Last week, a defining geopolitical event unfolded in Benghazi, Libya, with implications that extend far beyond the immediate Maghreb theater. The visit of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, to meet with Major General Saddam Haftar of the Libyan National Army (LNA) resulted in a defense agreement valued between $4 billion and $4.6 billion. While Western attention remains fixed on conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Levant, this procurement represents a fundamental restructuring of the North African security architecture. It signals the effective collapse of the United Nations arms embargo and the emergence of a “South-South” military-industrial channel that operates independently of Western oversight or conditionality.
For the past half-decade, the operational tempo in Libya has been dictated by the prevalence of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), specifically the Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2, which proved decisive in repelling LNA advances on Tripoli in 2020. The introduction of the JF-17 Thunder (Block III) fundamentally alters this tactical equation.
While Western attention remains fixed on conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Levant, this procurement represents a fundamental restructuring of the North African security architecture.
The JF-17 Block III, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter co-developed by Pakistan and China, introduces capabilities previously absent from the LNA’s arsenal. Equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and compatible with PL-15 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, the platform is technically capable of detecting and engaging tactical drones and legacy aircraft from standoff distances. From a strategic perspective, this acquisition transitions the LNA from a force reliant on irregular mercenaries and asymmetric warfare to one possessing state-level air superiority capabilities.
Furthermore, the inclusion of 12 Super Mushshak trainer aircraft indicates a long-term institutional strategy. Rather than relying solely on external contractors or the Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) for air support, the LNA is investing in indigenous capacity building, establishing a pilot training pipeline that ensures operational sustainability independent of foreign proxies.
The transaction highlights a growing trend in global defense economics: the rise of alternative supply chains that bypass traditional Western and Russian monopolies. This deal is characterized by a “South-South” cooperation model, where a nuclear-armed South Asian power supplies a North African non-state actor (or quasi-state entity) without the political preconditions typically attached to Western arms sales.
For Pakistan, grappling with severe economic headwinds and a need for foreign currency, the sale represents a lucrative export opportunity that leverages its indigenous defense industry. For the LNA, it provides access to advanced military hardware without the diplomatic friction of navigating US or EU export controls. General Munir’s reference to Libya as a “land of lions” during his address to LNA officers serves to legitimize this partnership through a narrative of pan-Islamic solidarity rather than mere transactional commerce. This rhetorical framing seeks to elevate the LNA’s status from a militia to a sovereign partner in the eyes of the region.
Perhaps the most significant outcome of this agreement is the open challenge it presents to the credibility of international law. The United Nations Security Council has maintained an arms embargo on Libya since 2011, a measure theoretically designed to prevent the proliferation of heavy weaponry in the fractured state. However, the scale and publicity of the Pakistan-Libya deal suggest that this mechanism has lost its deterrent value.
Perhaps the most significant outcome of this agreement is the open challenge it presents to the credibility of international law.
Pakistani defense officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, have characterized the UN restrictions as a “paper embargo” that is “virtually non-existent”. This stark assessment underscores a reality where enforcement mechanisms—such as the EU’s Operation Irini—are bypassed via air corridors or direct government-to-government transfers that ignore maritime interdiction protocols. The lack of an immediate, high-level diplomatic censure from Washington or Brussels suggests a tacit acceptance of the new status quo, or perhaps a strategic paralysis born of competing priorities.
The Benghazi Accord marks a critical inflection point. The LNA’s acquisition of fourth-generation fighter aircraft does not merely escalate the potential for renewed conflict; it demonstrates the viability of a parallel international order where sanctions are disregarded and military capability is auctioned to the highest bidder. As the JF-17 fleet becomes operational, the strategic calculus for the Government of National Unity in Tripoli—and its international backers—must shift from containment to navigating a reality where the LNA possesses qualitative military parity, if not superiority. The era of the embargo is effectively over; a new phase of unbridled militarization in North Africa has begun.
Published originally on December 24, 2025.
