The decision by Syria’s new authorities to integrate foreign jihadists into the country’s military has been a major objective for interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa since he took power in Damascus following the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024. What is significant now is approval from the United States—a reversal from its position as recently as May 2025, when Washington opposed granting senior positions in the government to foreign fighters.
President Donald Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa in Riyadh last month undermined that position. As Trump announced the removal of U.S. sanctions on Syria, he urged the Syrian leader to “Tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria”—a message that contrasted to the concessions granted.
Some 3,500 foreign fighters—primarily Muslim Uyghurs from China and Central Asia—will be incorporated into a newly-established unit within the Syrian military.
Regardless of the shift in the U.S. position, Syria was never likely to comply with the demand of expelling its foreign jihadist allies. After all, al-Sharaa and his government view these fighters as instrumental in the overthrow of Assad, believing that granting them Syrian citizenship and positions within the military is a justified reward for their contributions. A U.S. blessing for such a move could prove costly—both in terms of Washington’s credibility in counterterrorism efforts and the potential long-term stabilization of Syria and the broader region.
Under the integration plan, some 3,500 foreign fighters—primarily Muslim Uyghurs from China and Central Asia—will be incorporated into a newly-established unit within the Syrian military. These extremist fighters previously operated under the banner of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the al-Sharaa-led Islamist faction that played the leading role in the offensive that toppled Assad. The Uyghur militants belong to the Turkistan Islamist Party, an Al Qaeda-linked group seeking to establish an Islamic emirate in China’s Muslim-majority Xinjiang region. The Turkistan Islamist Party became a key actor in the Syrian conflict after its fighters entered the country from Turkey. The group also has presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Due to the foreign jihadists’ allegiance to al-Sharaa, Thomas Barrack—the U.S. ambassador to Turkey who simultaneously serves as Trump’s special envoy to Syria—advocates for integrating them into a state-led framework, believing it to be a pragmatic means to contain and manage their activities. This is naïve.
For one, such integration would hinder efforts to build a unified, professional military in post-Assad Syria. With conscription abolished, ordinary Syrian youths are likely to resist enlisting in a force dominated by foreign jihadists. Over the long term, this dynamic could pose a danger of entrenching extremist influence within Syria’s military institutions.
[Ahmed al-Sharaa] seeks to shape the military and other state institutions in ways that will secure his political influence beyond the transition.
Like the Assads before him, al-Sharaa aims to build a military loyal to his leadership. During this transitional period, he seeks to shape the military and other state institutions in ways that will secure his political influence beyond the transition. Integrating his jihadist allies into the military could serve two purposes for al-Sharaa: It allows him to appease them while simultaneously attempting to curb their own ambitions. In any case, this strategy carries risks for al-Sharaa himself, because it could empower actors who later may challenge his authority or undermine the coherence of the military.
These extremists maintain ties with terrorist groups throughout the region. Incorporating them into Syria’s defense apparatus risks legitimizing not only their activities but also those of affiliated terror networks beyond Syria’s boundaries. The dangers they pose are transnational in scope and scale, ranging from the potential export of jihadist ideology to the reactivation of global terror recruitment efforts.
Normalizing the role of terrorist organizations within state structures could also undermine U.S.-led international counterterrorism efforts at a time when threats from terrorist groups remain high in Syria and across the broader region. Examples from Gaza and elsewhere demonstrate that attempts to domesticate terrorist groups with the hope of moderating them are consistently ineffective.
In the Syrian context, if the United States cannot control political and military dynamics, it should, at minimum, distance itself from policies that are likely to backfire.
