Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa is scheduled to meet with President Donald Trump in Washington in November, the first visit by a Syrian leader to the White House. During the trip, al-Sharaa is set to sign an agreement to join the global coalition against the Islamic State.
With Syria at the center of the fight against the Islamic State, such an announcement seems like a welcome step. From a counterterrorism perspective, however, it is alarming. Al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda operative with ties to the Islamic State, toppled the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 with a coalition of Islamist and jihadist forces—groups that now constitute the core of his Syrian military. The Syrian president may have abandoned his extremist ideology, but many factions within the military—including thousands of foreign fighters—continue to adhere to jihadist beliefs.
Al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda operative with ties to the Islamic State, toppled the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 with a coalition of Islamist and jihadist forces.
When al-Sharaa’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham controlled Idlib province in northwestern Syria, it ruled with an iron fist, suppressing all other groups. Yet the enclave became a haven for many fleeing Islamic State fighters and their families. In fact, Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a U.S. raid in Idlib during Trump’s first term, and his successor, Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi, met the same fate there. Several other top Islamic State leaders were targeted and killed by U.S. forces in areas under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham control.
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Islamic State terrorists expanded in parts of the country. This was not only due to a security vacuum but also because many soldiers in the new Syrian military tolerate the Islamic State’s presence or at least do not view it as a serious threat. Thus, despite Damascus’s attempts to cooperate with the U.S. military in targeting Islamic State militants, this has remained limited in scope and effectiveness.
For the Sharaa government, a formal partnership with the U.S.-led coalition would serve as another means to consolidate power and project legitimacy domestically and abroad. But Syria’s military in its current form is not an effective fighting force. It lacks professional doctrine, discipline, and organization. Many disparate factions that are part of the military still operate with a militia-like structure and mindset. Its members’ and top officers’ loyalties lie not with the state but with militia leaders, and in some cases, directly with Turkey, a coalition member that has shown little interest in countering the Islamic State in Syria.
Syria’s renewed ties with Russia are another reason why Damascus is unlikely to be an effective partner in the anti-Islamic State coalition, even if there were political will to cooperate. With Syria announcing that it will honor all previous deals with Russia, Moscow will maintain its involvement in the Syrian military. This makes the Syrian government less reliable, especially in terms of intelligence sharing and joint operations with the U.S. military.
[Washington] must ensure that its longtime partner, the Syrian Democratic Forces, remains intact in any integration with the Syrian military.
If Syria is to be an effective counterterrorism partner, Damascus must give a larger role to the Kurdish-led, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, which has been the major element of the U.S.-led efforts to combat the Islamic State over the past decade. With direct U.S. support, the Syrian Democratic Forces has established specialized counterterror units that could and should play a central role in a national capacity beyond northeast Syria.
The Syrian Democratic Forces, which controls nearly one-third of Syria’s territory, also holds thousands of Islamic State fighters and their families, including foreign nationals, in multiple detention centers and camps. If Syria formally joins the coalition, responsibility of managing these facilities would fall to the Syrian government. However, Damascus lacks the necessary capabilities, making Syrian Democratic Forces integration more important. With many countries reluctant to repatriate their citizens from these camps, any shift in security dynamics on the ground could create yet another counterterrorism challenge for the United States and its partners.
If Washington’s goal in bringing Syria into the coalition against the Islamic State is to stabilize Syria and reduce the U.S. military footprint in that country, it must ensure that its longtime partner, the Syrian Democratic Forces, remains intact in any integration with the Syrian military. The United States should also press Damascus to allocate key positions within the military to Syrian Democratic Forces commanders, particularly those specialized in counterterrorism. Only then would Syrian membership in the coalition represent a sensible step toward long-term stability for Syria and beyond.
