Efrat Aviv, associate professor in the Department of General History at Bar-Ilan University and a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), spoke to a September 15 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes her comments:
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024 “reshaped Turkey’s regional position” vis-à-vis its military, political, and long-term goals with its neighbors, the West, and Israel. During Syria’s civil war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aligned with Syria’s northern jihadi groups to topple Assad. Post-Assad, Ankara’s policy clashed with Washington’s because Erdoğan felt betrayed by U.S. support for the Syrian Kurds. Erdoğan’s main goal is to “prevent an independent Kurdish entity in northern Syria” as well as to “prevent separatist momentum among Kurds inside Turkey.”
Within Turkey, tensions between the more than three million Syrian refugees and the Turks are high, increasing domestic social, economic, and political pressure.
Within Turkey, tensions between the more than three million Syrian refugees and the Turks are high, increasing domestic social, economic, and political pressure. The cost of hosting the refugees has exceeded forty billion dollars. Erdoğan’s plans to resettle them in Syria’s north is stoking Europe’s fears. If Syria’s infrastructure is unable to support the massive number of those repatriated, even if they were confined to a Syrian safe zone dependent on the Turkish economy, the plan’s failure could trigger another flood of refugees across the continent into Europe.
Turkey’s aim to establish itself as a sub-regional power is fueling Erdoğan’s “neo-Ottoman vision” to fill the void left by a weakened Russia and a diminished Iran. “It wants the new Damascus to be more committed to Ankara than to Tehran or to Moscow,” thereby achieving a “strategic win” by striking a balance between Shiite Iran and Sunni power. In this new power dynamic, Erdoğan depicts himself as the benevolent “protector of Muslims around the world.” His plan is for Turkey to no longer be seen as the Ottoman empire of old, accused of colonialism and genocide, but as a new power and “a savior” conquering territory in Syria.
By crafting his image as a “humanitarian savior,” Erdoğan can frame his designs on Syria not only in terms of security, but as a moral and religious duty. This tack allows him to deflect Western criticism over human rights abuses in Turkey. As part of his “rapprochement diplomacy,” Erdoğan offered to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Israel and Hamas—a rich irony, given Turkey’s high levels of antisemitism. Despite his pretense as “a peacemaker with global influence,” Erdoğan’s intention is to serve Turkey’s interests. This is apparent from his contributions to tensions between Turkey and Greece over Eastern Mediterranean energy, to tensions between Turkey and Israel, and to tensions between Turkey and Syria’s Kurds.
Ankara’s Syrian ventures are not only a source of national pride, as indicated by the public rallies in Turkey supporting them, they also mute criticism of the country’s economic crises. Erdoğan’s justification of his push into Syria as a counter-terrorism fight against ISIS “functions as a pretext to expand Turkish influence.” Instead, Erdoğan expends resources purportedly dedicated to that effort to instead fight the Kurds and cooperate with Islamist factions to leverage his control in Syria. Turkey invested four hundred billion dollars in Syria—which it cannot spare—by pouring it into “construction, education, health, and infrastructure to secure long-term control.” The monies spent on large housing and industrial projects increase Syria’s economic dependence on Turkey and create profits “in the tens of billions” that flow back to Turkey.
Erdoğan’s justification of his push into Syria as a counter-terrorism fight against ISIS “functions as a pretext to expand Turkish influence.”
Erdoğan gambled that backing the Syrian rebels, who won, would position him as the “big winner” and enable him to demand that non-Turkish “foreign forces,” i.e. the U.S. and Israel, evacuate Syria. Israel, undeterred by Erdoğan’s power grab, deployed and maintains its forces on the Syrian side of the Golan. It also took steps to block any buildup of Hezbollah terror forces eager to fill the vacuum, or any Hamas training sites in Syria’s Afrin or Idlib province under Turkish control.
Israel’s traditional friendship with the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds is a hedge against Iran and ISIS as well as “a potential balance against Turkey.” Jerusalem and Ankara could well collide over this flash point, given Erdoğan’s antagonism toward the Kurds. Erdoğan’s rehabilitated image, intended to burnish his legitimacy with the West as a NATO member, still worries Western and European partners. They are indebted to Kurdish partners who waged a successful fight against ISIS. Although the U.S. gives Erdoğan room for his right to self-defense against terrorism, Ankara’s buildup in Syria creates a Turkish client still under the influence of the area’s jihadi groups. The worry remains that suppression of human rights in Syria under Turkey’s tutelage poses a threat to the Syrian Kurds.
The tension between Israel’s support for the Kurds and the Druze in Syria on the one hand, and Turkey’s support for the Syrian government and local Islamist organizations on the other, could well break into open conflict. Ankara can either become “regional leader and Sunni protector,” or it can make unilateral moves to undermine stability as an occupier, fueling new conflict among regional rivals.
