The United States and Israel have had three main problems with the Islamic Republic of Iran: Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, its ballistic missile program, and its proxy networks around the region.
There are four main Iranian proxies or proxy groups: Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon; Hamas in the Gaza Strip and West Bank; the various Iranian-backed militias in Iraq like the Badr Corps, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hezbollah; and their political supporters like former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the Houthis in Yemen.
The public press may not have picked up on Turkey’s efforts to keep Hezbollah alive, but all regional intelligence services have developed damning evidence.
All are fearful right now. Israel’s beeper operation quite literally neutered Hezbollah’s rank-and-file cadre of fighters. This past autumn, I spent a couple of evenings in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahieh counting people missing eyes and fingers. Still, Hezbollah is far from defeated. Its military cadre has simply gone to ground. While it may no longer yield as many missiles, it can do significant damage with automatic rifles, snipers, and plastic explosives as in the first decades of its existence, nor has the United States done much to dry up its financial networks in West Africa and South America.
Diplomatically, the State Department errs by not demanding the ouster of Nabih Berri, who has protected Shi’i militant groups from his perch as speaker of the parliament. Berri is corrupt, his wife even more so, and hinders Lebanon’s freedom from Hezbollah’s yoke. It is time he departs for Russian exile or simply departs from the world. The Trump administration should also use its leverage with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to make clear that any continued supply of Hezbollah will end with Turkish agents in coffins. The public press may not have picked up on Turkey’s efforts to keep Hezbollah alive, but all regional intelligence services have developed damning evidence.
Hamas, too, is far less defeated than the White House and the Board of Peace may like to pretend. When battling a wildfire, the metric for success is to extinguish it, not put 90 percent of it out, declare victory, and then go home. So long as Hamas remains armed, it will seek to outlast President Donald Trump and use its survival as evidence of victory. Hamas’s goal is to outlast not only Trump, but also 90-year-old Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, currently in the third decade of his four-year term.
In Iraq, hedging against a possible Iran strike has become central to politics. When I was in Baghdad this month, pro-Iranian politicians and militia leaders had liquidated their assets, changed their cell phones, switched license plates on their vehicles, and even moved houses—all to avoid the possibility of being on the wrong end of an American drone. During the June 2025 war and the April and October 2024 Israel-Iran conflict, most Iraqi militia leaders stood down. The attack on Iran will fundamentally end the comeback effort of pro-Iranian former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Maliki was not always in Iran’s pocket, but cynically embraced Tehran and now should pay the price. As he doubles down, my advice to Iraqis close to him would be to stay at least 100 meters away for their own health and safety.
In each case—Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq—it is possible to eradicate Iran’s proxy network completely. But what about Yemen?
The Houthis may appear to be the second tier of Iranian proxy. Living far from Iran, and cut off from resupply should the Iranian regime fall, could the Houthis survive?
[The Houthis] have existed for decades without Iranian assistance and so will simply persist even if the Islamic Republic falls.
The answer is yes. Put aside Saudi Arabia’s embrace of Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood affiliate Islah, which often serves as a lifeline for the Houthis. The Houthis are simply the latest manifestation of Yemen’s pre-republic Imamate, the traditional leaders of the regime before Arab nationalists seized the government of North Yemen in 1962. While the Houthis have been happy to accept Iranian cash and weaponry, they do have more legitimacy in the mountainous interior. They have existed for decades without Iranian assistance and so will simply persist even if the Islamic Republic falls, especially now that the Saudis have kneecapped the Southern Forces that were the only internal force capable of defeating the Houthis.
The Iranians did not create every proxy; they co-opted many. Those they did create—Hezbollah, and many of the Iraqi groups—will wither. But those whose creation predates the Islamic Republic might manage to survive and will need a concerted effort to combat. In the case of the Houthis, this may mean both targeted bombing of Houthi leadership; a removal of ports like Hudaydah from de facto Houthi control; a formal designation of Yemen’s Islah party as a Foreign Terrorist Organization; and, lastly, meaningful diplomatic pressure, if not sanctions, on Saudi Arabia to stop co-opting and appeasing the Houthis in exchange for quiet.
