Mohamed Farid, Egyptian member of parliament and policy expert, previously served as deputy chair of the Egyptian Senate’s Committee on Human Rights and Social Solidarity. Farid spoke to a December 15 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
Cairo’s assessment of the Yemen file is that over the past few years, there has been a “strategic failure” in handling the Houthis and Iran. The destabilizing Houthi militia threatened international navigation, and the Biden administration’s decision in 2021 to remove them from the U.S. list of foreign terror organizations weakened deterrence by reducing political and economic pressure. That move, combined with a “poorly managed Iran file,” enabled the Houthis to expand from “a local insurgency into a strategic disruptor actor.” The intersection of inconsistent pressure, incoherent policy, and Iranian support led to the Houthis’ development of missiles and drones with the “ability to identify, track and target commercial vessels.”
Cairo’s assessment of the Yemen file is that over the past few years, there has been a “strategic failure” in handling the Houthis and Iran.
Despite repeated air strikes from the U.S. and the presence of allied naval power, “commercial shipping continues to avoid the Red Sea.” The Houthis launch from dispersed sites inside “a very fragmented state.” Their main support comes from Iran, and until this is addressed, these strikes are only a temporary fix. The Houthi militias “adapt faster than the conventional forces,” maintaining the ability to threaten “vast magnified spaces” despite missile and drone intercepts because it only takes a small number of missiles to “disrupt the global shipping decisions.” Absent a political solution, airstrikes risk reinforcing the Houthi narrative that the Houthis are acting in defense of Gaza by confronting the major powers. In a battle for “legitimacy,” the Houthis gain a “symbolic value of resistance.”
Not only does Egypt suffer economic repercussions from the loss of Suez Canal traffic, but any “missile fragment or drone debris” that lands near the Sinai will adversely impact tourism. Freedom of navigation requires a “coherent strategy agreed upon by the international and regional actors.”
The terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Somalia presents a similar challenge due to the lack of political stability there. The Al Shabab terrorist group in Somalia exploits “governance gaps and devalued authority and in [the] absence of any strong national center.” That is why Egypt places a premium on supporting Somalia to “strengthen the federal institution, consolidating security forces under national command and encouraging Somali actors to resolve the internal differences within a national framework.”
Although there are foreign military bases in the whole of Africa, stability remains elusive in light of prevailing poverty, “trafficking in humans, weapons, [and] illicit goods.” For example, Egypt disputes Ethiopia’s military presence in Somalia because “in order to pave the way for access to the Red Sea,” Ethiopia’s exploitation of racial and tribal tensions contributes to instability there. Egypt has engaged with Eritrea in “diplomatic and economic cooperation” in an effort to bring about regional stability. The latter’s extensive coastline along the Red Sea is of strategic importance in maintaining maritime security. These arrangements highlight the necessity for a responsible military presence supporting stability because “sometimes the intervention and unilateral military expansion would lead to more devastation and more instability.”
Sudan’s instability threatens Egypt’s national security with “cross-border criminal networks, gold smuggling, human trafficking, arms flow, [and] extremist movements.”
Finally, Sudan “represents one of the most dangerous scenarios that Egypt faces because it combines institutional collapse, militia violence, and direct spillovers.” The conflict there is between a national military institution and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which evolved from the Janjaweed militias who were engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Darfur. The integration of this Sudanese militia into the “stable political system without being dismantled first” would accelerate state collapse by entrenching violence into the system.
The consequences of this conflict are the millions of Sudanese refugees who fled into Egypt. Located in metropolitan cities, the basic humanitarian services of health care, schooling, and such provided by Egypt puts enormous pressure on the social services system. Aside from the human toll, Sudan’s instability threatens Egypt’s national security with “cross-border criminal networks, gold smuggling, human trafficking, arms flow, [and] extremist movements.”
The conflict will not be ended by partitioning Sudan into eastern and western areas. Rather, that would serve to “institutionalize the militia control. It would create permanent zones of instability and hotbeds for terrorism and instability and export violence across borders.” The resulting destabilization of Egypt’s national security would be unacceptable. “Militias and terrorist groups exploit weak states; fragmentation lead[s] to instability.” Only sustainable foundations bring order and stability. Cairo is consistent in its position of “trying to act as a stabilizing power in the region” to prevent “regional implosion.”
