Michael Knights, adjunct fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and head of research and chief product officer at Horizon Engage, a strategic advisory firm, spoke to an October 26 Middle East Forum podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
On September 30, most U.S. forces withdrew from Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital, despite the penetration of Iraq’s military and government institutions by Iranian-backed Shiite militia forces known as the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces. The Trump administration has pressured Iraqi prime minister Ali al-Zaidi to dismantle these militias, which have yet to be disarmed. “While the Trump administration has pushed to compel the Iraqi prime minister to dismantle these militias, Iraqi officials announced that Baghdad did not view September 30, 2026, as a deadline to disarm these groups. And in fact, the Prime Minister Al-Zaidi announced that the militias won’t disarm until June 2027.”
The Trump administration has pressured Iraqi prime minister Ali al-Zaidi to dismantle these militias, which have yet to be disarmed.
Iranian penetration occurred despite the presence of 4,000 U.S. forces in Iraq stationed to counter Islamic State activities rather than the actions of neighboring Iran. Some residual forces will remain to protect “diplomatic points of presence” through air defense and low-profile training missions.
The most dangerous of the Iraqi Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces that attacked the U.S. forces are the Badr Organization and Kata’ib Hezbollah, the latter closely tied to the Iranians and sanctioned by the U.S. as a foreign terrorist organization. It is short-sighted to sanction Kata’ib Hezbollah while permitting the unsanctioned Badr organization to operate in plain sight because Badr is a feeder organization to Kata’ib Hezbollah. Since the Badr group “acts as an incubator and a troop generator and a drone and missile hider” for major terror groups, the U.S. should also designate Badr as a foreign terrorist organization.
Groups that are designated as foreign terrorist organizations are “being given a pass right now.” The head of Kata’ib Hezbollah recently met with Iraq’s prime minister. And in direct contravention of a U.S. directive, the leader of another designated group, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, is a terrorist and human rights abuser who became Iraq’s deputy prime minister and member of Iraq’s cabinet. This is as much as sign of Shia militia forces accelerating their activities in response to the U.S.’s formal withdrawal as it is an indication of the weakness of Iraq’s prime minister, who had told the Trump administration the militias would disarm by June 2027. The Iran-backed militias have effectively become a version of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp within Iraq’s ministries in that they have money-generating functions, including control of the Ministry of Oil.
The U.S. decision to withdraw from Iraq is part of President Trump’s campaign promise to end U.S. engagement in forever wars. Although the militias defiantly claim that they pushed the U.S. forces out of Iraq, the Hormuz Strait is open, Iran is blockaded, and the risk of a renewed escalation hangs in the balance. Aggressive U.S. sanctions also have teeth because Baghdad’s reliance on the U.S. to process Iraq’s income in dollars gives Washington some leverage to press the issue of disarmament.
The problem remains that Iran has taken over Iraq, “the fourth largest producer of oil in OPEC” that is generating more oil revenue than Iran is currently. Tehran is protective of its “piggy bank” and is shielding the Popular Mobilization Forces and all of its Iranian proxies in the country so that they can ultimately become self-financing. Iran uses Iraq to smuggle out its oil during the U.S. blockade and commingle Iranian oil with Iraqi oil, thereby branding it as Iraqi and ensuring that the oil revenue will find its way to the regime.
Iran uses Iraq to smuggle out its oil during the U.S. blockade and commingle Iranian oil with Iraqi oil, thereby branding it as Iraqi and ensuring that the oil revenue will find its way to the regime.
The U.S. is not getting the point across to al-Zaidi to be tougher and that “his future interest lies in doing the hard work with these militias.” Instead, the U.S. is opting for the short-term fix of giving al-Zaidi an out for keeping them quiet, “but in the long term it’s bad for America” and the region while the militias “metastasize and grow under the surface.” They are rejuvenating networks that were sanctioned as Iran smuggles its oil and goods in and out of Iraq. “Iran can forward-deploy weapons to be used against, for instance, Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline.” In essence, Iran is using Iraq “as a military launchpad, but also as an economic engine from which to extract value and do sanctions evasion.”
This situation will not change unless the Iraqi prime minister is backed by his own special forces, the U.S. military, both countries’ intelligence services, and the threat of U.S. sanctions. However, it is more likely that al-Zaidi will not take on Iran and its proxy militias, for to do so would put his life at risk. He could make superficial efforts to give the U.S. “a little win” by keeping the militias quiet and preventing them from hitting U.S. bases and Saudi targets. Going for the “big win,” such as reducing the militias’ power, is “high risk/high return,” and the Trump administration is not interested in that kind of commitment.
The consequence of the U.S. withdrawal for the Kurds, who are U.S. allies, is that the Iranians are targeting them in Iraqi Kurdistan with drones and missiles. The U.S. if needed would likely expand air patrols over Iraqi Kurdistan because “it’s the forward defensive depth of the U.S. bases in Jordan and Israel and the Eastern Mediterranean.” As for the Kurdish opposition in Iran, whose leaders have fled to Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership are harboring them and will not repatriate them as they will face certain death at the hands of the regime.
The U.S. should do its utmost to strengthen Iraqi-Saudi relations because Iraq is ethnically Arab, Kurdish, and Turkoman, not Persian. Iran tries to pull the Shiites in Iraq, many of whom do not want to be part of a Persian empire, into “the Persian sphere of influence and the Iran threat network.” The Iraqis are desperate to find alternative routes to exporting its oil through the Hormuz Strait, and the Saudis could offer Iraq a cheaper way to sell it. Riyadh could even provide a pipeline for Iraqi oil in the future, but the Saudis are risk-averse and fear that the Iraqi militias will fire drones and rockets at them.
There is also the issue of Turkey-Iraq relations and Iraqi Kurdistan which is geographically located between them. Turkey and Iraq could help each other via the underutilized pipeline that they share. Iraq needs the technical assistance and the investment that Turkey could provide, and in turn Iraq can provide for Turkey’s energy needs. Iraq could also provide a “secure southern flank” to help Turkey manage its Kurdish issue. Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, is working to bring the two together. “It’s such a no-brainer that Iraq should use its own existing pipeline to export its oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean, precisely as it was intended to do during the Iran-Iraq War, when Hormuz and southern Iraq [were] once again threatened by Iranian attacks.”
The Trump administration would do well to recognize “this is not a part of the axis of resistance you can ignore.”
On the surface, the militias staying quiet is good news, but it would not be due to any pressure from al-Zaidi. Rather, it would mean that the Iranian proxies calculated they could get more oil revenue out of Iraq if they hold their fire. Leaving the conflict with the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf countries to Iran and the Houthis would enable these proxies to keep their eye on “the big prize, controlling Iraq.” By playing the long game, the militias are consolidating their power so that they will be “too big for us to help remove.”
The Trump administration would do well to recognize “this is not a part of the axis of resistance you can ignore.” It is a well-funded and well-armed part of the axis that “in many ways is kind of replacing Lebanese Hezbollah.” If there are renewed attacks or even if there are no attacks, either is “bad news” because the Popular Mobilization Forces are adapting to avoid countermeasures. The coming year will tell, but “I think we took our foot off the gas at just the wrong moment.”
