Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, spoke to a November 2 Middle East Forum podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
Saudi Arabia is engaged in two conflicts: one with the Houthi side of the civil war in Yemen, and the other with Iran. Because the Houthis are an Iranian proxy, the Saudis consider both as part of a single conflict, but Riyadh’s approach to each differs.
Following the escalation of the Iran war in the region, the closing of the Hormuz Strait and the blockade of the the regime’s ships through the strait, Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia spiked during the summer of 2026.
Following the Houthis’ takeover of Sanaa and ouster of Yemen’s internationally recognized government in 2014, the Iranian proxy built a missile arsenal along the Yemeni-Saudi border that threatened Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Riyadh responded by becoming kinetically involved but could not dislodge the Houthis, a unified, battle-hardened force, from their base in Yemen’s highlands.
Following the escalation of the Iran war in the region, the closing of the Hormuz Strait and the blockade of the the regime’s ships through the strait, Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia spiked during the summer of 2026. The Houthis pursued their own goal, seeking “a bridge to Iran” to obtain planes and ships and build their own arsenal in Yemen to resupply themselves. Despite the blockade, Omani intelligence, penetrated by the regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), supplied the Houthis with equipment and spare parts from China through Oman.
The Houthis’ strategy against Saudi Arabia involves unleashing a swarm of drones, followed by cruise missiles, and finally, ballistic missiles. Air defenses are easily overwhelmed by this strategy, notwithstanding that the Saudis have effectively thwarted drone attacks by devising nets and scaffolding. Nonetheless, some missiles have gotten through, hitting airports as well as a Persian Gulf refinery.
Ayatollah Khamanei’s funeral served as the pretext for the Houthis’ attack against the Saudis. A number of Yemenis had wanted to attend the funeral of the slain cleric who was killed early in the war against Iran. Aware that planes from Iran to Yemen were filled with IRGC trainers, equipment, and military supplies, the Saudis bombed Yemen’s Sanaa airport. The Houthi attacks were designed to block the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and derail Riyadh’s ability to export its own oil through its East-West Pipeline.
Although its forces are proficient to some degree, in particular its air force, the kingdom cannot effectively defend itself because of its small population relative to its “very large territory.” Domestically, support for the kingdom remains strong. Saudi intelligence services effectively monitor internal threats. For the most part, the populace sees “this war is a major rallying cry” in support of Saudi nationalism and the kingdom. Its military, more capable in conventional warfare than in the contemporary way of war with drones and ballistic missiles, was deliberately kept weak during the 1950s and 1960s to preclude any military coup against the regime. Further plagued by a lack of coordination between military branches, its ineffectiveness was further compounded by a lack of institutions promoting merit rather than loyalty. “So, it’s a question of having the right incentives, the right institutions in place, which they don’t have, and they’re desperately trying to build.”
The kingdom’s Houthi foes in Yemen have proven formidable fighters from their territory. Viewed through a historical perspective of the armies who tried and failed to conquer it, “Yemen is sort of like Afghanistan, the graveyard of empires.” The Ottomans in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth centuries failed, as did the Egyptians, who were defeated after entering Yemen’s civil war in the 1960s.
Although the kingdom could easily have turned to jihadist fighters to counter the Houthis, Riyadh is unwilling to entertain the possibility of a potential fifth column turning against it.
The kingdom is averse to sending its own troops to do battle in Yemen, and Sudanese mercenaries it sent there did not fare well. To deter a land invasion of Houthis from the south and Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias from the north, the Saudis entered the Mecca Pact, a Sunni mutual defense treaty with Pakistan and Turkey. Those foreign troops, with the possible addition of Syrian soldiers, will defend the kingdom in such a scenario. Although the kingdom could easily have turned to jihadist fighters to counter the Houthis, Riyadh is unwilling to entertain the possibility of a potential fifth column turning against it.
The Houthis aim to take over Yemen and extort the Saudis for passage through the Bab-al-Mandeb strait by demanding billions in war reparations. Riyadh knows that any capitulation will open itself to endless blackmail. Iran seeks a similar arrangement for access through the Hormuz Strait. The Saudis fear a resumption of U.S. attacks against the Iranian regime because any retaliatory attack would target Saudi and Gulf states’ critical infrastructure. Among the network of energy, oil, and gas are vital water desalination plants which provide 90 percent of the region’s fresh water. This drives Riyadh’s different approach to the Iranian threat versus the Houthi threat. Negotiate with Tehran but diminish or defeat the Houthis and consign them to their base in Yemen’s highlands.
In a bid to negotiate with Iran, a Saudi advisor is in Beijing for a meeting with the Iranian representative. A rumored agreement between the U.S. and Iran, brokered by Qatar, would potentially include a Chinese guarantee of Iranian compliance. Reports include stages that could see the Hormuz Strait open, some sanctions lifted and the Iranian oil blockade removed. Saudi press reports the talks involve transfer of Iran’s enriched uranium to a third country and denial of enrichment beyond a minimal level.
While the Trump administration determines its next steps towards Iran in the wake of the midterms, the history of U.S.-Saudi relations has been characterized as “a structural relationship” in which the Saudi military is trained and equipped by the U.S., and the kingdom’s elite largely educated in the West. In an effort to diversify their oil-dependent economy, the kingdom is committed to developing America’s artificial intelligence by building data centers. The kingdom invests in America, not China, for the practical reason that “the American economy is the most liquid and the deepest of all economies and markets.” Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), along with the Saudi elite, speaks English and is entirely oriented towards America.
That is not to say that the relationship is not without its ups and downs. Although the vast majority of 9-11 hijackers were Saudi, the kingdom fiercely turned against al-Qaeda in the aftermath. Riyadh warned the U.S. not to invade Iraq based on the Saudis’ realistic fears of an Iranian takeover of that country. The kingdom also opposed President Obama’s policy of siding with Egypt’s Islamists and empowering the Muslim Brotherhood. What’s more, the Saudis were against Obama’s signing of the JCPOA with Iran.
Biden did an about face and courted the crown prince on bended knee following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent shock to the oil market.
President Biden, “beholden to the left of the Democratic Party,” doubled down on the kingdom by calling Saudi Arabia a “pariah” and undoing the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization. But Biden did an about face and courted the crown prince on bended knee following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent shock to the oil market. As part of his charm offensive, Biden offered the Saudis a variety of agreements if they would normalize relations with Israel. These agreements, negotiated but unsigned, would reappear during President Trump’s second term.
The Saudis were pleased with President Trump during his first term, during which the U.S. not only helped MBS secure his power to become crown prince, but also eliminated the head of the IRGC’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. The unsigned agreements drawn up by Biden were assumed by President Trump during his second term and extended to the Saudis “without having to normalize with the Israelis.” The Saudis are willing to entertain a staged process of normalization with the Israelis. That said, Riyadh requires “some sort of symbolic gesture towards the Palestinians and a Palestinian state” to placate elements in the kingdom who consider it important, even though the Saudis do not care what the final state looks like.
However, if the regime’s survival were at stake, and if aligning with Israel would be necessary to save it, the Palestinian question would “recede in importance.” Given Iran’s adherence to “scorched earth policy” in order to stay in power, the Saudis would similarly do what is necessary to survive.
While Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have normalized relations, it would make sense for the UAE to unite with Saudi Arabia in their joint battle against the Houthi threat from Yemen. Full cooperation between the two Gulf states seems unlikely because they are fierce competitors. The Omanis and the Qataris are pro-Iranian to one degree or another, but many of the Gulf countries are unaligned, and Iran plays on those divisions to its advantage.
The Arabs are eager to involve the Chinese as mediators and guarantors in negotiations with Iran. Beijing prefers to see a set-upon U.S. bogged down and weakened by the Iranian conflict because it serves China’s regional aims. Beijing sees Iran as its “strategic ally,” and as such still helps Iran and the Houthis. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries are angered, but China’s relationship with the Saudis is “a commercial transactional” one. Beijing knows that after the war, the Saudis will want to sell its oil, and China is loathe to replace the U.S. as enforcers of “freedom of navigation and shipping on the high seas.” After all, why place themselves at a disadvantage when “they much prefer the Americans do it because it’s costly and they’re free riders?”
While Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have normalized relations, it would make sense for the UAE to unite with Saudi Arabia in their joint battle against the Houthi threat from Yemen.
The Iranians and its IRGC can still extract resources through its militias and corrupt politicians in Iraq, but the Saudi economy has considerable reserves of cash and sells its oil at a premium. An unexpected silver lining for the Saudis has been the pause placed on their unrealistic giga projects that would have bankrupted the country.
The current reality is that Saudi Arabia faces a serious threat on three fronts–the Houthis in the south, the Iraqi Shia militias in the north, and Iran to its east. A Saudi commentator said, “this is the most existential threat the kingdom has faced since it was founded in 1932.” Priority one for the kingdom is survival.
