On August 17, 2026, Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service forces arrested Abbas al-Yaqoubi, a senior Harakat al-Nujaba figure and intelligence official within the Popular Mobilization Forces, after a pursuit that began in Jurf al-Naddaf, south of Baghdad.
According to Iraqi security information, Yaqoubi was the main suspect in attacks targeting neighboring countries, including recent strikes on Saudi Arabia. Security forces first tried to arrest him inside a Nujaba facility in Jurf al-Naddaf but clashed with armed members of the group. The Iraq Counter-Terrorism Service continued tracking him until detaining him in Dhi Qar under judicial orders.
The institution whose chief was portrayed as a possible militia target closed the case of a senior militia figure amid mounting political and security pressure.
Within hours, the arrest became a political and security crisis. Militia-linked actors threatened escalation, with some warning that Baghdad could “burn” if Yaqoubi remained in custody. Roughly two days later, the Popular Mobilization Forces announced that the judiciary had dismissed the charges and released him.
Intelligence information had also pointed to an alleged plot to assassinate Faiq Zaidan, head of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council, who had backed state control over weapons. The government has not publicly presented evidence establishing the plot or identifying those behind it.
The contradiction was clear. The institution whose chief was portrayed as a possible militia target closed the case of a senior militia figure amid mounting political and security pressure. After his release, Yaqoubi held a press conference and attacked the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. He accused U.S. Envoy Tom Barrack of plotting against the factions and provoking internal conflict. Militia-aligned media followed by accusing the intelligence service of working for the United States and Israel.
The intelligence service was already in militia crosshairs. On March 21, 2026, a drone struck the service’s Baghdad headquarters, killing one officer and wounding another. There has been no public finding of those responsible.
On August 11, Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani met with militia leaders, Popular Mobilization Force officials, and Coordination Framework figures in Baghdad. Iraqi sources said he drew red lines: no surrender of militia arsenals, no armed confrontation with the state, and a negotiated formula that would preserve the factions’ structures. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf later joined the discussions. Proposals included freezing arsenals, hiding them, or temporarily moving some weapons—even into Iran—to avoid confrontation with the government.
Factions willing to surrender some weapons have handed them to the Popular Mobilization Forces, rather than the army or Interior Ministry. Yet the line between Popular Mobilization Forces facilities and factional infrastructure is blurred, an overlap acknowledged by Popular Mobilization Forces chair Falih al-Fayyadh. Senior officials within the commission retain organizational links to armed groups involved in the disarmament debate. Moving a missile from a faction’s warehouse to a Popular Mobilization Forces warehouse changes little if the same commanders, fighters, communications networks, financing structures and loyalties remain intact.
Militias do not need an open confrontation to impose limits on the government; they need only to raise the political and security costs until the state retreats.
Prime Ministers Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani also promised to bring weapons under state control. Those pledges proved unenforceable when they confronted the militias’ political and coercive power.
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has tried to go further. Yet his first serious test was minor: It involved one commander from one faction and ended with Zaidi’s surrender and the militia leader’s release, while Tehran moved to promote a compromise that would prevent threats to militia structure. Zaidi’s government is not facing a technical question over where missiles are stored. It is facing a test of state authority.
The Yaqoubi affair showed that militias do not need an open confrontation to impose limits on the government; they need only to raise the political and security costs until the state retreats.
Washington should stop measuring Baghdad by its promises and start judging it by what it can enforce. If U.S. support continues without consequences for retreat, it will not strengthen Baghdad. It will reinforce an order in which militias draw the red lines.
