“The new crusaders have been defeated.” With this phrase, echoing language used by the Islamic State to describe the United States, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, secretary-general of Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah, celebrated Republicans’ defeat in the midterm elections. He hailed the outcome as a victory for Iran and the “axis of resistance,” congratulated Iran’s leadership, invoked the “unity of fronts,” and called for a change of political course in Iraq.
Iraqi political and media figures close to Iran welcomed the Republican losses. Commentator Iyad al-Samawi declared that Iran had achieved a sweeping victory as President Donald Trump’s room for political and military maneuver narrowed. Salah al-Arabawi, head of the Wa’ai Party, said Tehran had blocked its opponents without closing the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian embassy in Baghdad posted a video mocking Trump.
Commentator Iyad al-Samawi declared that Iran had achieved a sweeping victory as President Donald Trump’s room for political and military maneuver narrowed.
An unnamed official in one of the ruling Coordination Framework’s leaders’ offices said Iran-aligned forces had hoped for precisely this result. Some factions, he suggested, might use Trump’s confrontation with Congress to expand their activities.
Yet Iran’s regional allies suffered some of their harshest setbacks under President Joe Biden. His presidency saw Israel’s war in Gaza, the killings of senior Hamas and Hezbollah leaders—including Ismail Haniyeh, Hassan Nasrallah and Yahya Sinwar—and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, all of which diminished Tehran’s regional influence.
U.S. forces also killed Kata’ib Hezbollah commander Abu Baqir al-Saadi in Baghdad in 2024 and struck other Iran-backed armed groups. That record complicates the enthusiasm for Democratic gains.
Republicans, meanwhile, were the ones who overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003, enabling Iraqi parties long based in Iran to enter government. Their relationship with those forces later turned hostile. Trump ordered the strike that killed Qods Force chief Qassem Soleimani and Deputy Chairman of Popular Mobilization Committee Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020, and authorized direct attacks on Iran during his second term.
According to the Pentagon, Iran-backed militias killed at least 603 American service members in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. Yet Washington continued working with political alliances containing parties linked to Tehran, even as it confronted armed groups operating within the same political environment.
Democrats also helped consolidate the existing order. In 2010, Barack Obama’s administration accepted a deal that kept Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister, despite Ayad Allawi’s list winning more parliamentary seats. Iran also intervened to support Maliki, and successive U.S. administrations kept engaging with the same political elite.
Obama’s negotiations with Tehran later produced the 2015 nuclear agreement. To Iraqi critics of U.S. policy, these choices suggest that Washington prioritized accommodation with established parties over challenging Iranian influence.
Many Iraqis see the United States less as a succession of Democratic and Republican administrations than as a power capable of reshaping their country’s political trajectory. That view deepened when Washington continued dealing with Iraq’s ruling parties after the 2019 protests, during which Iran-backed forces killed hundreds of demonstrators demanding an end to corruption, sectarian patronage, and foreign interference.
Many Iraqis see the United States less as a succession of Democratic and Republican administrations than as a power capable of reshaping their country’s political trajectory.
Iraq’s latest elections offered another chance to reconsider that approach, at a time when Iran was weakened by regional defeats. Trump opposed Maliki’s return but welcomed businessman-turned-politician Ali al-Zaidi, another candidate backed by the same Coordination Framework, hosting him at the White House and praising their relationship. Zaidi’s government has yet to dismantle armed networks, even after attacks on Saudi Arabia originated in Iraq amid reports of Iranian involvement and local support.
American voters’ rejection of Republicans was not a vote for Iran. The war, living costs, and domestic policy also shaped their choices. But the response of Iran-aligned groups in Iraq shows how Iran-backed militias view divisions in Washington as opportunities to strengthen their own positions.
Hamidawi’s castigation of Americans as “new crusaders” makes no distinction between Democrats and Republicans. It portrays America as an ideological enemy regardless of who governs it. That is worth remembering when American politicians believe that one party or the other can convince their Iran-backed opponents to make peace.
