The Sudanese civil war remains the world’s bloodiest. Perhaps 26 million across Sudan require humanitarian assistance, and nearly 10 million displaced Sudanese need shelter and health care, with the risk of famine growing.
Delays on a ceasefire agreement continue to deepen suffering across Sudan. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council, dismissed the joint communique issued by the United States, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, which together form the so-called Quad that coordinates policy toward Sudan.
Whether Burhan’s aim is to force Trump to expand the Quad or simply replace the group with Qatar and Turkey is unclear.
During a visit to Doha, Burhan instead proposed that Qatar and Turkey should mediate between himself and rival Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti. Burhan’s statement that the Quad’s communique “does not concern us” challenges Quad members. Burhan’s stance cements his alliance with Islamists as U.S. and Quad members’ concerns grow over “violent extremist groups linked to or aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Burhan’s latest move seeks to leverage both Qatar’s relationship with President Donald Trump, who has befriended Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, and Trump’s affinity and friendship with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Burhan hopes to counter-balance both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while simultaneously bolstering Egypt’s military role in the Sudanese conflict. As a member of the Quad, Egypt hopes to strengthen its profile in the region and use relations with Burhan and Qatar to gain diplomatic support for Egypt’s disputes with both Ethiopia and Israel. Whether Burhan’s aim is to force Trump to expand the Quad or simply replace the group with Qatar and Turkey is unclear.
Burhan’s proposal to boost two supporters of Sudan’s own Islamist movement coincided with statements from Islamist leaders like Ali Ahmed Karti, Sudan’s former foreign minister, who denounced the Quad’s “blatant interference in Sudan’s internal affairs.” At the same time, the Sudanese National Forces Coordination, a coalition of armed groups supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces that Burhan theoretically commands, accused the Quad of “unacceptable bias,” since Burhan and Islamist factions remain entrenched in denying Hemedti’s rival Rapid Support Forces a seat at the table.
While Burhan’s Transitional Sovereign Council managed to take Khartoum in March 2025, its de facto government remains based 500 miles away in Port Sudan. The Council’s military arm, the Sudanese Armed Forces and Islamist militias such as the Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade and Shield Forces, have suffered defeats in recent weeks. Both tensions and internal pressure to curb foreign intervention of rival powers grow within the military-Islamist alliance.
The flow of weapons has diversified as Burhan expands his alliances with both Yemen’s Houthis and Pakistan.
Recent setbacks suffered by Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces have raised the urgency for the group to procure weapons like drones from Iran and elsewhere. The flow of weapons has diversified as Burhan expands his alliances with both Yemen’s Houthis and Pakistan. Qatar’s role arming the Sudanese Armed Forces has been more discreet, including an alleged airdrop around October 7, 2025, supposedly facilitated by Doha. Some observers say Qatar’s role in the conflict in Sudan continues the proxy war with Arab rivals in support of Islamist groups.
Burhan’s newfound urgency for mediation may also reflect a need to deflect attention from atrocities committed by the Sudanese Armed Forces. Observers attributed a November 6, 2025, drone strike on a convoy near the Chadian border to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Rapid Support Forces claimed the convoy carried humanitarian supplies for the Al-Fashir region. The drone strike followed reports of three previous strikes on United Nations convoys in Millet, Koma and Nyala, all held by Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces.
Washington faces challenges as Burhan raises the stakes. Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior adviser on Arab and African affairs, says “warring sides had ‘agreed in principle’” to discuss a ceasefire, while reports claim the Sudanese Armed Forces has “repeatedly said it wants to continue fighting.” Boulos must now avoid falling in Burhan’s trap. If the United States is to end the Sudanese war, it must set ceasefire priorities within the current framework before expanding the table to include Qatar and Turkey, lest it cause further delays or empower states for whom empowering an Islamist government trumps efforts to end the civil war.
