Tensions again flare across Yemen’s oil rich Hadhramawt, a South Yemeni governorate bordered by the Gulf of Aden to its south and Saudi Arabia’s Empty Quarter to its north. The fighting, which erupted on November 29, 2025, threatens to derail the 2019 United Nations-brokered power-sharing deal between Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government and the Southern Transitional Council that seeks southern secession. The dispute between Hadhramawt First Deputy Governor Amr bin Habrish, commander of the Hadramawt Protection Forces, and Brigadier General Saleh bin Al Sheikh Abu Bakr (Abu Ali al-Hadrami)’s Security Support Brigades also reflects deep divisions among southern factions.
The fighting, which erupted on November 29, 2025, threatens to derail the 2019 United Nations-brokered power-sharing deal.
Bin Habrish served as head of the Hadhramawt Tribal Alliance from its 2013 establishment, until his tenure ended with the November 29, 2025, inauguration of Sheikh Khaled Mohammed Al-Kathir. Bin Habrish long has positioned himself as a regionalist leader protecting Hadhramawt’s natural resources against outsider exploitation, and now targets the so-called al-Dhala’i and Yafa’i group, a reference to the Southern Transitional Council that today governs Aden and much of the rest of the former South Yemen. Bin Habrish’s area of influence extends from his base in Wadi Hadramawt along the Mahrah-Marib road, a region under the First Military Command of Yemen’s Internationally-Recognized Government. Southerners see First Military Command officers as an extension of Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah Party and often accuse the First Command of collaborating with Houthi rebels smuggling weapons and technology components from al-Mahrah along the Omani border to al-Jawf, a governorate in northern Yemen that the Houthis largely control.
The recent conflict escalated as the Hadramawt Protection Forces clashed with elements of the Security Support Brigades in the Ulaib Mountains area, between Wadi Hadhramawt and the coast, culminating in Bin Habrish’s capture of the Petro Masila oil and gas facilities near Ghayl bin Yamin in the southeastern part of the governorate. Later, Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi’s appointment of Salem Ahmed al-Khanbashi as governor of Hadramawt, a product of weeks of negotiations between political factions in Riyadh, exacerbated perceived threats to local interests. Events converged as parties jockeyed to leverage their positions vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, challenging the power balance between northern and coastal Hadhramawt.
Yemeni media initially described events as another manifestation of the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The two Gulf states and nominal allies back different factions in Sudan and perhaps also Libya. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman embraced Bin Habrish, while Abu Dhabi supported the Southern Transitional Council-aligned Abu Ali al-Hadhrami. This, however, may have been too simplistic a narrative. Subsequent reports suggested that pro-Southern Transitional Council troops had permission to enter the Wadi.
Such an agreement would be in the interest of both the Southern Transitional Council and arguably the Hadramis themselves, for three reasons. First, it would consolidate security control over the Hadhramawt province and prevent calls by some parties to divide the province into north and south. Second, such consolidation of control would simplify operations at major oil facilities to generate revenue for the Internationally Recognized Government. Third, improving security in Hadhramawt’s northern desert could strengthen counter-smuggling operations to weaken Houthi rebels, although this might require restructuring military commands to merge the First and Second Commands, a reform that would weaken al-Islah.
Improving security in Hadhramawt’s northern desert could strengthen counter-smuggling operations to weaken Houthi rebels.
The Hadramawt Tribes Alliance has also fractured following the scheduled election for leadership. Bin Habrish expected to be re-elected, but tribal leaders instead selected al-Kathiri, director-general of Tribal Affairs for Hadramawt Valley and Desert. Al-Kathiri’s election grants the Southern Transitional Council direct influence and deters potential dissent by tribal elements opposed to the Internationally Recognized Government, the Southern Transitional Council, and the leadership in Mukalla, the provincial capital and South Yemen’s second-largest city.
In response to the crisis, al-Alimi and Governor al-Khanbashi met with their respective security councils on December 1, calling for Bin Habrish to withdraw his forces from Petro Masila to enable the energy facility to resume operations. Bin Habrish stands to be the biggest loser; he could now lose the deputy governorship in addition to the Hadramawt Tribes Alliance presidency, though too great a marginalization could lead Bin Habrish’s Hadramawt Protection Forces and tribal elements opposed to al-Kathiri to fight for their own survival.
Still, the biggest winner at present are forces allied with the Southern Transitional Council, which now seem to move without resistance from the Marib-Hadhramawt border in the west along the N5 road through al-Mahrah toward the border with Oman.
If al-Islah has indeed lost northern Hadhramawt and the Houthis have lost access to weaponry smuggled from Oman through Al-Mahrah to Al-Jawf, then there could be new tension within the Presidential Leadership Council as Al-Islah seeks to lick its wounds and recover its power. While the November 2025 U.S. designation of the Muslim Brotherhood did not mention its Yemen affiliate, U.S. pressure could consolidate Islah losses and help expand stabilizing Southern Transitional Council control over even more of South Yemen.
