Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Leak Dirt on Each Other and on Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi

The Iraqi Government Has Extended the Deadline for Disarmament of Iran-Backed Militias Until June 2027

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in Berlin in October 2026.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in Berlin in October 2026.

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Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Iraqi militia, said that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi knew who had financed the drones and rockets fired at Israel during the Gaza war and claimed that Zaidi still owed them $5 million for their efforts and actions.

On November 7, 2026, Kata’ib Hezbollah security official Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, addressing al-Zaidi directly, said the prime minister knew who provided the money, who transferred it, and who guaranteed the transactions. He claimed the militia possessed receipts. Al-Assaf also accused al-Zaidi and his family of amassing more than $13 billion through government contracts and of encouraging attacks on the Khor Mor gas field in Iraqi Kurdistan to pressure Emirati investors.

Kata’ib Hezbollah security official Abu Mujahid al-Assaf ... said the prime minister knew who provided the money, who transferred it, and who guaranteed the transactions.

The accusations followed government measures targeting businesses linked to armed factions. On November 5, al-Zaidi ordered Iraq’s Military Industrialization Authority to deal with manufacturers rather than middlemen. The government then canceled contracts involving three companies at Mosul International Airport.

That same day, media figures associated with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Iran-backed militia led by Qais al-Khazali, circulated allegations about companies registered to the children and relatives of Kata’ib Hezbollah leader Ahmad al-Hamidawi.

Among the companies they named were Al-Taawun Company for Trading and Supplying Foodstuffs; Ard al-Masal, which deals in trade and transport; the Babylon Company, which works in trade and real estate; Raw’a and Alam Company for trade and investment; the Mara’i Company for agricultural and livestock; Ayadi Al-Khair Company, a foreign labor employment agency; and the Yanabi’ Al-Jinan Contracting Company, operating in trade, transportation, tourism, real estate, and contracting. They also identified al-Jabal al-Akhdar, which allegedly held contracts to purchase fuel oil from Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization.

Iraqi security forces are stationed by the Freedom Monument in Baghdad's Tahrir Square in February 2024.

Iraqi security forces are stationed by the Freedom Monument in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square in February 2024.

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The dispute exposed a growing rivalry between two powerful Iran-backed factions. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq has sought to expand its influence over government institutions, security positions, and state contracts. Kata’ib Hezbollah has retained independent armed forces and territorial control, particularly in Jurf al-Sakhr, a subdistrict of the Babil governorate.

On November 8, Saud al-Saadi, a lawmaker from Kata’ib Hezbollah’s political wing, Hoquq, demanded information about al-Zaidi’s wealth. An arrest warrant issued months earlier for Hussein al-Hamidawi, reportedly the son of Kata’ib Hezbollah’s leader, also surfaced. That day, a drone attack halted production at the Khor Mor gas field, operated by the United Arab Emirates’ Dana Gas, disrupting electricity in Iraqi Kurdistan.

On November 9, a 19-page Iraqi intelligence report leaked, describing suspected oil smuggling in Jurf al-Sakhr. It included satellite imagery showing tanker movements, storage facilities, and suspected pipeline breaches between 2021 and 2026. Kata’ib Hezbollah-linked forces have controlled Jurf al-Sakhr since recapturing from the Islamic State in 2014. Thousands of displaced residents have been unable to return, while government security forces face restrictions on entering the area. Al-Zaidi ordered an investigation and dispatched security forces toward Jurf al-Sakhr. The operation was subsequently suspended after Kata’ib Hezbollah threatened to confront forces entering without its approval.

On November 12, al-Zaidi met for more than three hours with Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, Popular Mobilization Forces chairman Faleh al-Fayyadh, and Popular Mobilization Forces chief of staff Abdul Aziz al-Mohammadawi, known as Abu Fadak, who is also a senior Kata’ib Hezbollah commander. The meeting sought to prevent an armed confrontation and negotiate access for government investigators.

Al-Mohammadawi had previously challenged al-Zaidi’s orders to bring weapons under state control. In a video, he openly defied the prime minister’s disarmament efforts, declaring that the militias would never surrender their weapons and daring anyone to try to take them.

Washington designates Kata’ib Hezbollah a terrorist organization and has pressed Baghdad to place weapons under state control.

On November 13, an investigative committee entered Jurf al-Sakhr, accompanied by government troops. It included representatives from 11 government and security institutions, including the Counter Terrorism Service, federal police, Oil Ministry, and Integrity Commission. However, the government placed the committee was under the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces’ Security and Discipline Directorate, rather than under an independent military commander.

The investigators met militia commanders before beginning their inspection. A video appeared to show a militia member ordering an army colonel to provide the cameraman’s identification. The visit proceeded under negotiated arrangements that restricted independent government access and filming.

Washington designates Kata’ib Hezbollah a terrorist organization and has pressed Baghdad to place weapons under state control. The Iraqi government, meanwhile, has extended the deadline for militia disarmament until June 2027. Iran-backed militias have followed Tehran’s strategy of buying time. They secured an extension beyond the November 3, 2026, U.S. midterm elections, then celebrated Republican losses and Democratic gains.

Meanwhile, Kata’ib Hezbollah continues to control territory, oil-related activities, and commercial networks. Iraq’s prime minister must negotiate with militia leaders merely to send government investigators into territory he theoretically governs. The negotiations prevented an armed confrontation, but they also allowed the militia to retain its control.

Ali Mahmoud Alabraz is an Iraqi journalist and researcher focusing on armed groups in Iraq and the Middle East. His work analyzes their dynamics and how they shape state authority, institutions, and society. Follow him on X @AliMahm49383150.
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