It’s Time for Oman to Close the Door on the Houthis

Oman, like Qatar, likes to position itself as a mediator, upon whom all sides can rely. Whereas Qatar carved out an intermediary role with both the Taliban and Hamas, Oman has sought to position itself as the go-to mediator for Iran and the Houthis.

Jake Sullivan, then a confidant to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, traveled secretly to Muscat to begin the process that would culminate in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He seized upon am Iranian offer that a bipartisan array of U.S. predecessors dismissed as uncertain in its origins and coming via Iranian officials who could not shape the portfolios they sought to discuss.

After the Houthi capture of Sanaa in 2014, Muscat hosted Houthi negotiators and spokesmen both to negotiate and to represent the group to the outside world. A Houthi presence in Muscat enabled other activities as well. Just as the Taliban office in Qatar enabled the Taliban to launder funds, the Houthi presence in Muscat enabled the Iranian-backed rebel group to coordinate arms shipments. While Oman denies involvement, U.S. intelligence complained and their Omani counterparts cracked down on Iranian weapons-smuggling overland across the Oman-Yemen border. In 2022, the Omanis cracked down, though when the focus moved on, many of the Houthi and Yemeni tribal networks resumed their smuggling.

While Omani diplomats depict their position as virtuous—and, perhaps, they sincerely wish that to be true—there comes a point when platforming a group uninterested in peace makes the host part of the problem. With Houthi missiles hitting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq must conclude that he is not advancing peace but, rather, laundering a combatant’s excesses and imbuing it with legitimacy. Mohammad Abdulsalam, the Houthis’ chief negotiator and spokesman, has lived in Muscat for years; published reports continue to place him in the Omani capital as of September 2026.

If the Omani government were interested in peace, Muscat would expel the Houthis—perhaps to Saudi Arabia—with a statement that Oman will always offer its good offices for genuine mediation, but it will not allow any group to remain in Oman when that organization openly attacks other Gulf Cooperation Council members. If Oman does not, it signals that launching missiles at Riyadh’s international airport is acceptable.

Sending the Houthis packing would do more for peace than endless, insincere negotiations. It would establish a red line defining a limit to the behavior even Oman can tolerate. Only when the Houthis agree to abide by the rules of war should Oman—or any future mediator—privilege them with presence.

If Sultan Haitham and the Omani Foreign Ministry instead protect the Houthi presence, the Gulf Cooperation Council should consider suspending, if not expelling, Oman, and the United States should consider a cascade of coercion that begins with sanctioning Oman for any financial transaction in which Houthi representatives engage, culminating in designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Too many countries embrace mediation to bypass accountability, rather than to achieve peace. Oman’s tilt, if not sympathy, toward the Islamic Republic should disqualify it from a mediator’s role. To punish insincere mediators will improve future mediation, by forcing foreign ministries to recognize that they, too, have something at stake if they perform poorly or allow their clients to do so.

There is a lesson, too, for the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other countries opposing the Houthis: No country should engage a mediator that wants it to lose. Today, the Omanis do far more to preserve the Houthi problem than resolve it. This likely has been a deliberate choice on the Omanis’ part, one for which Muscat should be held accountable if it doubles down on the status quo.