi patrons.
At issue is the U.S.-backed ceasefire plan. At first, Burhan hailed President Donald Trump’s “declared intention … to bring about a fair and just peace in Sudan,” and he praised Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for urging Trump to intervene. Then, just a few days later, Burhan rejected the new plan, dismissing it as the “worst yet.” The chairman of the Port Sudan-based Transitional Sovereign Council accused U.S. envoy Massad Boulos of bias and parroting foreign talking points, and pledged to continue the “fight for Sudan’s survival.”
Half the population [of Sudan] needs lifesaving aid, over 10 million have been forced from their homes, and famine spreads.
Burhan’s rejection of the U.S. initiative seemingly surprised Mohammed bin Salman who spoke to Burhan shortly before he visited the White House. As part of the [Sudan] Quad, Saudi Arabia seeks a resolution that secures its own national security given that hundreds of miles of Sudanese coastline lie opposite Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. A protracted conflict widens a security vacuum, enables weapons proliferation, and opens space for extremist actors threatening the wider region.
Burhan’s response places Mohammed bin Salman in a tough spot following his meeting with Trump, especially after the rival Rapid Support Forces and its chief, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” announced they had accepted the humanitarian pause proposed by the Quad composed of United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.
The conflict between Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces and Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces is the world’s bloodiest, with far more killed and displaced than in Ukraine or Gaza. The Sudanese Civil War erupted in April 2023. Nearly three years later, half the population needs lifesaving aid, over 10 million have been forced from their homes, and famine spreads. The international community has echoed U.S. concerns and the “immediate urgency of de-escalating the violence and ending the suffering of the Sudanese people.” In his comments during the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum, Trump acknowledged the conflict “wasn’t on [his] charts,” but spoke of Mohammed bin Salman’s influence in addressing the issue.
Many in the region hope that Trump’s personal relations with Arab leaders could produce a ceasefire, if not a breakthrough, to resolve the conflict. The Quad and Boulos had reached an impasse as Burhan refused to engage. When Burhan proposed Qatar and Turkey as mediators, concern grew that Trump would accommodate Qatari Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani’s more Islamist, anti-Saudi, anti-United Arab Emirates agenda at the expense of the Quad. Interestingly enough, though, Trump neither mentioned al-Thani nor his ally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during his November 18, 2025, remarks.
Events following the November 2025 U.S.-Saudi summit in Washington have set high hopes for progress on Sudan’s peace track.
Burhan has remained staunch on his responses to the Quad. He continues to reject “biased” initiatives and accused Boulos of mimicking foreign governments to “impose dictates on the country.” During a November 24 address to high-ranking military officials, accompanied by his assistants, General Yasir Al-Atta and General Ibrahim Jabir, Burhan went so far as to say that he considered the ceasefire proposal “the worst paper to be presented, as it nullifies the existence of the Armed Forces [and] demands the dissolution of all security agencies.”
Such a stance presents mounting challenges for Saudi Arabia, which aims to play a major role in the region, fending off growing influence across the Horn of Africa and East Africa from Iran, Qatar, and Turkey. These three countries represent a triumvirate of terror-sponsorship that use proliferation, training, funding, and support for Islamist factions to expand their own footprints in Africa, much to the detriment of Quad members.
Events following the November 2025 U.S.-Saudi summit in Washington have set high hopes for progress on Sudan’s peace track. Hemedti’s unilateral ceasefire adds pressure on Saudi Arabia to convince Burhan to change his approach. There is a limit, however, to how far Saudi Arabia can let Burhan hew his own path in contravention of Saudi security and diplomatic interests. Burhan, however, must also deal with tensions within his ruling Transitional Sovereign Council as Islamist factions continue to reject foreign interreference, fearing a peace deal will marginalize their leadership. If Burhan feels Saudi Arabia no longer suits his purpose, there is a possibility he will seek a new patron among one or all three terror countries.
