Mixed U.S. Signals Meet Iran’s Bid to Control Hormuz Access

As the United States sends mixed signals about the trajectory of the war with Iran, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has outlined Tehran’s strategy to leverage its control over the Strait of Hormuz to extract concessions from countries seeking safe passage for their vessels.

In an interview with Japan’s Kyodo News on March 20, 2026, Araghchi emphasized that the Strait is not closed but, in effect, under Tehran’s discretion. “We have not closed the Strait. It is open,” he said, adding that Tehran is prepared to facilitate the transit of Japanese vessels and that talks with Tokyo are ongoing.

At the same time, President Donald Trump said Friday that the United States is nearing its objectives in the conflict and is considering scaling back military operations. He urged countries that rely on the Strait of Hormuz to assume responsibility for securing it. “The Hormuz Strait will have to be guarded and policed, as necessary, by other nations who use it—the United States does not,” Trump wrote in a post.

Many countries—including members of the European Union, Japan, and South Korea—may prefer to negotiate arrangements with Tehran, rather than commit to an open-ended military effort to secure the waterway against Iran’s will. Such a scenario would hand Tehran a powerful new tool: the ability to control access to a vital global energy route and exert sustained pressure on both regional neighbors and industrial economies. This outcome would undercut the objectives of the U.S.–Israeli campaign and create a new strategic reality favorable to Iran.

Trump’s remarks may reflect posturing in response to allied reluctance to deepen military involvement. Yet signals remain contradictory. On March 20, 2026, reports indicated that the Pentagon is deploying additional ground forces to the region, potentially pointing to contingency plans for direct intervention in the Persian Gulf—whether to neutralize threats in the Strait of Hormuz or secure key energy infrastructure such as Iran’s Kharg Island terminal. Mixed messaging also may be aimed at calming markets, as major indices continue to slide.

A March 20 statement ascribed to Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new supreme leader who has not been seen on camera or video since his father was killed on February 28, was a traditional message on the occasion of the Persian New Year, which his father usually delivered by a televised address. The statement barely made references to Tehran’s position on the war or reaching a settlement with the United States. This did not radiate a strong central leadership and sounded more like a sermon than Ali Khamenei’s speeches had.

Most Iranian observers and social media influencers believe that the new supreme leader is either dead or injured and others are issuing statements in his name. Some openly expressed skepticism that the statement might have been written by AI and included errors in quoting the Quran. One anonymous but popular Persian account with more than 200,000 followers claimed that Mojtaba died recently in the hospital while in a coma.

President Masoud Pezeshkian also released a brief Persian New Year video, which appeared to underscore the strain on the leadership. Filmed in what seemed to be a makeshift bunker, the recording suffered from poor audio and video quality. His subdued delivery offered little sense of confidence or direction.

Airstrikes continued as Iranians marked the New Year, with residents reporting multiple large explosions in and around Tehran.

The U.S.–Israeli campaign has inflicted extensive damage on Iran’s military and security infrastructure. Strikes have targeted a broad array of assets, significantly degrading naval capabilities, missile production, air defenses, and key industrial and military sites, including nuclear- and drone-related facilities. Numerous senior commanders have been killed, and the regime’s capacity to sustain missile and drone operations has been sharply reduced. Taken together, these developments suggest a shift from offensive operations to a more constrained, attritional posture, with limited prospects for the rapid recovery of regime capabilities.